which it is vain for the Society to plan, or the proprietors to build, (except on the fea-coaft for the encouragement of the fisheries), while the prefent fyftem of husbandry is followed. The landed intereft ought certainly to confider the increase of rent, which the fheep hufbandry would introduce, as a fufficient compenfation for the lofs of their feudal honours, power, and attendance.

If, befide an entire change in the fyftem of husbandry, the fifheries, and the manufactures of woollen and bar iron were properly established and regulated, the Highlands, instead of being thinly peopled with an indolent and wretched race, would become the abode of industry and comfort, and fupport an increased popu lation, not only in its own mountainous districts, but over every part of the empire.

ART. V. A Comparative View of the Public Finances, from the begin. ning to the clofe of the late Adminiflration. By William Morgan, F. R. S. Second Edition. With a Supplement, containing an account of the Management of the Finances to the prefent time. London. Longman & Rees. 1803. 8vo. pp. 115.

SUCH of our readers as intereft themselves in the financial affaire of Great Britain, must be well acquainted with the writings of this acute and diligent calculator. The tract now before us, may be confidered as a continuation of his Facts,' published in the year 1796. The object of both thefe performances, is to fubftantiate the charge of extreme profufion of the public money against the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, in both, nearly the fame mode of demonftration is adopted. Our author details the various items of the national expenditure-the loans negotiated for providing fupplies-the differences between the fums received and the debt created-the permanent addition to our public burthens in confequence of the augmented debtand the flowness of the procefs of liquidation, when compared with thefe augmentations. He lays before us a full view of all thofe circumftances of lofs and burthen, and compares their extent, during the last war, with their extent during the Sevenyears war, and the American war. He finds that the amount of the loffes incurred, and burthens impofed in confequence of the financial operations which the late conteft rendered neceffary, exceed in a very great proportion the fimilar loffes and burthens Entailed upon the country by the two preceding wars, even after all due allowance is made for the different durations of the hoftilities in the three periods; and he infers, that the minifters

under

under whofe aufpices fuch operations were carried on, are entitled, beyond any former adminiftration, to the appellation of extravagant; that the late war has been ruinous beyond all previous example; and that the accumulated burthens of this country have now brought it to the very brink of deftruction.

It is by no means our intention to follow Mr Morgan through all the statements by which he fupports thefe general pofitions. We fhall, however, endeavour to exhibit a fhort abftract of the refults of his calculations, which are formed apparently with great accuracy, and are certainly detailed in a very diftinct and luminous manner. We fhall then ftate the general objections which we have to urge against the conclufions which he has thought proper to found upon thefe premifes.

I. The chief expences of a war-establishment, are those of the army, navy, and ordnance. The average amount of the annual charges referable to thefe heads during the five years of war from 1755 to 1759 (both inclufive) was fomewhat lefs than 8,800,000l.; the greateft expenditure in any one year was above 13 millions; and the whole actual expence of that period, exceeded the whole estimated expence in the proportion of 1.43 to I nearly. The average amount of annual charges during the five years of war from 1778 to 1782 (both inclufive) was fomewhat lefs than 17,600,000l.; the greatest annual expenditure about 21 millions; and the proportion of the whole actual, to the whole estimated expences, nearly that of 1.76 to 1. The average of the annual charges during the five years of war from 1793 to 1797 (both inclufive), was above 25,800,cool.; the greatest yearly expenditure, about 294 millions; and the proportion of the whole actual, to the whole eftimated expences, that of 1.92 to 1. In the five years from 1798 to 1802 (both inclufive), the average yearly expenditure was above 29,400,000l.; the greatest annual expence upwards of 34 millions; and the proportion of the whole actual, to the whole estimated expences, that of 1.27 to I nearly.

