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Through all the above modes, with their respective tenses, the verb being considered as denoting an attribute, has always reference to some person, or substance. Thus if we say, Went, or, Go, or Whither goeth, or Might have gone, we must add a person or substance, to make the sentence complete. Cicero went; Cæsar might have gone; Whither goeth the wind? Go! thou traitor! But there is a mode or form under which verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to persons or substances. For example, To eat is pleasant; but to fast is wholesome. Here the verbs, to eat, and to fast, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a person or substance. Hence the Latin and modern grammarians have called verbs under this mode, from this their indefinite nature, infinitives. Sanctius has given them the name of impersonals; and the Greeks that of aπapéμþaτa, from the same reason of their not discovering either person or number.

These infinitives go further. They not only lay aside the character of attributives, but they also assume that of substantives, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several attributes. Thus, in the instance above, pleasant is the attribute attending the infinitive to eat; wholesome the attribute attending the infinitive to fast. Examples in Greek and Latin of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
Scire tuum nihil est.

Οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ ̓ αἰσχρῶς θανεῖν.

things temporary have their existence, as it were limited by time; that they are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they all submit to its power, according to those common phrases, that time is a destroyer; that things decay through time; that men forget in time, and lose their abilities; and seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth, indeed, is, time always attends motion. Now the natural effect of motion is to put something, which now is, out of that state in which it now is, and so far, therefore, to destroy that

state.

"The reverse of all this holds with things that exist eternally. These exist not in time, because time is so far from being able to measure their existence, that no time can be assumed, which their existence doth not surpass. Το which we may add, that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolution.

"To instance in examples of either kind of being. There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, that the

diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was there ever a time when it was not incommensurable, as it is certain there was a time when there was no Stonehenge, or Pyramids ? or is it daily growing less incommensurable, as we are assured of decays in both those massy structures?" From these unchangeable truths, we may pass to their place, or region; to the unceasing intellection of the universal mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See Nat. Ausc. 1. iv. c. 19. Metaph. 1. xiv. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. edit. Du Val. and note g, p. 11. The following passage may deserve attention.

Τοῦ γὰρ νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος οὔπω τέλεος, ἂν μὴ προσθῆς αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοεῖν ἀεὶ, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἐντελέστα τος ὁ νοῶν ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα. Max. Tyr. Diss. xvii. p. 201. edit. Lond.

y It is from the infinitive thus participating the nature of a noun or substantive, that the best grammarians have called it sometimes ovoμa pnμatikov, a verbal noun;" sometimes ovoμa phμatos, "the

The Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine pôμa, or "verb," a name which they denied to all the other modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the infinitive only. Thus the infinitives, Teρiжатеîν, ambulare, "to walk," mean simply that energy, and nothing more. The other modes, besides expressing this energy, superadd certain affections, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus ambulo and ambula mean not simply "to walk," but mean, "I walk," and "walk thou." And hence they are all of them resolvable into the infinitive, as their prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper character. Ambulo, "I walk;" that is, indico me ambulare, "I declare myself to walk." Ambula, “walk thou;" that is, impero te ambulare, "I command thee to walk;" and so with the modes of every other species. Take away, therefore, the assertion, the command, or whatever else gives a character to any one of these modes, and there remains nothing more than the mere infinitive, which (as Priscian says) significat ipsam rem, quam continet verbum.z

The application of this infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those verbs that denote any tendence, desire, or volition of the soul, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense, as well as syntax, to say, Bovλoμai îv, cupio vivere, "I desire to live;" but not to say, eooiw v, edo vivere, or even, in English, “I eat to live;" unless by an ellipsis, instead of “I eat for to live," as we say, eveкa тоû Sîν, or pour vivre. The reason is, that though different actions may unite in the same subject, and, therefore, be coupled together, (as when we say,

verb's noun." The reason of this appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive article before it in all cases ; τὸ γράφειν, τοῦ γράφειν, τῷ γράpe. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spencer:

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake, Could save the son of Thetis from to die. Ἀπὸ τοῦ θανείν. In like manner we say, * He did it to be rich,” where we must supply by an ellipsis the preposition for. "He did it for to be rich," the same as if we had said, "He did it for gain:" EVEка TOû #λOUTELY, ÉVEKA TOû Kéρdovs, in French, pour s'enricher. Even when we speak such sentences as the following, "I choose to philosophize, rather than to be rich," Tò φιλοσοφεῖν βούλομαι, ἤπερ τὸ πλουτεῖν, the infinitives are in nature as much accusatives, as if we were to say, "I choose philosophy rather than riches," Tv poroφίαν βούλομαι, ἤπερ τὸν πλοῦτον. Thus, too, Priscian, speaking of infinitives, Cur

rere enim est cursus; et scribere, scriptura; et legere, lectio. Itaque frequenter et nominibus adjunguntur, et aliis casualibus, more nominum ; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, et dicier, hic est.

And soon after, Cum enim dico, bonum est legere, nihil aliud significo, nisi, bona est lectio. 1. xviii. p. 1130. See also Apoll. 1. i. c. 8. Gaza Gram. 1. iv. Td dè àæapéμφατον, ὄνομά ἐστι ῥήματος, κ. τ. λ.

2 See Apollon. 1. iii. 13. Kalóλov mûv аρпyμévov àτó TIVOS, K. T. λ. See also Gaza, in the note before. Igitur a constructione quoque vim rei verborum (id est, nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere infinitivum possumus dignoscere; res autem in personas distributa facit alios verbi motus. Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. 1. xviii. p. 1131. From these principles Apollonius calls the infinitive ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, and Priscian, verbum generale.

"He walked and discoursed,") yet the actions, notwithstanding, remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to volitions and actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the volition is unintelligible till the action be expressed: cupio, volo, desidero; "I desire, I am willing, I want"-What? The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by infinitives, which express the proper actions to which they tend. Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre: "I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see." Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax.a And so much for modes, and their several species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters; it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism, (which last is no more than a combination of such truths,) must always be expressed under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to the indicative, we may denominate it, for that reason, the mode of science. Again: as the potential.is only conversant about contingents, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this mode the mode of conjecture. Again: as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming proficients; hence we may call the interrogative, the mode of proficiency.

:

b

Inter cuncta leges, et percontabere doctos,

Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid pure tranquillet, &c.

Hor.

Further still as the highest and most excellent use of the requisitive mode is legislative command, we may style it, for this reason, the mode of legislature. Ad divos adeunto caste, says Cicero, in the character of a Roman lawgiver; "Be it therefore enacted," say the laws of England; and in the same mode speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this mode that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science which he is about to establish.

There are other supposed affections of verbs, such as number and person; but these, surely, cannot be called a part of their essence, nor, indeed, are they the essence of any other attribute, being, in fact, the properties, not of attributes, but of substances. The most that can be said, is, that verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect

a Priscian calls these verbs, which naturally precede infinitives, verba voluntativu ; they are called in Greek προαιρετικά. See 1. xviii. 1129; but more particularly see Apollonius, 1. iii. c. 13, where this whole doctrine is explained with great accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. et

Lat. p. 685. edit. Var.

Nec omne απαρέμφατον cuicunque verbo, &c.

b Ob nobilitatem præivit indicativus, solus modus aptus scientiis, solus pater veritatis. Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.

the number and person of every substantive, that we may know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal attributes. The same may be said of sex, with respect to adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect beings, male or female, though substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex. We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining, is the difference of verbs as to their several species, which we endeavour to explain in the following

manner.

d

CHAPTER IX.

CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF VERBS, AND THEIR OTHER REMAINING

PROPERTIES.

ALL verbs, that are strictly so called, denote energies; now, as all energies are attributes, they have reference, of course, to certain energizing substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such energies, as to love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as men, birds, swords, &c. Further, every energy doth not only require an energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some subject. For example: if we say, Brutus loves, we must needs supply, loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one. The sword wounds, i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every energy is necessarily situate between two substantives; an energizer, which and third person are improperly so called, being, in fact, but negations of the other

It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a grammarian as Sanctius should justly deny genders, or the distinction of sex to adjectives, and yet make persons appertain, not to substantives, but to verbs. His commentator, Perizonius, is much more consistent, who says, At vero si rem recte consideres, ipsis nominibus et pronominibus vel maxime, imo unice inest ipsa persona; et verba se habent in personarum ratione ad nomina plane sicuti adjectiva in ratione generum ad substantiva, quibus solis autor (Sanctius scil. 1. i. c. 7.) et recte genus adscribit, exclusis adjectivis. Sanct. Minerv. 1. i. c. 12. There is, indeed, an exact analogy between the accidents of sex and person. There are but two sexes, that is to say, the male and the female; and but two persons, (or characters essential to discourse,) that is to say, the speaker and the party addressed. The third sex

two.

d Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note a of this chapter, p. 163, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an octavo volume, published 1750, the author Mr. John Petvin, vicar of Ilsington in Devon; a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the philosophy both of the ancients and moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

e We use this word energy, rather than motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of genus, which includes within it both motion and its privation. See before, p. 144.

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is active, and a subject, which is passive. Hence, then, if the energizer leads the sentence, the energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a verb active: thus we say, Brutus amat, "Brutus loves." On the contrary, if the passive subject be principal, it follows the character of this, too, and then becomes what we call a verb passive: thus we say, Portia amatur, Portia is loved." It is in like manner that the same road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is ascent, with respect to the foot is descent. Since then every energy respects an energizer, or a passive subject; hence the reason why every verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference to some noun for its nominative case.f

But to proceed still further from what has been already observed. Brutus loved Portia. Here Brutus is the energizer; loved, the energy; and Portia, the subject. But it might have been, Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the Roman republic; for the energy is referable to subjects infinite. Now, among these infinite subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the energizer also, as when we say Brutus loved himself, slew himself, &c. in such case the energy hath to the same being a double relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the Greeks to that species of verbs called verbs middle; and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the verb still retains its active form, and the passive subject (se or "himself") is expressed like other accusatives.

Again: in some verbs it happens that the energy always keeps within the energizer, and never passes out to any foreign ex= traneous subject. Thus when we say, Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth, it is impossible the energy should pass out, (as in the case of those verbs called by the grammarians verbs transitive,) because both the energizer and the passive subject are united in the same person. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting? It is the will and vital powers belonging to Cæsar. And what is the subject, made so to move or sit? It is the body and limbs belonging also to the same Cæsar. It is this, then, forms that species of verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call verbs neuter, as if, indeed, they were void both of action

f The doctrine of impersonal verbs has been justly rejected by the best grammarians, both ancient and modern. See Sanct. Min. 1. i. c. 12; 1. iii. c. 1; 1. iv. c. 3. Priscian. 1. xviii. p. 1134. Apoll. 1. iii. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper nominative supplied to all verbs of this supposed character.

5. Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπτωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ενεργετικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως: “The verbs, called

verbs middle, admit a coincidence of the active and passive character." Apollon. 1. iii. c. 7. He that would see this whole doctrine, concerning the power of the middle verb, explained and confirmed with great ingenuity and learning, may consult a small treatise of that able critic, Kuster, entitled De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

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