to their system of forming immoveable lines; and the French, by keeping themselves in a mass, were secure against the attacks of their cavalry.

When the seat of war was transferred to mountainous or difficult countries, close columns could no longer be made use of the French at once perceived this, and, abandoning the system of close columns, formed immense bodies of sharp shooters, light infantry, and chasseurs. The French soldiers are peculiarly well adapted for this species of warfare; and, by availing themselves of the most trifling advantages of ground, they frequently forced large bodies of Austrians to

retreat.

In the course of a few campaigns, the French armies, though they did not acquire a regular system of tac tics, became able to move with great rapidity. As they did not pay much regard to regularity and precision, their movements were executed with greater velocity. In the midst of a movement that appears confused, individual intelligence enables every man to find his place; the manœuvre, instead of being performed in a body, is executed individual ly, and, for that very reason, with greater rapidity.

Moreau was the French general who adhered most closely to the old system of warfare. His military character differs from that of the other French generals: he was chiefly distinguished by his superior talents and science, while the others owed their reputation to the bold and daring manner in which they formed and executed their plans.

The effects of the revolution were not less conspicuous in the subordinate arrangements of the army. Their wants were supplied by requisition. When they entered a country, they had little or no baggage. Their losses from fatigue, disease, and famine, were never regarded by their generals; and, as most of their officers had been raised from the ranks, they received some consolation for the hardships

VOL. VI, NO. XXXVII.

and privations they endured, by reflecting on their former situation.

The French began to support their armies by levying contributions in the countries they came to, By abandoning the old system of forming depots and magazines, they certainly exposed their troops to famine, want, and disorder, and in many instances suffered from the fury of the inhabitants, who were exasperated by their excesses. With all these inconveniences, however, they appear to have reaped very important advantages from this mode of supplying their armies. Formerly, the movements of armies were anticipated from the magazines they had formed, and the position of their depots; and their route was retarded by the attention which it was necessary to pay to them. The inroads of the French armies were unexpected, and their progress was rapid. They calculated only on success; and they obtained it, by the unlooked for celerity of their movements, and the boldness and enterprise of their plans.

The idea of supporting an army in that manner was fully developed by Guibert; and the revolution, which has been a school of bold and daring experiments, has shown the correctness of his reasoning upon that and many other military innovations.

When we see these volunteers of liberty dragged to the armies with an iron collar fastened to their necks, when we consider that they are in great part composed of royalists or enemies to government; when we reflect on the disorder, the waste, the want of discipline, the misery, the maladies, and the state of the hospitals, which consume six times the number of men that perish in battle; when we see the soldiers incessantly on the point of mutiny, and sometimes freely indulging themselves in it; their officers, some of whom cannot even read; their generals, many of whom are grossly ignorant; while several who have risen to the, rank of commanders

9

in chief were originally dealers in thread and needles (Jourdan), monks (Pichegru), physicians (Doppet), barristers (Moreau), common soldiers (Massena), dancers (Muller, Victor), carmen (Brune), quack doctors (Massot), painters (Cartaux), fencing masters (Augereau), cooks (Championet), &c., &c.; when we see soldiers of uncouth appearance, without the smallest show of subor dination, and in rags, we cannot but ask ourselves the question, how it has been possible, that such an assemblage could have achieved military exploits of so distinguished a stamp?

In the explanation of these facts, it is to be observed, that the want of discipline among the French soldiers is more apparent than real. Though a French soldier is not chatised for ordinary offences, but is allowed to sell his effects, to be dirty, and to commit disorders, yet whatever is considered as an essential breach of military discipline is punished with the utmost severity. A distinction is thus made between what is personal to the soldier, and what relates to the service. His conduct on service is as exemplary as in any other army; and he makes it a point of honour to be vigilant and strictly observant of countersigns.

In their battles the French derive great advantage from keeping a body of reserve, composed of the best troops, and commanded by an able general. By concentrating their forces on the point of attack, instead of forming extensive lines, they are enabled to spare troops for that purpose. They generally commence the action with light troops. In that situation the courage of every individual is displayed; and the emulation excited leads men to the most daring actions. One great excellence which Erench soldiers possess, is that of penetrating into the state of the adverse forces, and of making an attack with rapidity and precision the moment they seem disposed to give way. Their sharp-shooters frequently succeed in deciding important actions; and if they are re

pulsed, they are protected by the reserve, which supports them, or attacks in its turn.

The battle of Marengo is a striking instance of the advantages which the French derive from their reserve; and on more than one occasion it has been the means of recovering a battle which was considered as lost. The French are much indebted for their victories to the use of horse-artillery, which was composed of picked men, and exposed on every occasion. Their other artillery, during the course of last war, was greatly inferior to what it had formerly been: it was however disposed in such a manner as not to retard the movements of the infantry; and no field pieces were attached to their battalions.

