While the Six Day War was forty-five years ago, I think an understanding of the events which led up to the hostilities, and its aftermath, is an essential element for understanding the current state of affairs in Israel and the Middle East.

And Michael Oren's book, "Six Days of War", appears to be an excellent source of information. Some books about military campaigns get bogged down in describing every platoon number, every company number, every battalion and regimental commander, adjutant, and every piece of ordinance and piece of equipment they used or had available. Oren's book seemed to contain the right mix of information on personnel, military, and political perspectives from the Countries involved, as well as for the regional major powers, i.e., the U.S. and Soviet Union.

While Oren is the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, and would naturally have a pro-Israeli perspective, I think he met his stated objective of trying to present a fair and even-handed perspective of this important part of MidEast history.
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This history of the Six Day War is extremely well written. Based on extensive research, this tale of the war reads better than most thriller/suspense novels I've read. It also presents data from both sides of the equation, though it obviously has a more pro-American / pro-Israeli stance when opinion is interjected into the retelling of events. If you want to know about the Six Day War, though, this is the book to use to acquaint yourself with it. ( )

I read this in a flash a few years ago. It isn't a social history nor is it investigative. It yields a basis for an ideology. I accept that. I just read this review http://www.ussliberty.org/orenbook.htm and it upset my indifference. What can I say? I'm exhausted. ( )

This is a fairly straight forward account of the war with a lot of focus on the three week build up and diplomatic efforts before the war. The book spends little time on the mission critical work of Israeli intelligence in disrupting the Arab communications and sending out false orders. This sowed never before seen chaos particularly with Egyptian front line commanders being falsely ordered to return to Cairo, leaving the men leaderless at the front. ( )

Oren's challenge was to weave together an accurate account of the Six Day War that covered many different perspectives from a myriad of sources. All sides of the conflict needed to be represented and not just from the perspective of battles and conflict. He needed to produce an account that was not only balanced and unbiased, but thorough in its investigation and analysis. This was accomplished through meticulous and extensive research. ( )

Opera avvincente, ricca di particolari e di citazioni. Non ritengo sia un libro di parte, certo, vengono esaltate le Forze Armate israeliane, ma considerando i fatti ritengo decisamente normale. Non mancano note critiche nei confronti della marina israeliana e a politici estremisti israeliani. Giudizio molto positivo e consiglio la lettura a chiunque voglia farsi un'idea della polveriera Mediorentale. ( )

Oren describes the sadly destructive momentum that developed in the weeks leading up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. ( )

Er du opptatt av hva som er bakgrunnen for konfliktene i Midtøsten vil denne boken gi deg mange svar. Den handler om opptakten til krigen mellom Israel, Egypt, Jordan og Syria, og selvsagt selve krigens gang. Boken er tildels enorm på detaljer. Et mangfold av informasjonskilder gjør boken svært troverdig.

Her får du vite hvorfor Vestbredden, Østlige Jerusalem og Golanhøyden ble okkupert. Du får svar på spørsmålet om hvorfor krigen fikk så store følger og hvordan den kunne vare så kort tid.

Det kanskje mest interessante for oss som er opptatt av detaljer er det unike innblikket i både det diplomatiske arbeidet og arbeidet innad i den israelske regjeringen før og under krigen. ( )

The world was created in 6 days, and so was modern Israel. This paean to Jewish hardiness, perseverance, cunning and pragmatism is, at the blurb-level, about the shortest war during the Baby Boomer generation. But the heart and motivation of this book, by author [a:Michael Oren|4503505|Michael Oren|http://www.goodreads.com/assets/nophoto/nophoto-U-50x66-251a730d696018971ef4a443cdeaae05.jpg], the sitting Israeli ambassador to the United States, is about existential rights; i.e., who is the rightful owner, landlord and tenant of the dry and weary land which holds Jerusalem at its center. This is the tale of a week's worth of confused and bloody war, a war that embodied many other regional and worldwide events leading up to it, and influences Middle East and international geopolitics 46 years later. ... And on the 7th day, instead of resting, this new-but-ancient, small-but-ferocious nation lies uneasy, vigilant against enemies that surround it. One would have to recognize of course that this is written from the point of view of Oren, quoting diplomatic dispatches, eyewitness accounts and historical records for credibility, but a view that is certainly not unbiased, notwithstanding the attempts at fairness. In so many words, he presents Israel's argument as a form of subdermal apologetics. And either you will accept it or reject it, but seldom will the response be blah. Such is the way of the world when it comes to anything Israel. The title war is also called the 3rd Arab-Israeli war, and it behooves the reader to find out about the first two wars (1948-9 and 1956) for context. It would also help to have a detailed map on hand as the war is prosecuted on three different fronts, with references to many place names that may not be commonly known. The impact this book had on me was to spur research (thank you Wikipedia even if people think you are inaccurate!) about Middle East history and events, to understand, from several viewpoints why things are the way they, or at least have a sense of some of the nationalistic and religious motivations. If it does the same to you, then the book has perhaps made its best possible impression. I do not recommend this book if one is looking for military tactics and strategy as the writing is more intellectual and philosophical than nitty-gritty warfare. ( )

