a paffionate and hafty, but a fedate fettled defign upon another man's life, puts him in a ftate of war with him against whom he has declared fuch an intention, and fo has expofed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to deftroy that which threatens me with deftruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preferved as much as poffible, when all cannot be preferved, the fafety of the innocent is to be preferred and one may deftroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the fame reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reafon, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and fo may be treated as beafts of prey, thofe dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be fure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

§. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his abfolute power, does thereby put himself into a ftate of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a defign upon his life: for I have reafon to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my confent, would ufe me as he pleased when he had got me there, and deftroy me too

when

when he had a fancy to it; for no body can defire to have me in his abfolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i. e. make me a flave. To be free from fuch force is the only fecurity of my preservation; and reafon bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; fo that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, muft neceffarily be supposed to have a defign to take away every thing elfe, that freedom being the foundation of all the reft; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that fociety or common-wealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and fo be looked on as in a state of war.

§. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any defign upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, fo to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; becaufe ufing force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to fuppofe, that he, who would take away my liberty, would

not,

not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i. e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expofe himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggreffor in it.

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§. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the fate of nature and the State of war, which however fome men have confounded, are as far diftant, as a ftate of peace, good will, mutual affistance and prefervation, and a ftate of enmity, malice, violence and mutual deftruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common fuperior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the fate of nature. But force, or a declared defign of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common fuperior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the fate of war and it is the want of fuch an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggreffor, tho' he be in fociety and a fellow fubject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he fets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from prefent force, which, if loft, is capable of no reparation, permits me P

my

my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggreffor, because the aggreffor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decifion of the law, for remedy in a cafe where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's perfon, makes a ftate of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

§. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceafes between those that are in fociety, and are equally on both fides fubjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the paft injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no fuch appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggreffor offers peace, and defires reconciliation on fuch terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and fecure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and conftituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifeft perverting of justice, and a barefaced wrefting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of fome men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war:

for

for where-ever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to adminifter juftice, it is ftill violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiaffed application of it, to all who are under it; where-ever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the fufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in fuch cafes, an appeal to heaven.

§. 21. To avoid this ftate of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into fociety, and quitting the state of nature for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the State of war is excluded, and the controverfy is decided by that power. Had there been any fuch court, any fuperior jurifdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a fate of war: but we fee he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (fays he) be judge this day between the children of Ifrael and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then profecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and P 2

therefore