 I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as 1$ and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in...  The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart - Page cixby Dugald Stewart - 1858Full view - About this book
 | John G. Taylor - 2001 - 396 pages
...at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception. ... If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. For Hume, then, the self disappears on closer analysis, an interesting feature... | |
 | James Fieser - 2000 - 340 pages
...certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity.'"" - If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are... | |
 | Adam Potkay - 2000 - 276 pages
...myself, and may truly be said not to exist. ... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him . . . But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to... | |
 | Ruth Pouvreau - 2002 - 212 pages
...If any one, upon serious und unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion ofhimself, l must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may he in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may. perhaps,... | |
 | A. B. Dickerson - 2003 - 231 pages
...can observe any thing but the perception . . . If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him.34 The view that Kant's argument in § 16 relies on a premise like this concerning the absence... | |
 | James Beattie - 2004 - 216 pages
...relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity. 20 — If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are... | |
 | George Walker - 2004 - 396 pages
...certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer: he may perhaps perceive something simple, and continued, which he calls himself,... | |
 | Marc Elliott Bobro - 2004 - 164 pages
...nor hate ... I shou' be entirely annihilated. ... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him" (T 252). Leibniz also thinks that persons are not conventional beings; objects that have no real essence... | |
 | Georges Dicker - 2004 - 280 pages
...never observe anything but the perception. ... If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him.1' Furthermore, Hume argues that it is not even possible to find oneself in introspection because... | |
 | Robert M. Burns - 2006 - 466 pages
...never can observe anything but the perception ... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him ... He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain... | |
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