Gripping book about Israel's Six Day War ( )

Excellent description of the War, particularly the political aspects, utilizing newly available sources. Particularly intriguing is the description of how the war evolved from an effort to drive the Egyptians away from their close deployment on the Israeli border, the original intent, into an unplanned conquest of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Haights. ( )

The first 60% covers the chaotic political machinations leading up to the war. It is far too detailed and esoteric for the casual reader without some background in recent Middle East history. The war itself is pretty interesting but high level and not too personal. Battles go by quickly. In the end the author keeps impressing how important the war was for subsequent Middle East history, but doesn't really explain why or how except for about a dozen individuals who get a "where are they now" treatment - once again, it helps to be knowledgeable before arriving. This book was written by someone who was involved in the war and an important Israeli politician and public figure, he set out to write a definitive history of the war and it probably is. Does not adapt very well to audio, though doable for the attentive listener, 18 hours is a long slog and the mind wanders. Recommend an abridged version if you can find it, probably best read so you can absorb the material. ( )

An attempt at an objective telling of the Six Days War and the conflicts within individual nations and between nations that shaped the outcome.Certainly, history is kinder to the losers than the winners, but this book makes a valiant attempt at exposing the dysfunction that shaped the conflict and the subsequent landscape of the modern Middle East. ( )

A great introduction to the 1967 war and it's causes. The author tries his best to cover what is a very politically charged and still unresolved subject. I found the coverage of the diplomatic moves before the fighting started to be the highlight of the book.

I would recommend it. ( )

Oren's account starts with a question on what to begin the history with
(a point which appealed to me as an Irishman). Oren's appreciation of the complexity of the background to the war is quite astute - from the earliest days of the state's formation nothing had ever been clearly resolved.
Oren spends a large amount of time going through the political background to the war, its place on the world stage (the US was in the middle of the Cold War and becoming ever-more involved in Vietnam).
The psychology of the protagonists is given centre-stage. Much like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the inexorable creep of decision-making, the claustrophobic encroaching of opinion and remaining options pressurises the almost inevitable progress towards hostiliities.
Once we get to the war itself, Oren is less sure than before, almost entirely relating the war's progress by relating/quoting first-hand accounts, but as the war's continuance is in some ways entirely political this is not a serious disadvantage to the work.
In the appendix Oren's value as a historian is apparent. While Arab sources are still not available, he has interviewed as many Arab participants as Israeli during his research. ( )

3628. Six Days of War June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Michael B. Oren (read Sept 15 2002) This is undoubtedly the best book read this month. It tells of the Six Day War, putting it in context, from 1948 to 1966, the catalyst for the war itself, the crisis, the countdown and a chapter for each of the six days, and a chapter on events since. The book is tremendously readable since it covers the supremely tense and exciting diplomatic events prior to and during the war, as well as the military account. The military account is NOT boring (as such sometimes can be) but gives enough detail without getting lost in minutiae. This balanced, objective book is definitely a candidate for best book read this year. I cannot say enough good things about it. ( )

Fascinating study of the June 1967 Middle East War in which the author seeks to present a "fair and balanced" narrative, using both Arab and Israeli sources. In Oren's moment-by-moment account, he highlights the complexities of the politics behind the war (such as Johnson's weakness because of Vietnam; the Soviet fear factor; Nasser's love-hate relationship with his military commander Amer; Hussein's vulnerability and fear of Nasser; and the battles within the Israeli government among the strong personalities of Eshkol, Dayan, and Rabin). Oren also elaborates on many small elements of caprice that affected the outcome of the war (for example, when the American Ambassador Wally Barbour decided to take off for the weekend instead of conveying Hussein's letter of apology to Eshkol for a mine accident along the border in November 1966; or the crisis period after Nasser evicted the U.N. from the Sinai, and U-Thant postponed a trip to Cairo for three days because he wanted to wait until his horoscope said it was propitious to travel.) Oren recounts developments that even seem very humorous in retrospect, as when the Israelis confronted Chuvakhin, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel, in May 1967 about the lie that Israeli troops were massing on the border in Syria. Chuvakhin "replied simply that his job was to communicate Soviet truths, not test them." Or when the Israelis entered Nablus on day three of the war to find thousands of people lining the streets to applaud them: the citizens had believed the propaganda that the Arabs were winning, and mistook the Israelis for Iraqis.

