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ment, où l'on montre quelle est l'étendue de nos connaissances certaines et la manière dont nous y parvenons: communiqué par Monsieur Locke.' "Here," wrote Le Clerc by way of note to his translation, "is the outline of an English work which the author has been good enough to publish, to oblige one of his particular friends "-of course Le Clerc himself— " and to give him an outline of his opinions. If any of those who take the trouble to study it observe in it any passage in which the author seems to them to be in error, or anything obscure or incomplete in his scheme, they are requested to communicate their doubts or objections to the printers. Though the author is not very anxious to publish his treatise, and though he thinks he would be wanting in respect to the public if he offered them what satisfied himself without first knowing whether they agreed with it or thought it useful, yet he is not so shy as not to hope that he will be justified in publishing his whole treatise by the reception accorded to his abridgment." The modest yet dignified purport of that note was evidently suggested by Locke, and was in keeping with the modest yet dignified temper that had guided him all through the preparation of his work.

"This abridgment," Le Clerc, who was naturally proud of having been the first to introduce his friend's bold arguments to the world, said long afterwards, pleased a great many persons, and made them desirous of seeing the work at large; but several who had never heard the name of Mr. Locke, and had only seen the abridgment in the Bibliothèque Universelle, thought that it was the project of a work of mine which was but yet designed, and that I fastened it upon an Englishman to know what the world thought of it; but they were soon

1 Bibliothèque Universelle, vol. viii. (1688), p. 141.

undeceived. I had some copies of it printed singly, to which Mr. Locke prefixed a short dedication to the Earl of Pembroke."1

2

Locke's epitome of 1687, of which we have his own manuscript copy as well as Le Clerc's French translation, shows that he added some chapters and re-arranged others before the essay itself was published in 1690. At least one paragraph of the essay, as we read in it, was written on the 11th of July, 1688,3 and in another he speaks of " this present year, 1689." It is clear, therefore, that additions and corrections were furnished up to the time when the sheets passed out of his hands, just as additions and corrections were made in each of the subsequent editions published in his lifetime. But the work was substantially completed in 1687.

Locke made no secret of the fragmentary and disjointed way in which he originally worked out the problems that, when the whole had been severally dealt with, he arranged in the order that seemed to him most suitable for the presentment of his complete argument or series of arguments.

"I must confess," he wrote in his third book, "that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it; but when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I

1 Eloge de M. Locke.' I have not been able to meet with a copy of this reprint and dedication.

2 Lord King,' pp. 362-398.

6

3 Concerning Human Understanding,' b. iv., ch. xi., § 11.

4 Ibid., b. iv., ch. xiv., § 29. In b. ii., ch. xv., § 8, however, Locke mentions 1671 as though it were the year in which that section was written.

found it had so near a connection with words that, unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge, which, being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions, and though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge at least, they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose upon our understandings."

This and some less important statements, together with certain inferences that may perhaps be legitimately drawn from various other passages and allusions, seem to show that, after sketching out the scheme put forward in the introductory chapter-which, as it stands, is hardly introductory to the whole work-Locke proceeded, at starting, to discuss, in the substance of what is now the second book, but much less comprehensively, "the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them;" that he then began, in what is now the fourth book, "to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it," and "to examine the nature and grounds of faith or opinion, and the reasons and degrees of assent; " but that, before he had completed that undertaking, he turned aside to prepare the wonderful 1 'Concerning Human Understanding,' b. iii., ch. ix., § 21.

treatise on words or language which is now the third book; and that ultimately he wrote several additional chapters of the second book, and, perhaps last of all, the three chapters on "innate principles," which, with the introductory chapter, constitute the first book."

1 Premising that my study of the phraseology of the essay, with this special object, has not been minute enough to lead me to speak authoritatively, if indeed it would be allowable in any case to speak authoritatively about the order of composition followed in a work avowedly "written by incoherent parcels, and, after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as humour or occasions permitted," I may briefly enumerate the following points in support of the suggestion made above :

1. The beginning of book ii. is in direct continuation of book i., ch. i. The latter ends thus: "I presume it will be easily granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds. Every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our first inquiry then shall be how they come into the mind." Book ii., ch. i., is 'Of Ideas in General and their Original,' and thus commences: Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, . . . . it is in the first place to be inquired how he comes by them," i.e., his ideas.

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2. That book iv. was begun before book iii. is clear from the passage quoted in the text. This, if it needs confirmation, may be slightly confirmed by a comparison between book iv., ch. iii., § 18 (also book iv., ch. xii., § 8) and book iii., ch. xi., § 16.

3. At least one part of book iv. was written before one part of book ii. Speaking of ideas of duration in book ii., ch. xvii., § 5, Locke says, “He that considers something now existing must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall here say no more of it." The "other place" is book iv., ch. x., § 3.

4. It seems to have been Locke's invariable rule to clear his ground as he went along, never to assume as proved anything that he intended afterwards to prove or try to prove. To this rule, I know of no exceptions in his argumentative writings out of the essay, whereas instances are numerous there, all tending to show, as I think, that book iv. was substantially written at an early date (ch. x. at any rate, as has been noted in the text, was written before 1683, when Shaftesbury referred to it on his death-bed), and the last three chapters of book i. last, or nearly last, of all. Without taking up too much space with quotations, I may refer the curious reader for such allusions

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But we must look at Locke's arguments in the order in which he chose to publish them.

The purpose of the Essay concerning Human Understanding,' as Locke announced in his introductory chapter, was "to inquire into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent." "In order whereunto," he said, "I shall pursue this following method. First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them. Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence and extent of it. Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge; and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent."1

and assumptions to book i., ch. ii., §§ 1, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 23, 27, 28, and book i., ch. iv., §§ 13, 21. Book i., ch. iv., § 1, assumes the whole argu

ment of book ii.

5. The extracts made from, and the references to, Thevenot and other travellers in book i., ch. iii., show that this chapter at any rate could not have been written till after Locke had studied their works. Locke made the acquaintance of Thevenot while in Paris, and after that was reading Thevenot's books, and communicating with him about barbaric customs. But I have given reasons for supposing that a large part of the essay was written at Montpellier, before Locke went to reside in Paris.

1Concerning Human Understanding,' b. i., ch. i., §§ 2, 3. The following references are to the fourth (the last edited by Locke himself) and subsequent editions. In the earlier editions, in consequence of his interpolations, the numbering of both chapters and sections is sometimes different. Except in one or two cases which will be noted, I have, however, in this chapter, quoted exclusively from the first edition, my desire being to give some account of his opinions at this time. A few later additions will be described in their chronological order.