 I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as 1$ and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in...  The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart - Page cixby Dugald Stewart - 1858Full view - About this book
 | Patricia Kitcher - 1990 - 314 pages
...relations and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity... If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are... | |
 | Richard Brilliant - 1991 - 196 pages
...at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception ... If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...has a different notion of himself, I must confess that I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as... | |
 | Wayne Waxman - 2003 - 368 pages
...farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. Perceptions stand in no need of support : the manner in which they " belong to" and are "connected... | |
 | Paul S. Penner - 1995 - 170 pages
...annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that... | |
 | Hunter Brown, Leonard A. Kennedy - 1995 - 660 pages
...further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. All I can allow him is that he may be in the right as well as I, and that... | |
 | Philipp Wolf - 1998 - 364 pages
...never can observe any thing but the perception. ... If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must...All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right äs well äs I, and that we are essentially different in this particular (Hume 1978 (ed. Selby-Bigge),... | |
 | Patricia Kitcher - 1998 - 324 pages
...relations and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity. ... If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer. All I can allow him is. that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are... | |
 | Ulrich Ratsch, Michael M. Richter, Ion-Olimpiu Stamatescu - 1998 - 228 pages
...observe any thing but the perception. [. . . ] If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him."40 It is not surprising that Hume declares that he cannot find a self, no matter how hard he tries.... | |
 | Y. Masih - 1999 - 606 pages
...time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly he said not to exist. . . .If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,...himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him." (252) If the identity of the self is purely fictitious, then how does it arise at all? According to... | |
 | Kenneth A. Bryson, Ken Bryson - 1999 - 236 pages
...of associations. Hume is the original "string-theorist"; we are nothing but strings of impressions: "If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection,...himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him ... I am certain there is no such principle in me" (ibid). So, there is no evidence to support the... | |
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