II. In order to defray thefe extraordinary expences of the war establishment, loans to a great amount have always been required. During the Seven-years war, from 1756 to 1762 (both inclusive), 48,600,000l. were raised in this way; during the American war, (1776 to 1782, both inclufive), 57 millions were borrowed; during the first feven years of the late war, 141 millions, exclufive of the Imperial loan; and, during the three last years, nearly

* In the extraordinaries of this period, are reckoned various fubfidies, viz. the Imperial, Ruffian, Portugueze, and Pavarian, which are all charged to the army extraordinaries.

nearly 76 millions were raised in the fame manner. When these vaft fums were borrowed, the credit of government was almost always fo low as to render neceffary the creation of a confiderable fictitious capital of debt. In this way, the country, in confequence of its difficulties, and of the fcarcity of capital, came to be loaded with a debt much greater in amount than the money really received from the lenders; that is to fay, it became bound to pay interest for more than they actually advanced, and could only redeem the principal at par, by paying the whole nominal amount. Calculating the annuities according to their value at the period of their commencement, the difference between the funded debt created, and the money received, was, during the Seven-years war, near 9 millions; during the American war, near 29 millions; during the firft feven years of the haft war, about 774, exclufive of the lofs on the Imperial loan; and during the last three years of that war, above 39.

III. For paying the intereft and other yearly expences of the debt thus contracted, various permanent taxes have become neceffary, befides thofe extraordinary contributions which were levied during that part of the laft war when an attempt was made to raise the fupplies within the year. The burthens impofed in confequence of the debt incurred during the Sevenyears war, amount to above 1,900,000l.; the American war added nearly 3 millions; the feven fift years of the last war rendered an increafe of nearly 6 millions neceffary; and the three last years of the war entailed upon the country a farther load of above 2,900,000l., not including the income tax, upon which upwards of 56 millions were fecured, and the repeal of which rendered new permanent taxes requifite; fo that the permanent addition made to the public burthens by the loans of the feven first years of the late war, may be reckoned at above 7 millions, and the addition occafioned by the three last years, at more than 3 millions.

We shall now endeavour to exhibit, in the form of a Table, a comparative view (according to the foregoing details) of the expences, debts, and public burthens which have been occafioned by the three last years; affuming the statements for the Sevenyears war as unity, except where a proportion is given.

A

Seven-Years War.

Five firft

American War.

Late War, From 1793 to 1802 (both inclusive).

Seven Years. Five firft Years Seven Years. Five firft Years Five laft Years Seven firft Years Three laft Years

This Table condenfes the whole argument which can be drawn against the late war, and the financial operations that accompanied it, from contrafting its expences with thofe of the glorious conteft which gained America and India, or with thofe of the difaftrous ftruggle which deprived us of half our foreign dominions, and shook the whole empire. By comparing columns I, III, V, and VI, an estimate is eafily formed of the relative effects produced by the three wars, during the fame period of five years; a comparison of columns II, IV, and VII, exhibits the relative effects of the wars during the fame period of feven years; and the VIII. column continues the comparison through the last three years of the late war. Alf Mr Morgan's accufations against the late administration, derived from comparing it with former ministries, are therefore comprehended in this Table; while the whole cafe is thus brought forward, as well as the part favourable to his fide of the question.

From these ftatements (fays our author) the predeceffors of Mr Pitt, by a fyftem of progreffive extravagance, appear, during the course of a century, to have accumulated a debt of two hundred and thirtytwo millions, which their more prodigal fucceffor, in feventeen years, has increased to more than five hundred millions. Compared, therefore, with thofe of the late minifter, how weak and contemptible are all former exertions! The mafs which, in other hands, required one hundred years for its formation, has, under his management, been doubled in one twentieth part of the time; and the nation, long accustomed to regard the approach of the debt to one hundred millions as an approach to certain bankruptcy and ruin, have been led, by the experience of his adminiftration, to believe that public credit is almoft as boundless as minifterial profufion. Befides the addition of three hundred millions to the funded debt of the kingdom within the last eight years, a further fum of fix millions Sterling has been annually raised, from the year 1798, by triple affeffments, voluntary contributions, income-tax, convoy duty, and other measures of finance, equally new and extraordinary. Had these enormous fums been procured, like the reft of the fupplies, by the usual method of a loan, it would have appeared that the expenditure of the prefent war had already added above three hundred and fifty millions to the capital of the Public Debt, or one hundred and twenty millions more than all the wars that have defolated the country fince the Revolution. p. 13. 14.

The means by which the late miniftry were enabled to borrow fuch vaft fums, and to provide for the intereft of the loans, are difcuffed by Mr Morgan in a fuperficial and partial manner. The negotiation of loans could not, he thinks, be facilitated by the opulence of the nation, nor by the ftate of its credit, fince the poor-rates have been rapidly increafing, and the funds have been lower than in any former period of our hiftory. As foon as

the