THERE is no subject of political reflection of more importance than that of national defence. Happily, America is, at the present moment, more likely to be engaged in enlarg ing than defending her territories, but how long her present security from regular invasion may last, it is impossible to conjecture. No disquisitions on this subject can, at any time, be quite unseasonable, as peace is the only period of preparation and provision against future danger.

The following ingenious thoughts on this subject, by a British politician, were designed for the present situation of affairs in Great Britain, but they will not be found unworthy to excite interest and curiosity in the statesmen of every nation.

It appears, from the most careful survey of historical evidence, that a well disciplined army has, in all ages, been a sure foundation of political importance and power; and that such armies have been the immediate and efficient instruments in bringing about all those important revolutions in the affairs of mankind, of which history has preserved any

NO. XXXIX. VOL. VI.

authentic record. It is therefore very material to inquire, what are the peculiar qualities which characterize soldiers, and in what manner those qualities naturally arise out of the peculiar constitution which armies have in all ages assumed

The constitution of an army is not the fanciful device of any rash projector; its fundamental principles are grounded on the unchangeable qualities of the human mind, and have on that account remained sta

tionary, amid the varying fashions, manners, and improvements of mankind; it has, indeed, grown out of the nature of society, and has been found, by the universal experience of mankind, to be well calculated to fit those who are trained under its

regulations for the purposes of war.

The perfection of a military force consists in an instant and complete obedience to command; not indeed on a parade, where any man may, without much exertion, yield a ready compliance with whatever is enjoined him; but it is in braving every mode of peril and of death, in obedience to orders, that the milita

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ry character is exhibited in its genuine perfection It is therefore the object of discipline, not only to establish authority on a solid foundation, by training men to a constant familiarity with the peremptory decrees of martial law, but also to facilitate and secure obedience, by forming and bringing to maturity those habits of mind which enable them, bravely and cheerfully, to confront danger. There arises, besides, in all armies, when they are engaged in the operations of war, and exposed to its perils, a peculiar system of manners, which very materially assists the effect of positive institutions. From the ardour of zeal, emulation, and honour, which the situation in which soldiers are placed naturally produces, men are animated to unusual exertions of valour; they glory and rejoice in scenes, which the mind, in its natural state, contemplates with horror. It is only, also, in the perilous emergencies of real service, that a commander has an opportunity of securing the confidence, and conciliating the affections of his troops; by displaying courage, capacity, and presence of mind, in the midst of danger; by an unwearied attention to the comforts of the soldiers; by showing, on all occasions, a zealous attachment to the character and profession, and by cheerfully participating in all the dangers and privations to which they are exposed. By these means, all great generals have contrived to con municate to their troops an extraordinary portion of heroic zeal: by employing peculiar incentives, they have given new energy to all those principles on which the excellence of the military character depends, and have called forth in their service all those enthusiastic feelings which, in the hour of danger, a imate the passions and fortify the heart. Men accustomed to this sort of training very soon acquire all those habits which teach them fearlessly to expose themselves to danger; and on those qualities of the mind entirely rests that grand dis

ction which exists between sol

diers and men employed in peaceful occupations; and that superiority in the field which has always enabled armies to discomfit and disperse every kind of irregular force which has been rashly exposed to their attack.

It is, therefore, highly dangerous and impolitic in any state to rely for its security on the efforts of men who are not soldiers; who employ themselves only occasionally in acquiring mechanical dexterity in the use of arms, but who devote the chief portion of their time and attention to pursuits wholly different. It is impossible that men, placed in such circumstances, can ever acquire the characteristic habits and feelings of soldiers; and it has been found, by experience, that they have never been able to withstand the shock of a regular army. Whenever, therefore, the military force of any state is formed, either wholly or in part, of the unwarlike population of the country, who may, no doubt, be very easily assimilated in external appearance, but who never can acquire the real character of soldiers, great inconvenience and danger must result. In contriving a scheme of warlike operations, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the troops to be employed. It would, no doubt, be extremely culpable in a commander, to waste the energies of a veteran force in feeble and indecisive warfare; but it would evidently lead to consequences still more disastrous, if raw and inexperienced levies were appointed to execute bold and offensive plans. But if the same army is composed of opposite kinds of troops, how is it possible to combine their exertions in the prosecution of one object? The mode of warfare to be pursued must either be adapted to the one sort of force or to the other. The regular army must either be clogged by the incumbrance of an inferior force, and the general system of military operations consequently enfeebled; or troops, im perfectly disciplined, must be ordered on service which they are not.

qualified to perform, and may involve, in their defeat, the ruin of the whole body.

To assimilate new levies to regular soldiers, and to arrange them in solid battalions in the same line, is a very dangerous experiment. In all the various and unlooked for fluctuations of affairs which may occur in a battle, the new levies might be left alone to sustain the fiercest onset; and on their steadiness the event of the day might depend. By unforeseen accidents, they might be surrounded by perils, which it would require the collected fortitude of yeterans to repel; they might be placed in positions which they could not maintain, or appointed to services which they could not perform. They cannot be qualified for any scheme of offensive hostility, or the attack of any important post, which, being defended by veteran troops adyantageously posted, might not perhaps be carried but by the reiterated efforts of desperate intrepidity. The danger, therefore, of conjoining new levies in any great proportion with regular soldiers is manifest; and either in this case, or where the whole force of a country is composed of troops imperfectly disciplined, there is no chance of safety, in case of invasion, but by resorting to a system of defensive warfare, which, in an open or level country, can never be ultimately successful, except through the misconduct of the enemy, and which, even in a country abounding in strong positions, is of very doubtful issue. With a force imperfectly disciplined to check veteran troops by a judicious combination of scientific movements; to chuse positions so excellent as to bid defiance to the efforts of the most enterprising enemy, and so to fortify and secure them, that superior gallantry should be only a passport to destruction, requires such skill and talents, and such a series of prosperous chances, that it would be quite unsafe for any state to hazard its safety on such a rare conjunction. The invading army might, by rapid and daring hostility, render nugato

ry a system of defensive tactics; they might force their enemy to a battle in defence of some capital object; and how uncertain and precarious would such a contest be, if success depended on the persevering yalour of inexperienced troops!

An invader, who possesses an ar my excellently trained and disciplined, and who is opposed by a force of an inferior character, will ultimately succeed in his views, if he is sufficiently rapid and enterprising in his movements, so as to prevent both the spirit of adventure from languishing among his followers, and the invaded country from concentrating its physical strength; and where invasions in similar circumstances have not succeeded, it has only been because the hostile commander, instead of pursuing a system of bold and sanguinary hostility, has wasted the energies of his troops in feeble, indecisive, and protracted warfare, which, in his situa tion, leads more surely to destruction than the blindest temerity. How quickly did Suwarrow subdue the Polish insurgents, by the celerity of his motions, and the unparalleled boldness of his designs!

The events of war are determined by the united influence of discipline and tactics; and, consequently, the perfection of the military art is produced by a combination of skilful tactics with a high state of discipline. Were the distinction between those two sources of excellence well understood, and sufficiently attended to, it might lead to a more clear elucidation of events which have been but imperfectly accounted for on general principles, and have, for that reason, led to much mistake. A general may have brought his troops to the highest possible degree of discipline, but he may not have perfected a system of tactics in a corresponding degree; or an unskilful general may be entrusted with the command of excellent troops, and may be opposed by a more skilful commander with an army inferior in discipline; and the uperiority of tactics on one side