Secrecy, commonly considered important in military operations, was no object in the French army. When the general had a movement in view, the whole army knew of it; while at the same time a thousand other plans were talked of and discussed. A spirit of enterprise was thus kept up in the whole army, and their camps became schools of military instruction. In other armies, the officers and soldiers who have made a campaign are in general more ignorant of the movements which their army has made, than their countrymen at home. It is deemed necessary to conceal from them, as much as possible, not merely the movements to be made, but even those which have taken place.

History furnishes us with many instances of great successes arising from the discoveries and observations of common soldiers: and, indeed, where the minds of so many men are employed on one object, valuable suggestions must frequently be produced by their united efforts. In few armies is any care taken to discover or collect their observations. The French army affords every facility for that purpose. The commander has opportunities of availing himself of the information of the whole army. The generals of division, during the engagement,

receive the same assistance from the intelligence of the individuals who compose their columns. Their observations pass from rank to rank; and while those which were just were circulated, there was discernment enough to arrest the progress of those which were unfounded. It was thus that, amid the disorder and confusion which seemed to render the French armies ungovernable, and incapable of executing a plan, astonishing results were produced, because every one contributed to forward the common object, from his voluntary as well as personal exertions. Every officer and every soldier fought as if the orders they were executing had been their own. These circumstances have given a peculiar character to all the operations of the French army.

When a company arrives at a post, or on the ground which it is to occupy, the soldiers, from curiosity, example, the desire of appearing intelligent, and from the vanity inseparable from the French character, instead of lying lazily on the earth, examine the post in every point of view; they proceed to reconnoitre, and form their several plans of attack or defence. If at tacked, they have the incalculable advantage of being acquainted with the ground, and of knowing beforehand all that can be done. It frequently happens, that the soldiers, without officers, conduct themselves not only with bravery, but with infinite ability.

The rapid advancement of generals from the ranks, is not surprising in such an army; and one campaign, in such circumstances, would form more officers than twenty in an army where promotion depended on purchase or court favour, and where every disposition to discuss the movements of the army was regarded as a crime. An officer, who afterwards rose to a very high command in the French service, is said to have sent to Paris a plan for an approaching campaign, when he was only a sergeant. It was remarked by officers who had occasion to con

verse with the prisoners taken by the Austrian army, that they seldom met with a French soldier who had not made some calculation of the force of the army he belonged to, and of the division he served with. An Austrian or British soldier seldom knows any thing beyond the sphere of the company in which he is posted; and in the old school this is considered as the perfection of military discipline.

The enemy does not seem to have derived any advantage from the want of secrecy which prevailed in the French operations. It was afterwards observed, indeed, that they had announced what they had done. True: but, amidst the infinite number of projects which were published, how was it possible to discern the real one? and, in many instances, a resolution is formed at the moment, in favour of one plan instead of another, as circumstances seem to favour it. It is a great mistake that the plans of the campaign were formed at Paris, and that Carnot directed the most trifling movements of the armies. Disputes about the execution of orders must have occurred, if the commanders in chief and those under them had acted on minute and detailed plans. In fact the latitude of the orders was such, that though the generals might go wrong from ignorance or design, they could hardly be guilty of formal disobedience. The French made their officers responsible for the event, not for the means which they employed. The instructions given to Dugommier, who commanded at the siege of Toulon, by the committee of public safety, were, Vous firendrez Toulon, ou vous meriterez nos regrets. These are very clear instructions, but, at the same time, very general.

It is much wiser to leave to the general the free choice of the measures which he is to adopt, than to tie him strictly down to the most perfect plan of a campaign that ever was formed in a cabinet. thing is prescribed beyond the general object in view, it is the result of

If any

jealousy, of vanity, or of a fatal desire of commanding.

This system of plans and detailed orders, which the French were too wise to incumber themselves with, appears to have pervaded the whole Austrian service. The generals were there fettered by the instruc tions they received, and looked to the council of war with greater apprehension than to the enemy. They were always impressed with their responsibility for the event, and continually calculating the loss they might sustain, not only in men, but in military effects and artillery. A general who was defeated when attacked, was acquitted; but if he was defeated in an offensive operation, he was undone for ever: as if an army became secure against an attack by not making one itself. Their artillery, which was excellent, was made an incumbrance, instead of an assistance. It was a point of honour to preserve it at every risk; and the Austrian infantry would on some occasions have avoided defeats, if it had either had no artillery, or had consented to lose it.

