And thus it is, that all attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives. Besides the distinctions above mentioned, there are others which deserve notice. Some attributes have their essence in motion; such are to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of motion; such are to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation; such are the attributes of great and little, white and black, wise and foolish, and, in a word, the several quantities and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives; those which denote motions, or their privation, are either verbs or participles. k And this circumstance leads to a further distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all motion is in time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But, besides this, all rest or privation of motion implies time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one place for one instant only? So, too, is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. To stop, therefore, or rest, is to be in one place for more than one instant; that is to say, during an extension between two instants, and this of course gives us the idea of time. As therefore motions and their privation imply time as their concomitant, so verbs, which denote them, come to denote time also. And hence the origin and use of tenses, "which are so many different forms assigned to each verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various times in which such meaning may exist." Thus scribit, scripsit, scripserat, and scribet, denote all equally the attribute, to write, while the difference between them is, that they denote writing in different times. Should it be asked, whether time itself may not become, upon occasion, the verb's principal signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, (as in the words writeth and speaketh,) and different times by the same verb, (as in the words writeth and wrote,) neither of which could happen, were time any thing more than a mere concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives or substantives. Of the * Thus Proclus, in the beginning of his treatise concerning motion: 'Hpeuoûv or τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοπῷ ὂν, καὶ αὐτό, καὶ τὰ μέρη: “That thing is at rest, which for a time prior and subsequent is in the same place, both itself, and its parts." The ancient authors of dialectic or logic have well described this property. The following is part of their definition of a verb: ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσημαίνον xpóvov, "a verb is something, which signifies time over and above,” (for such is the force of the preposition πρός. If it should be asked, Over and above what? It may be answered, Over and above its principal signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing attribute. See Arist. de Interpret. c. 3. together with his commentators Ammonius and Boethius. adjective kind are timely, yearly, daily, hourly, &c.; of the substantive kind are time, year, day, hour, &c. The most obvious division of time is into present, past, and future, nor is any language complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended. Hence it is that in universal time past we may assume many particular times past, and in universal time future, many particular times future; some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of extension, as does every given line, however minute. Here, then, we are to seek for the reason which first introduced into language that variety of tenses. It was not, it seems, enough to denote indefinitely (or by aorists) mere present, past, or future, but it was necessary, on many occasions, to define with more precision what kind of past, present, or future. And hence the multiplicity of futures, preterites, and even present tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our ideas. However, as the knowledge of tenses depends on the theory of time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter. CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING TIME AND TENSES. m TIME and space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the extension of space, and between yesterday and tomorrow the extension of time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those of time only exist in transition or succession. Hence, then, we may gain some idea of time, by considering it under the notion of a transient continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of transition go, time is different from space; but as to those of extension and continuity they perfectly coincide. Let us take, for example, such a part of space as a line. In every given line we may assume anywhere a point, and therem See p. 18, note n. To which we may add what is said by Ammonius: ovde yàp ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ νῦν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. "Time doth not sub sist the whole at once, but only in a single now or instant; for it hath its existence in becoming and in ceasing to be.” Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. Β. L fore in every given line there may be assumed infinite points. So in every given time we may assume anywhere a now or instant, and therefore in every given time there may be assumed infinite nows or instants. Further still: a point is the bound of every finite line, and a now, or instant, of every finite time. But although they are bounds, they are neither of them parts, neither the point of any line, nor the now or instant of any time. If this appear strange, we may remember that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily extended also, it being essential to their character that they should measure their whole. But if a point or now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other points, and infinite other nows, (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest extension,) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible. These assertions, therefore, being admitted, and both points and nows being taken as bounds, but not as parts," it will follow, that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line, and the beginning of another, so the same now or instant may be the end of one time and the beginning of another. Let us suppose, for example, the lines A B, BC. I say, that the point B is the end of the line A B, and the beginning of the line B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain times, and let B be a now or instant. In such case, I say, that the instant B is the end of the time A B, and the beginning of the time BC. I say likewise of these two times, that with respect to the now or instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily future, as being subsequent. As, therefore, every now or instant always exists in time, and without being time, is time's bound; the bound of completion to the past, and the bound of commencement to the future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the medium of continuity between the past and the future, so as to render time, through all its parts, one entire and perfect whole." η φανερὸν ὁτὶ οὐδὲ μόριον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο τῆς μίας μόρια: “ It is evident that a now, or instant, is no more a part of time than points are of a line. The parts, indeed, of one line are two other lines." Natur. Ausc. 1. iv. c. 17. And not long before : Τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ σύγ κεισθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν : “A now is no part of time; for a part is able to measure its whole, and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts; but time doth not appear to be made up of nows." Ibid. c. 14. · Τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ From the above speculations there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as time present. For if all time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot, like a line, be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If, therefore, any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential? Further than this: if there be no such thing as time present, there can be no sensation of time by any one of the senses. For all sensation is of the present only, the past being preserved not by sense but by memory, and the future being anticipated by prudence only and wise foresight. But if no portion of time be the object of any sensation; further, if the present never exist; if the past be no more; if the future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts out of which time is compounded; how strange and shadowy a being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect nonentity? Let us try, however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power to seize this fleeting being. The world has been likened to a variety of things, but it appears to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνου ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχὴ, τοῦ δὲ τεAeurh: "A now or instant is (as was said before) the continuity or holding together of time; for it makes time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one time and the ending of another." Natur. Auscult. 1. iv. c. 19. Evvéxeca in this place means not continuity, as standing for extension, but rather that junction, or holding together, by which extension is imparted to other things. * Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήσειςc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον : “ For by this faculty (namely, the faculty of sense) we neither know the future nor the past, but the present only." Αριστ. περὶ Μνημ. Α. α. 4 ̔́Οτι μὲν οὖν ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε ̇ τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ οὔπω ἐστίν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτὲ οὐσίας: “ That therefore time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite time which is ever to be assumed still further and further. Now that which is made up of nothing but nonentities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of entity." Natural. Ausc. 1. iv. c. 14. Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ οὖσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισται καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ οὐπώ ἐστι· συμπαραθέει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος: “ How therefore is it that they approach nearly to nonentities? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exists the past and the future, and these are nonentities ; for the one is vanished and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural substances pass away along with time, or rather it is upon their motion that time is an attendant.” Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10. as others make their appearance. The senses look on while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing save what is present and instantaneous. But to the memory, to the imagination, and above all to the intellect, the several nows or instants are not lost, as to the senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be transitory and passing. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these instants under one view, together with that interval of continuity which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the idea of time." For example: The sun rises; this I remember it rises again; this too I remember. These events are not together; there is an extension between them-not, however, of space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognise some extension between them. Now what is this extension but a natural day? And what is that but pure time? It is after the same manner, by recognising two new moons, and the extension between these; two vernal equinoxes, and the extension between these; that we gain ideas of other times, such as months and years, which are all so many intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing intervals of continuity between two instants viewed together. And thus it is the mind acquires the idea of time. But this time it must be remembered is past time only, which is always the first species that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the idea of time future? The answer is, we acquire it by anticipation. Should it be demanded still further, and what is anticipation? We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, this pas * Τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ορίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτο φαμὲν εἶναι χρόνον : “ It is then we say there has been time, when we can acquire a sensation of prior and subsequent in motion. But we distinguish and settle these two by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the extremes to be different from the mean, and the soul talks of two nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is time, and this it is we call time." Natural. Auscult. 1. iv. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon |