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empire, the former are depreffing the national fpirit, and corrupt ing the morality of their country. This has certainly not even the paltry merit of a good paradox, and may be ranked with the author's own peculiar notions of the corn-trade or the land

tax.

The length to which our remarks have already extended, prevents us from entering into a minute difcuffion of the doctrines maintained in the differtation upon the foreign relations of the Ruffian empire. Although we are very far from agreeing with our author in the conclufions which he forms on this important fubject, we think he has ftated them with fome force, and, in many points, has argued the queftion with confiderable plaufibility. Much of his reafoning is, however, founded upon facts which we have no opportunity of verifying; and the most important part of thefe facts, the affertions refpecting the contraband trade of the neutral powers, confifts of fecret history, or allufions to private anecdotes, not authenticated by references to a fingle name. We entertain more than fufpicions of his whole information with regard to the conduct of the British diplomatic affairs in the northern courts during the late war.

Ruffa, our author maintains, has little or no intereft in the commerce of Europe. Her immenfe refources are all internal. and independent. With fcarcely any frontier to defend, the has the most ample means of annoying both Europe and Afia. Great Britain cannot invade her fovereignty of the Baltic, without the co-operation either of Sweden or Denmark, all chance of obtaining which has been entirely loft, together with the good-will of the reft of the world, by the unjuft and irritable conduct of the late administration. He inveighs with peculiar bitterness against the whole proceedings of Great Britain towards the fecondary powers, and particularly, thofe of the Baltic; and accufes her of firft forcing them into the arms of Ruffia, and then wreaking upon their heads, that vengeance which the dared not vent againft the Great Northern Empire. He draws a comparison between the conduct of Britain and France towards the allies whom they wifh to gain over, and determines the preference clearly in favour of the latter. He is decidedly of opinion, that Ruffia will foon make an attempt upon our dominions in the Eaft; and recommends, in a very earneft manner, the acquifition of Brazil by this country. All these topics, which we have only sketched with conciseness as the refults of his fpeculations, are illustrated at length, and many of them with much ingenuity. We particularly refer to his remarks upon the conduct of affairs in the Baltic his statements refpecting the difficulties, we fear the infurmountable difficulties of repeating in that quarter the naval campaign

of

of 1801, and, ftill more, of extending our attacks to the Swedish or Ruffian ports; and his obfervations on the means which Ruf fia poffefles of annoying our Eaft Indian empire.

II. In the last part of thefe Sketches,' entitled, France and Ruffia,' we are prefented with a view of the confequences which may refult to Great Britain from the continued alliance of thofe powers. It is obvious that fuch an inquiry must involve in a great measure a repetition of the previous fpeculations. We all only notice, in a very general way, the fubitance of such of our author's conclufions as have not already come under our re view.

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He contends that the two great nations will endeavour to unite the East Indian powers againit Britain, and encourage difaffection among the British and native troops; that they will in like man ner feduce the Weft Indian colonifts, by a promife of extending their market, and intimidate them by threats of underfelling, or of conquering them; that they will prevent Great Britain from receiving fupplies of grain either from Europe or America; fpare ro expence to create mutiny among our forces, and diffenfions among our manufacturers; and carry on an unceafing war against our finances in every quarter of the globe. Such are the indirect and fecret meafures of hoftility to which we fhall be exposed; and in order to counteract them, feveral expedients are pointed out by this bold and ingenious projector. We mult entirely conquer the native princes of the Peninfula; and, after confolidating cur Indian empire by force, we must fecure its future growth, as well as the continuance of fubordination, by reforming the internal adminiftration, deftroying all the fettlements of foreign na tions, and abolishing the monopoly: We muft at once fecure our Weft Indian property and compel other nations to permit a free colony trade, by laying open the commerce of our own fettlements. At home, we must cultivate our wafte lands, abolish all premiums and bounties in the provifion trade, and treat our fores with liberal attention; employing our land troops, during peace, in national improvements, and our feamen in the extenfion of the fifheries. He adds, that we ought perpetually to watch the operations of the enemy; and to confider every act of preparation, not inftantly explained, as a ground of hoftility. The other remedies for the injuries which our finances may sustain, are vaguely and unintelligibly stated.

The measures of direct hoftility to which the alliance of France and Ruffia muft expofe this country, are next defcribed. They confift, chiefly, in the formidable armament of above 230 fail of the line, between two and three thousand fmall craft, and 300,000 land forces, by which they will furround us from North Bergen

to

to Cadiz; thus hemming us in upon every fide, and compelling us to concentrate all our ftrength at home; while they carry into effect their favourite purpose of difmembering the more remote parts of the British empire. In the Mediterranean a fleet of 65 fail of the line, with fmall craft in proportion, will be ftationed to protect the fouth of Europe from our attacks, and to cover the projected defcent upon our eastern fettlements. In the weft,, our chief danger arifes from flotillas and other light armaments. To defend this ifland, the author decidedly preferibes the plan of multiplying our naval ftations on the caft coaft, and maintains that the fyftem of blocking up an enemy in his ports, at all times extremely difficult, will be utterly chimerical in the juncture now under contemplation. The fame object may, however, be attained with complete certainty, he thinks, by a fleet of 40 fail ftationed between the Downs and Buchannefs, at points where they may have good anchorage and proper fea-room. The security of our affairs in the Eaft and the Mediterranean is to be commanded by the poffeffion of Malta, or fome fuch impregnable ftation between Toulon and the Dardanelles. The projects of the enemy in the Weft Indies, are to be oppofed, our empire there augmented, and our whole dominions, in every quarter of the globe, raised both in wealth and in military ftrength, by the acquifition of Brazil, or of fome territory advantageously fituated, and fit for the creation of a powerful army; and by maintaining, at the fame time, a right intelligence with the United States upon the diftribution of the larger iflands.

