a motion in common with all bodies whatever. A dog has only the second and third of these motions, and a stone only the last. Thus is the stone least active, the man most so, and the brute between both. The modes are different under which beings act upon one another. and Some (as the whole tribe of corporeal masses) only act, because they are acted upon, and that too by something external, and perfectly distinct from themselves. It is thus the nail acts upon the timber, because the hammer acts upon the nail; were not the hammer to drive, the nail would never penetrate. Now such motion as this is but a species of passivity, because though the beings, which possess it, have an original power to receive motion, they by no means possess an original power to impart it. And hence it follows, that if something did not exist more intrinsically active than themselves, they would never act, and there would be no motion at all. Action of this kind, (if it deserve the name,) is the action of beings, which, though moveable, are not intrinsically motive, that is, causes of motion. Another mode of action may be found in the following instances. A lamb acts upon the senses of a wolf-that sensation acts upon his appetite-that appetite acts upon his corporeal organs. By the action of these organs he runs, he seizes, and he devours the lamb. A child is seen by its mother likely to fall from a precipice. The sensation acts upon her parental affections-these affections act upon her corporeal organs. By the action of these organs she runs, she seizes, and she saves her child. The instances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with deliberation and thought. The splendour of the Roman empire acted upon the imagination of Cæsar-that imagination acted upon his desire of sovereign power-that desire acted upon the faculties of his mind and body. By the energy of these faculties he passed the Rubicon, conquered Pompey, enslaved Rome, and obtained the wished-for empire. Again; the domination of Cæsar acted upon the imagination of Brutus-that imagination acted upon his love for the republic -that love for the republic acted upon his corporeal organs. His hand in consequence plunged a dagger into Cæsar, and, for a time, the republic, which he loved, was restored. In all these instances the corporeal organs act, like the corporeal masses before mentioned, because they are first acted upon. But then they are not acted upon, as those are, by other external bodies, but by internal appetites, affections, and desires, all which, as well as the organs, are parts of one and the same being. Such being therefore is not, like beings of the first order, in a manner passive and only moveable; but, as it pos sesses within itself the power of imparting motion, as well as of receiving it, the action is that of a being, not only moveable, but intrinsically motive. We may go further, if we please, and suggest a third mode of action, the action of the first mover; that being, which, though motive, is itself perfectly immoveable. In a series of agents, where each of them imparts motion, which it has previously received, were such agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no motion could ever begin, were there not something at their head totally different from them all; something purely impassive; something, which can move, without being moved; in other words, which can impart motion to every thing else, and remain itself immoveable. It is to this character that Boethius alludes, in his truly sublime address to the Author of the Universe: Qui tempus ab ævo Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.m Considering action, therefore, and the being acted upon with a view to motion and the being moved, we may say that the Peripatetic system (for it is hence we derive these speculations) contemplated all beings in three views; either as moveable, but not motive; or as both moveable and motive; or, lastly, as motive alone, but not moveable." More is said upon this subject in the subsequent theory concerning motion.° We shall only add, that, in the above modes of acting, when bodies act upon bodies, the action for the greater part is reciprocal. While the oar impels the wave, the wave resists the oar; while the axe hews the timber, the timber blunts the axe; while the earth attracts the moon, the moon attracts the earth. And hence the theory of action and re-action, so accurately scrutinized in modern philosophy. m Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, οὐ KIVOUμEVOV: "The desirable and the intelligible move, without being moved." Arist. Metaph. p. 202. edit. Sylb. See below, chap. xvii. The Latin quotation is from the Consolation of Boethius, and is a part of those hexameters, which, for harmony of numbers and sublimity of sentiment, are perhaps not inferior to any in the Latin language: O! qui perpetua mundum, &c. - This doctrine is expressed by the Stagirite, but in an inverted order. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οὐ κινούμενον, κινεῖ· ἡ δ ̓ ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον, κινεῖ τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν ovdév. De Animal. Motu, p. 154. edit. Sylb. moves, and the organs which are moved, appear to be both of them vitally united in one and the same subject, see below, chap. xvii. Concerning the necessity of something, different from body, to put body in motion, Ibid. Concerning causative motion, Ibid. Concerning immobility, Ibid. and Hermes, p. 220, note c. P Of this doctrine we have the following account. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὲν λύεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις, ὅτι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ πάσχοντος· οἷον τὸ τέμνον ἀμβλύνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ τεμνομένου, καὶ τὸ θερμαῖνον ψύχεται ὑπὸ θερμαινομένου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ κινοῦν (ἔξω τοῦ πρώτου) αντικινεῖταί τινα κίνησιν· οἷον ὠθοῦν ἀντωθεῖταί πως, καὶ ἀντιθλίβεται τὸ exißov: "The cause why motions are stopped, is, that the acting power is also acted upon by that upon which it acts; for example, the cutting power is blunted by that which is cut; and the warming power If we contemplate the world, as well the vegetable as the animal, we shall perceive action and passion diffused through every part. And yet it must be observed both of action and of passion, (such at least as those we see around us,) that they are neither of them perpetual in any one particular instance. Corn only nourishes, and hemlock only poisons, when they meet a proper body on which to operate: the musician does not always perform, nor is the ear always affected by sounds: the painter does not always paint, nor is the eye always affected by colours. And hence the rise of that notable thing called power; that dormant capacity, into which both action and passion, when they cease, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their source they flow. There is nothing which appears so nearly to approach nonentity as this singular thing called power; yet is there nothing, in fact, so truly different from it. Of nonentity there are no attributes, no affections; but every power possesses a specific and a limited character, which not only distinguishes it from nonenity, but from every other power. Thus, among the active powers, the smith, when asleep, has still those powers