I

Cannot fufficiently admire the industry of a fort

of men, wholly out of favour with the prince and people, and openly profeffing a feparate intereft from the bulk of the landed men, who yet are able to raise, at this juncture, fo great a clamour against a peace, without offering one fingle reason, but what we find in their ballads. I lay it down for a maxim, that no reasonable man, whether whig or tory, (fince it is neceffary to use those foolifh terms) can be of opinion for continuing the war upon the foot it now is, unless he be a gainer by it, or hopes it may occafion fome new turn of affairs at home to the advantage of his party; or, laftly, unless he be very ignorant of the kingdom's condition, and by what means we have been reduced to it. Upon the two firft cafes, where intereft is concerned, I have nothing to fay: but as to the laft, I think it highly neceffary that the publick fhould be freely and impartially told what circumftances they are in, after what manner they have been treated by thofe, whom they trufted for many years with the difpofal of their blood and treasure, and what the confequences of this management are like to be upon themselves and their pofterity.

Those who, either by writing or discourse, have undertaken to defend the proceedings of the late miniftry in the management of the war, and of the

treaty

treaty of Gertruydenburgh, have spent time in celébrating the conduct and valour of our leaders and their troops, in fumming up the victories they have gained, and the towns they have taken. Then they tell us, what high articles were infifted on by our minifters and thofe of the confederates, and what pains both were at in perfuading France to accept them. But nothing of this can give the leaft fatisfaction to the just complaints of the kingdom. As to the war our grievances are, that a greater load has been laid on us than was either just or neceffary, or than we have been able to bear; that the groffeft impofitions have been submitted to, for the advancement of private wealth and power, or in order to forward the more dangerous defigns of a faction, to both which a peace would have put an end; and that the part of the war which was chiefly our province, which would have been moft beneficial to us, and destructive to the enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a peace, we complain of being deluded by a mock-treaty; in which those who negotiated took care to make fuch demands as they knew were impoffible to be complied with; and therefore might securely press every article as if they were in earnest.

These are some of the points I design to treat of in the following difcourfe; with feveral others, which I thought it neceffary at this time for the kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not miftaken in thofe facts I mention; at least not in

4

any

any circumstance so material as to weaken the confequences I draw from them.

After ten years war with perpetual success, to tell us it is yet impoffible to have a good peace, is very furprizing, and feems fo different from what hath ever happened in the world before, that a man of any party may be allowed fufpecting, that we have been either ill-used, or have not made the most of our victories, and might therefore defire to know where the difficulty lay. Then it is natural to enquire into our prefent condition; how long we shall be able to go on at this rate; what the confequences may be upon the present and future ages; and whether a peace without that impracticable point, which fome people do so much insist on, be really ruinous in itself, or equally fo with the continuance of the war.

THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

ALLIES, &c. [y].

TH

HE motives that may engage a wise prince, or ftate in war, I take to be one or more of thefe either to check the overgrown power of fome ambitious neighbour; to recover what hath been unjustly taken from them; to revenge fome injury they have received (which all political cafuifts allow); to affift fome ally in a juft quarrel; or laftly, to defend themselves when they are invaded. In all these cafes the writers upon politicks admit a war to be justly undertaken. The laft is what hath been usually called pro aris et focis ; where no expence or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at ftake, and confequently our utmoft force to be exerted; and the difpute is foon determined, either in fafety or utter deftruction. But in the other four, I believe, it will be found, that no monarch or commonwealth did

[y] This was written preparatory to the peace which the minifters were then concerting, and which was afterwards perfected at Utrecht. ORRERY.

This tract, and Remarks on the Barrier treaty, contain the principal facts which the author of John Bull has thrown into allegory; and greatly illuftrate that piece, of which indeed it is poffible they were the ground-work.

ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeded fo far as to exhauft the ftrength and fubftance of their country by anticipations and loans, which in a few years must put them in a worse condition, than any they could reasonably apprehend from thofe evils, for the preventing of which they first entered into the war; because this would be to run into real infallible ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear fo by a probable fpeculation.

And as a war fhould be undertaken upon a juft and prudent motive, fo it is ftill more obvious, that a prince ought maturely to confider the condition he is in, when he enters on it; whether his coffers be full, his revenues clear of debts, his people numerous and rich by a long peace and free trade, not over-preffed with many burthenfome taxes; no violent faction ready to difpute his just prerogative, and thereby weaken his authority at home, and leffen his reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his cafe, he will hardly be perfuaded to difturb the world's quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preserving the latter with honour and safety.

Suppofing the war to have commenced upon a juft motive; the next thing to be confidered is, when a prince ought, in prudence, to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for; or when that point is found impoffible to be ever obtained; or when contend