The merits of the Austrian army, however, are not to be underrated. Though its defects, and the degraded state of their soldiers, who are reduced to the condition of automatons, must be acknowledged, it is as much superior to the French army considered as a body, as a French soldier, considered as an individual, is to an Austrian. The two great causes of the defeats of the Austrians were, the want of genius and enterprise in their generals, and their deficiency in light troops. Instead of adopting an original mode of fighting, calculated to display the superiority of their troops in discipline, they kept themselves in cordons and lines, in which their cavalry could be of no use. The French, who were thus enabled to calculate on their movements, exposed themselves in a manner which they would not have ventured to do had they been opposed by an enterprising enemy. Even when acting on the

defensive, the Austrians ought to have made campaigns of movements, not of positions. This is il lustrated by the example of Turenne, prince Eugene, and Frederick of Prussia, who, during their defensive campaigns, kept up all the activity and appearance of offensive operations.

The want of light troops was the chief cause of the defeat of the Austrians. Even when commanded by the archduke Charles, they suffered severely from this circumstance. By converting their light troops, which were so famous in the wars of 1740 and 1757, into a sort of regular battalions, they lost the qualities which fitted them for that species of warfare.

The Austrians might have supplied this defect in Piedmont, in Switzerland, and in Italy, by employing the inhabitants of these coun tries as light troops; but though their adherents were more numerous than those of the French, they made less use of them. Their losses, from want of light troops, were enormous when the war was carried on in mountainous countries. They acted on the principle, that a sufficient number of men will always defend their ground; whereas, among mountains, the advantages of ground are of more importance than numbers. From the desire of adhering to a system of regularity which could not be preserved, instead of occupying the heights, and placing their troops according to the nature of the ground, they remained collected at the bottom: they were in consequence outflanked and surrounded.

The French soldiers, who are more active, more enterprising and ready in availing themselves of every advantage of ground, will hang round bodies of men that are much more numerous than themselves; they molest, harass, and advance upon them, by means of the smallest shelter. The Austrians, in the mean time, preserve their rank and file; but their oblique firing has not the least effect upon men who

are either scattered about, or advantageously posted; while every discharge of the latter, being levelled at a considerable body, cannot fail of telling. When the Austrians advance, the riflemen withdraw, but return to the charge as soon as the Austrians retire again: the Austrian troop is thus harassed by an enemy that keeps out of its reach, and whose numbers, upon looking at the extent of ground which they occupy, appear more considerable than they really are. This method of fighting continues, until the losses they have experienced, and the inutility of resistance, produce discouragement and confusion; and, at length, the troops overwhelmed with fatigue, and thrown into disorder, either disperse, or lay down their arms. The French who would not have dared to meet the same Austrians in open field, have often defeated and taken thousands of them with some hundreds of men only: for, the instant their ranks are broken, the Austrians become like a flock of sheep dispersed, and incapable of reuniting. The coolness of the Austrians is inexplicable. The humiliation of surrendering their arms does not seem to affect them any more. than the dangers of a battle. One would suppose, in considering their indifference, that it was nothing but the finale of a pantomime or ballet. The Austrians carry their fear of being outflanked or turned, to a degree which is at once ridiculous and extravagant; it might indeed be called a national disorder or weakness. They fancy themselves outflanked, or enveloped, at the very moment in which they might surround those, who have had the rash. ness to outrun them.

For the Literary Magazine. FOREIGN LITERARY AND PHILO

SOPHICAL NEWS.

EARL Stanhope has just printed at the stereotype office, for private

circulation among his friends, a small work entitled, Principles of the Science of tuning Instruments with fixed Tones. Among many other observations that seem to merit the notice of musicians, his lordship says, "musicians and tuners are in the habit of talking of the wolf in the singular number. I shall, however, show in the sequel that there are as many as five wolves, in the quints, and major thirds, taken together, in all those instruments which have exactly twelve fixed keys, or exactly twelve fixed tones in each septave." He then gives directions how to distinguish these five wolves, with a table founded on them: and adds, "We have been in the habit of considering what is commonly termed the wolf as an inherent imperfection in every instrument which has exactly twelve fixed keys in each septave, whereas it is clearly proved, that, so far from the five wolves being imperfections, it is precisely the proper distribution of those wolves which produces that charming and essential variety of character, be tween different keys, which is one of the chief requisites in a well-tuned instrument." His lordship gives the following as the peculiarities of what he calls the Stanhope monochord: 1. The wire is not made either of brass or of iron, but of steel, which is very far superior. For, steel wire does not keep continually lengthening, as brass and iron wires do when they are stretched considerably. 2. The wire in this monochord does not, as usual, pull downwards on the bridges, but the whole wire forms one straight and horizontal line, by which means the moveable bridge, which determines the exact length of the wire, can be moved without altering the tension of the wire.This is not the case when the wire pulls downwards on the bridges.3. The ends of the wire are not twisted round the two stout steel pins which keep it stretched; but each end of the wire is soft-soldered in a long groove formed in a piece of steel which goes over its corresponding pin. This is a great im