to fuch as have rendered themselves the proper objects of mercy, which is right, fit, commendable, and praife-worthy. If to fhew mercy to all offenders, without regarding that which renders the offender the proper object of mercy were right and fit, then the confequence will be, that there will be no punishment in futurity; because we may well be affured that God will not punish where the reafon of the thing requires that he should fhew mercy. And, on the other fide, if to punish all offenders equal to their crimes, without regarding that which renders the offender the proper object of mercy were right and fit, then the confequence will be, that there will be no mercy fhewn in futurity; because God will not fhew mercy where the reason of the thing requires that he fhould punish, which is the present cafe. But the truth lies betwixt thofe extreams. For, as God will punish fuch offenders as continue to be, notwithstanding his patience and long-fuffering towards them, the proper objects of punishment; fo he will certainly fhew mercy to all fuch offenders as have rendered themselves the fuitable and proper objects of it.

Thus, I think, I have fully ftated the notion of mercy, and fhewed what idea we annex to that term, in the prefent cafe. The next thing to be confidered, is what there is in nature which can, and does, render an offender the proper object of mercy;

Mercy,

Mercy, in the prefent cafe, takes place of juftice, and fuperfedes or fets afide punishment. Juftice, in the prefent cafe, is the ballance of common equity, by which is weighed out or difpenfed rewards and punishments, in an equal proportion to the good or evil, the virtuoufness or vicioufnefs of mens actions. And, that I may keep the argument clear of all incumbrances, and thereby guard against captious oppofers, I will ftate the notion of rewards and punishments, and of good and evil actions as the foundation of them. Those words reward and punish are relative, the former is a relative to fome paft good action or merit, the latter is a relative to fome paft evil action or guilt. For though in a loose and popular way of fpeaking all favours may be called rewards, and all afflictions may be called punishments, (as a man by fuffering great pain in a fit of the gout may be faid to fuffer great punishment thereby) yet, ftrictly speaking, no favours nor af flictions come under the denomination of rewards and punishments, but fuch only as have had fome good or evil actions, done by the receiver, to be the ground and foundation of them. If the fettled price of labour be one filling per day, and a man labours a day for me, and if I pay the labourer one Shilling, that pay is properly called reward; because there was fomething done by the receiver relative to reward, which was the ground of that pay, and which therefore gives

it that denomination. But if a man's pref fing neceffity, and not any precedent fervice done me, fhould excite me to put a filling into his hand, in order to fupply that neceffity, this action would properly come under the denomination of a gift, and not of a reward; because there was nothing in the receiver, relative to reward, to be the ground of that action, which could bring it under that denomination. And, as there must be a precedent good action or some service done, to be a foundation for reward; fo that action or service must be done by the receiver, and not by another, to conftitute what he receives a reward. If one man fhould perform a day's labour for me, and I should deliver a fhilling to another, he that received it would not be rewarded thereby; because there was nothing in him, relative to reward, to be the ground of it, which could give the action that denomination. Again, If a man, by a fall from his horfe, fhould break a limb, or otherwise fuffer great pain thereby, this would be a very great affliction to that man; and yet it would not come under the denomination of punishment, because there was no precedent evil action in him, (which is the relative to punishment) that was the ground of the affliction, which could give it that denomination. But if a man fhould steal an horfe, and should befentenced to death or banishment for it; the execution of that fentence would properly come under the denomination of punishment, because

there

there was a precedent evil action or guilt in him, which is the relative to punishment, that was the ground of that fentence, and therefore would bring it under that denomination. And, as there must be fome precedent evil action or guilt, to be the ground of punishment; fo that evil action must be done, and that guilt must be attracted by the fufferer only, and not by another, to conftitute any affliction punishment. If one man should steal an horfe, and another man, known to be innocent with regard to that fact, fhould be hanged; in that cafe, tho' the perfon hanged would fuffer one of the greatest of natural evils, yet that fuffering would not be a punishment to him, because he had no precedent guilt, which is the relative to punishment, to be the ground of that fuffering, and therefore, it could not come under the denomination of punishment to him. And, as to the guilt that was contracted by the other, it could not poffibly alter the cafe with refpect to him; because he could not poffibly become guilty thereby. And, fuppofing the innocent perfon fhould, not only confent to be hanged, but fhould voluntarily offer himself to fuffer, in order to fave the guilty; this would not alter the cafe at all, becaufe fuch confent and voluntary offer could not poffibly make him guilty of the other's crime, and where there is no guilt there can be no punishment; it being the fame grofs abfurdity to fuppofe punishment without crime, as it is to fuppofe a fon without a father. And, to fuppofe

suppose that punishment may be transferred from one perfon to another, when guilt, which is the ground of it, cannot, is the fame grofs abfurdity. How idle then must it be for men to pretend that the innocent Jefus bore the punishment that was due for the fins of mankind? I fay how vain muft fuch a pretence be? For, as it was impoffible that Christ should be guilty of our crimes; fo it was equally as impoffible that he should fuffer the punishment due for them. Again, the good or evil, or the merit or demerit of actions, which is the ground and foundation of rewards and punishments, does not arise from the good or evil effects and confequences of thofe actions, but from the good or evil motive or principle they fpring from, fuppofe the action of another, by mere accident and without any defign of the agent, fhould become very beneficial to me, in this cafe, tho' the action in it's effect and confequence would be a natural good to me; yet it would not be a moral good in the actor, because it's being a good to me was not the produce of his inclination and will, and therefore, it could not be a proper foundation for reward. Whereas, if that good to me was intended by the agent, and I was the proper object of his regard, then it would be a moral good in the actor, and he would be worthy of a reward upon the ac count of it. Again, if a man, by mere accident and without any defign, fhould take away the life of another; in this cafe, tho' the action in it's effect and confequence would be the greatest

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