Oren presents rich portraits of Nasser, whom he labels "a tragic figure" and Dayan, whom Oren claims in an afterword still not to understand. Although he feels Dayan "was a leader of a caliber virtually unknown in the Middle East today," Oren also calls Dayan "a man of utter contradictions - passionate and cold, creative and close-minded, fearless and fainthearted..." with a "prodigious ego" and enigmatic mind.

Oren posits that the greatest political change wrought by the war of 1967 was the collapse of Nasserism - or secular pan-Arabism - and its replacement by Islamic extremism. Israel also became "more Jewish" from the reclamation of its biblical homelands, while the Arab street became more anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic than ever. (In addition to Arab shame and anger over Israel's military hegemony, Oren attributes this increase to the propaganda that "dominates the Arab press and poisons Arabic school textbooks.")

The discussion of the American involvement (or lack thereof) will be particularly interesting to Americans. Johnson's incapacitation by Vietnam presaged Reagan's weakness after Iran-Contra, and even moreso, the perception that Clinton's impeachment battle affected his ability to respond to the growing terrorist threat from Al Qaeda.

Oren tries to shed light on the still unresolved circumstances surrounding the accidental Israeli attack of the USS Liberty on day four of the war. The Liberty was only thirteen nautical miles from the Sinai coast, in an area declared off-limits by Egypt. Johnson had told the Sixth Fleet stationed 240 miles away not even to turn around, so no one could charge the U.S. with collusion. Many aspects of the incident remain a [classifed] mystery.

Oren asserts that this war, "triggered by [Syrian-sponsored] Palestinian guerrilla raids and Israel's retaliations against them" and yet also due to a myriad of other issues, never really ended. As long as ignorance and falsehoods persist, and unless and until Arab societies develop strong middle classes with vested interests in stability, no real end to the conflict can be contemplated.

(JAF) ( )

NO OF PAGES: 446 SUB CAT I: Arab-Israeli Conflict SUB CAT II: SUB CAT III: DESCRIPTION: This is the most complete history to date of the Six Day War of 1967, in which Israel entered and began its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While no account can be definitive until Arab archives open, Oren, a Princeton-trained senior fellow at Jerusalem's Shalem Center who has served as director of Israel's department of inter-religious affairs and as an adviser to Israel's U.N. delegation, utilizes newly available archival sources and a spectrum of interviews with participants, including many Arabs, to fill gaps and correct misconceptions. Further, Six Days of War is an attack on "post-Zionism": the school of politics and history that casts Israel as the author of policies that intentionally promote the destuction of Palestine as a separate entity and of Palestinians as a people, not least through the occupation that began with the 1967 War. By contrast, Oren convincingly establishes in an often engrossing narrative the reactive, contingent nature of Israeli policy during both the crisis preceding the conflict and the war itself. As Prime Minister Levi Eshkol held the Israeli Defense Forces in check that May, Operation Dawn, an Egyptian plan for a preemptive strike against Israel, came within hours of implementation. It was canceled only because Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser feared it had been compromised. Israel's decision to seek its own security in arms was finally triggered, Oren shows, by Jordan's late accession to the hostile coalition dominated by Egypt and Syria. Geographically, the West Bank, then under Jordanian rule and occupation, cut Israel nearly in half. The military risk to Israel was unacceptable, Oren makes clear, in the context of a U.S. enmeshed in Vietnam and a West unwilling to act even in support of the status quo. Far from being a product of strategic calculation, Oren further argues, occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was also contingent: the consequence of a victory so rapid and one-sided that even Israel's generals found it difficult to believe it was happening. Israel, having proved it could not be defeated militarily and now possessing something to trade, hoped for comprehensive peace negotiations in a rational-actor model. Oren notes that some initiatives for peace did in fact develop. He seems, however, trying to convince himself along with his readers. Oren puts what he sees as Israel's enduring weaknesses in relief: not arrogance, but self-doubt, self-analysis and self-criticism, all carried to near-suicidal degrees in 1967. Arab policy, by contrast, featured a confident commitment to erasing Israel from the map. The Six Day War shook that confidence, he finds, but did not alter the commitment. About the nature of Israeli policy since the war, the book says little, but finds that "for all its military conquests, Israel was still incapable of imposing the peace it craved."NOTES: Purchased from Half Price Books. SUBTITLE: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Have not read, but have worked with a few guys that were there and picked this up. Low on my list, right now, but will get to it eventually.

1967 Israel-Arab War ( )