which make him a smith; the shipwright, when asleep, has still those powers which make him a shipwright. The powers distinguish both from the rest of mankind, who, purely from not having them, are neither smiths nor shipwrights. The same powers help to distinguish the same artists from one another; for the powers, though invisible, are incommutable; nor can those of the shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or those of the smith enable him to construct a ship. If we pass from active to passive powers, we shall find these, after the same manner, to be limited in every subject, and different in every species. Timber has the capacity of becoming a ship, but not an axe; iron, on the contrary, of becoming an axe, but not a ship. And though different agents, by operating on the same patient, may produce different effects, (as the shipwright makes timber into a ship, while the carpenter forms it into a house;) yet still must each effect correspond with the passive capacities; or else, where these fail, there is nothing to be done. Were the case otherwise, were not the passive powers essentially requisite as well as the active, there would be no reason why any thing might not be made out of any thing. Far distant, therefore, from nonenity are passive powers, is cooled by that which is warmed; and, in general, the moving principle (excepting the supreme and first) is reciprocally moved itself under some motion or other; the impelling power, for instance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compressing power, however latent: so far, indeed, that where they differ essentially from one another, they often lead to effects perfectly contrary, though the agent which operates be individually the same: Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit, Uno eodemque igni, &c. Virg. ut sup. p. 270. It is from this theory we perceive the reason of that ancient axiom, Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis; than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood. As to the active powers, there is an important distinction between those called rational, and the irrational. The subordinate are mostly confined to the producing one contrary out of two. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But the rational powers imply both contraries at once, and give to their possessor the alternative of producing either. The musician has the power both of melody and dissonance; the physician, the power both of healing and making sick; the magistrate, the power of deciding both justly and unjustly. The reason of this is, that rational power alone is founded in science, and it is always one and the same science which recognises contraries; that which teaches us harmony, teaches us discord; that which informs us what is health, informs us what is disease; that which discerns truth, discerns also falsehood. Hence, therefore, it is, that as every science may be called double in its powers of knowledge, so all action founded on science may be called double in its powers of acting. A noble privilege this to man, if well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abused; since by this he alone, of all sublunary beings, is properly entitled either to praise or dispraise. r With respect to powers in general, there is this to be observed: so important are they to the constitution of many beings, that often, though latent, they are more regarded than · ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κάμπυλον γινώσκομεν, κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν δ κανών· τὸ δὲ κάμπυλον, οὔθ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε TOÙ EVOéos: "One of the two parts in the contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. It is thus that by the straight we come to know both the straight and the crooked, for the straight rule of the artist is a judge of both. But the crooked, on the other side, is no judge either of itself, or of the straight." Arist. de An. i. 5. • Kal Twv dvváμewv ai μèv čσovrai &λoγοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου—καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δέ ἱατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγ μα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν : “ Of powers, some will be found irrational, others are attended with reason: and as to those which are attended with reason, the same powers will extend to things contrary: but as to the irrational, one power will extend only to one contrary: what is hot, for example, will only conduce to heating; but the art of medicine will become the cause both of disease and of health. The cause is, that this medicinal science is reason, and the same reason discovers both the thing and its privation." Arist. Metaph. p. 143. edit. Sylb. See also p. 68, and note f; and p. 294, especially in note t. the strongest apparent attributes. Thus it is from their medicinal powers only that we value the several species of drugs; and from their generative powers only that we value the several species of seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is, their apparent qualities, further than as they help to indicate those invisible powers. The just opposite to power is energy, which, as its etymology shews, implies the existing in deed or act, as opposed to that existence which only implies possibility. It And here it is worth observing, that every thing existing in power is necessarily roused into energy by something, which itself existed previously in energy." Events and incidents never stand still; some agents or other are perpetually energizing, though all, perhaps, by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them, at least, as are of the subordinate tribe. happens, indeed, in the world, as in a ship upon a voyage. Every hand at a proper season has his hours of rest, and yet the duty never ceases, the business of the ship is never at a stand; those that wake, rousing those that sleep, and being in their turn roused again themselves. But another way to shew that energy is of necessity previous to power, consists in admitting the contrary hypothesis. Let us suppose, for example, a man placed in a part of space, where there was, and ever had been, eternal silence; or otherwise in a part where there was, and ever had been, eternal darkness; could such a one ever actually either have heard or seen, however exquisite his powers both of hearing and seeing? And why not? Because to the evocation of one of these powers, there is a necessity of actual sound; to that of the other, of actual light; so that had not these energies existed previously, his powers must have remained dormant through the period of their existence. Suppose, therefore, all energies of all kinds to stop; how could they ever revive? Were they all once sunk into one universal sleep, where should we find a waking cause, to rouse them from their slumbers?* 'Ev py, "In act, in deed." See a sketch of the difference between act and power, p. 7. "It was a doctrine of the Peripatetic school, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς OT: "that energy is prior to power:" Arist. Metaph. p. 150. 152.—ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ hon oTiv:"that which exists in energy is always formed out of that which exists in power, by something which exists (already) in energy; for example, man is formed by man, the musical artist by the |