On the many curious and important queftions to which thefe various schemes give rife, we do not purpofe at present to offer any remarks. We must, however, obferve, that it would be unfair to judge haftily of feveral of them, which, like all projects of political change, when fuperficially viewed, and detached from the facts and arguments that lead to their formation, appear yery rash and extravagant. It seems to us, on the contrary, that many very plaufible fpeculations are fuggefted by our author in fupport even of what timid reasoners may be difpofed to call his wildest projects. And we are convinced, that feveral important confiderations, of which he seems not to have been aware, may be urged in favour of the extenfion of our colonial dominions, at leaft in the New World-a part of his theory which will proba bly startle most of his readers.

ART.

ART. IV. Prize Effays and Tranfactions of the Highland Society of Scotland. To which is prefixed, an Account of the Principal Proceedings of the Society, fince 1799. By Henry McKenzie Efquire, one of the Directors. Vol. II. Edinburgh, Creech, Hill, and Conftable. 1803. 8vo. pp. 556.

IN

the account prefixed to the first volume of thefe Tranfactions, we are informed, that the objects of the Society are, 1. An inquiry into the present state of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, and the condition of their inhabitants: 2. An inquiry into the means of their improvement: and, 3. An attention to the prefervation of the language, poetry, and music of the Highlands. Before we proceed to particularize and to examine the papers which are contained in this fecond volume, it may not be improper to premise a few obfervations on each of thefe objects.

It is evident, that no regular and fyftematic plan of improvement can be laid down or purfued, until the prefent fituation of the Highlands, and of their inhabitants, is fairly and fully afcertained. Thofe particular plans, indeed, which have been found to anfwer, in carrying on the improvement of other countries, may afford fome general principles, which must be ferviceable even in the Highlands; but this district of the empire differs in fo many material points from every other, that the information which may be derived from the fyftems of improvement purfued in other countries, will either be too general, and confequently in a great degree useless, or, if adopted experimentally, will be found in many particulars inapplicable, if not prejudicial. We are therefore furprised that, in the two vo lumes which the Highland Society have published, there is only one very short and unfatisfactory paper on the obftacles to im provements in the Highlands. As we can entertain no doubt of the fincerity and zeal of the Society, we certainly expected, before this time, to have received, at their hands, a full, clear, and impartial account, not merely of the foil, climate, and produce of the Highlands, but also of those obstacles to their "improvement, which are known to exift in the prejudices and indolence of the peafantry, and in the ftate of dependence or vaffalage in which they are generally held by their tackfmen. It is abfurd to expect, that the Highland peafantry will be inclined to take the trouble, and to run the risk of introducing the culture of wheat, rye, cabbages, &c. all of which are recommended in thefe Tranfactions, unlefs it be previously afcertained, from a fair reprefentation of the foil and climate of their country, not only that they can be raised, but that they will be productive

productive of more advantage than can be derived from any other mode of employing their ground.

With regard to the fecond object of the Society-an inquiry into the means of improving the Highlands, we apprehend, that they ought, at the very commencement of their proceedings, to have applied themfelves to the determination of a few general questions, and to have been guided, in their particular inquiries, by the refults of fuch investigations. In this way, it appears to us, that they ought, firft of all, to have afcertained, whether it would be better to extend the culture of grain, or to keep the Highland diftricts entirely in pafture; and if the propriety and utility of the latter measure had been determined, to have then difcuffed, whether the Highlands ought to be stocked with black cattle or with feep. In the Appendix to the fecond volume, a premium is offered for the beft effay on the introduction of theep farming. If this question had been previously difcuffed with ability and fairnefs, with the affiftance of full information refpecting the produce and population refulting from the prefent agriculture of the Highlands, the pages now occupied with effays on arable husbandry, would have been more usefully filled with important practical obfervations on the proper breeds of sheep, and their management. It would not be difficult to prove, that by the introduction of the sheep hufbandry, a much greater quantity of food would be raifed at much lefs expence, and with much lefs labour or rifk. The objection is ftrong, merely when it appeals to our feelings, or to our national partiality: it will not bear to be examined cooly and fairly. Even if we grant that the neceffary confequence of the introduction of the theep husbandry would be, that many of the Highlanders would be obliged to leave their mountainous diftricts, and feek employment in the low country, it may very well be doubted, whether this stop would not be productive of great national benefit, even without the facrifice of any real individual happinefs. At prefent, the Highlands afford a fcanty and precarious fubfiftence to a thin population. The Highlanders themselves are indolent, because they perceive that no exertion or labour can fecure them a fubfiftence from their own foil. Under the sheep husbandry, the Highlands would produce fubfiftence for at least four times as many human beings as they now maintain, while their prefent inhabitants, if they could not be employed in their native country, might find an ample and much more ufeful field for their exertions in a climate and foil that would more gratefully repay them. There is great reafon, to believe, however, that thefe benefits might be obtained, without the expatriation of those Individuals who ftill cling to their mountains with fo affectionate

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