dungeon, and his seclusion from society and ordinary sources of information, that, at sixteen years of age, he had no idea of a God, or any moral precept or duty. Nor did he know that any human being, or any animal, existed, except himself and his keeper. He understood no human language; and was so profoundly ignorant, that he supposed the wooden horses, which were allowed him for companions, were living beings like himself.

Let

it then be asked, which of the ten commandments was it possible for Caspar knowingly to violate, while in that state of ignorance? Could he prefer other Gods to Jehovah? Could he bow down to graven images, or to any other object, in disobedience to the second commandment? Could he be guilty of taking God's name in vain, or of profaning the Sabbath? Could he be guilty of disobeying father or mother, while he had no idea of any such beings? Could he have been guilty of murder, adultery, theft, or bearing false witness? How could he covet what he did not know had any existence? Could he with any propriety be classed with him who "knoweth to do good, and doeth it not?" And if Caspar was thus deficient at the age of sixteen, what must be the condition of an infant "the moment it becomes a child of Adam!" What precept of the Old Testament or the New is it possible for such an infant to transgress? We might. as rationally imagine a clock or a watch to possess a conscience, as such an infant.

10. Had we evidence that the hypothesis of Dr. Spring is true, we should have much reason to believe that children at their birth are miraculously

endowed with the requisites to moral agency, for the very purpose that they may sin as soon as they become the children of Adam. For there is no mode of communicating or acquiring ideas, known to our race, by which it would be possible for infants at that age to become possessed of such precocious knowledge and mental faculties as to render them capable of moral agency. Besides, it may be observed, that after children evince faculties for moral agency, they have no recollection of having been capable of knowing to do good as soon as they were born no remorse for having sinned at that early period; — and, in their present advanced state, they have no knowledge of right and wrong, excepting in those cases in which they have been instructed at a later period than the time of their birth. Conscience now has no advantage from any supposed precocious light possessed prior to birth, or immediately subsequent. It is occupied only about things in which it has been more recently instructed; and it goes no farther in “ accusing or excusing" than according to the instructions which it has received. If then the doctrine in question be true, in what possible way can we account for the facts it asserts, but by a miraculous agency? And are we to imagine that an innocent infant is an object so odious to God, that rather than behold it, he is at the expense of a miracle as frequently as a child is born, to render it a sinner or capable of sinning? If it be a truth that God possesses such a fixed aversion to infant innocency, as to be at such expense to make them all sinners, what must be his own character? Can it be altogether lovely?

While speaking of the opinion of those who suppose that the soul at its first existence" is not capable of moral exercise in any degree, and requires growth and enlargement to become capable,” Dr. Spring has the following inquiry: —

"How then is this spiritual, immortal existence to become capable of moral exercises? Mind,” he says, "does not grow like a vegetable. It cannot be enlarged by granulation. It expands and becomes vigorous only by exercise. But if the hypothesis on which we are animadverting be true, it is impossible for it ever to become more expanded or vigorous. It is not capable of exercise in any degree. It has nothing to begin with. I ask then again, how is this deficiency to be supplied." p. 16.

I am not an anatomist, in regard either to the soul or the body. I shall not attempt to give any account of the essence of the soul, or the manner in which its faculties are formed. I may, however, mention some things which seem to me probable, relating to the developement of these faculties — much more probable than that the soul at its first existence possesses a fund of knowledge, without having had any time or opportunity to acquire it.

From what we know of the manner in which ideas are acquired by adults and by little children, — and from what we know of the gradual advances of children in acquiring knowledge, it seems to me safe to infer, that the farther we trace back this progress, the fewer ideas the child will be found to have possessed, till we at length come to a period when it had not one idea. This is the state to which Dr. Spring refers when he "It has nothing to begin with."

says,

He supposes the child

must have a stock of ideas "to begin with," or it could never commence its march, How, then, I would ask, does the child obtain the stock "to begin with?"

But let it be supposed, that the mind or soul is organized for the purpose of receiving impressions or ideas through the medium of the bodily senses. Let it also be supposed, that when the child is born the faculty of Perception is in a state of forwardness corresponding with the infant state of the body, and that the body is furnished with infant senses, which are to be the mediums of light to the soul. The eye perhaps is the window through which the soul receives its first ideas of natural objects, external to itself. After acquiring a number of such ideas, Memory comes forward to retain the ideas acquired. Thus the soul may advance in its acquisition of ideas, and in the developement of its faculties, until at length it becomes capable of reflection, and of receiving some idea of a moral nature, perhaps at first but a single idea of moral right or wrong, and that too very imperfect.

The four "natural faculties," mentioned by Dr. Spring as necessary to moral agency, I should arrange in the following order. Perception, Memory, Reason, Conscience. This seems to me to be the order in which these faculties are developed. Perception, aided by the senses, gradually furnishes the soul with various ideas of natural objects. Memory is then needed to retain these ideas for further use. Then Reason is wanted, to compare, assort, and draw inferences. Conscience at last arrives, as God's vicegerent and advocate, in directing to a

good use of the stock in hand, and dictating as to what is right or wrong, duty or sin.

Such a gradual developement of the several faculties seems to me to correspond with what is observable in little children; and far more probable than that the soul possesses at the first moment of its existence the knowledge and the faculties necessary to moral agency - or to "know to do good, and do it not. In reference to this hypothesis of Dr. S. it may surely be asked, whence comes this stock of knowledge, this fund of ideas, prior to any opportunity to acquire them by any mode known to mankind?

It will be readily perceived that my aim has been to show, that a child at its birth has not the knowledge and the faculties requisite to moral agency; and, of course, that "some time must elapse between its creation and its moral character; and therefore that it cannot literally commence its existence as a sinner." But in reference to such reasoning or such a conclusion, Dr. Spring observes "We are constrained to say that it is a mere metaphysical quibble." He then goes on to say-"As well might it be said there is some conceivable time between the creation of matter and its essential properties, as to say there is some conceivable time between the creation of mind and its moral character. The sun, for example, is the source of light and heat; and at the instant of its creation it shines and warms." p. 19.

I freely submit my reasoning on this subject to the common sense of my Christian brethren. If I have exhibited no evidence that infants are not moral