details of his work, he is often extremely ingenious, clear, and fatisfactory; but in the grouping and diftribution of thefe parts, he is apparently irrefolute or capricious; and he has multiplied and diftinguished thent by fuch a profufion of divifions and fubdivifions, that the understanding is nearly as much bewildered from the exceflive labour and complexity of the arrangement, as it could have been from its abfolute omiffion. In following out the difcuffions into which he is tempted by every incidental fuggeftion, he is so anxious to fix and to limit an ultimate principle of judgement, that he not only lofes fight of the general fcope of his performance, but pushes his metaphyfical analysis to a degree of fubtlety and minuteness that must prove repulfive to the greater part of his readers. In the extent and the fineness of thefe fpeculations, he fometimes appears to lose all recollection of his subject, and often feems to talk his ingenuity to weave fnares for his understanding. The powers and the peculiarities which were thus indicated by the preliminary treatife, were certainly fuch as to justify fome folicitude as to. the execution of the principal work. While it was clear that it would be well worth reading, it was doubtful if it would be capable of being read: and while it was certain that it would contain many admirable remarks, and much profound and original reafoning, there was fome room for apprehending that the author's propenfity to artificial arrangement and me taphyfical diftinctions might place his difcoveries beyond the reach of ordinary ftudents, and repel the curiofity which the importance of the fubject was fo likely to excite. Actuated probably, in part, by the confcioufnefs of thofe propenfities (which nearly difqualified him from being the editor of his own fpeculations), and still too bufily occupied with the profecution of his great work, to attend to the nice finishing of its parts, Mr Bentham, about fix years ago, put into the hands of M. Dumont. a large collection of manufcripts, containing the greater part of the reasonings and obfervations which he proposed to embody into his projected fyftem. These materials, M. Dumont, affures us, though neither arranged nor completed, were rather redundant than defective in quantity, and left nothing to the redacteur, but the occafional labour of felection, arrangement, and compreffion. This tafk he has performed as to a confiderable part of the papers entrusted to him in the work now before us; and has certainly given a very fair fpecimen both of the merit of the original fpeculations, and of his own powers of expreffion and diftribution. There are fome paffages, perhaps, into which a degree of Hippancy has been introduced, that does not harmonife with the general general tone of the compofition, and others in which we mifs fomething of that richnefs of illuftration and homely vigour of reafoning which delighted us in Mr Bentham's original publis cations; but in point of neatnefs and perfpicuity, concifenefs and precifion, we have no fort of doubt that M. Dumont has been of the most effential fervice to his principal, and are inclined to fufpect that, without this affiftance, we should never have been able to give any account of his labours. The plan which Mr Bentham has chalked out for himself in this undertaking, is more vaft and comprehenfive, we believe, than was ever ventured upon before by the ambition of any one individual. It embraces almost every thing that is important in the fcience of human nature, and not only touches upon all the higher questions of government and legiflation, but includes moft of the abftract principles of ethics and metaphyfics, and profeffes to delineate thofe important rules by which the fineft fpeculations of philofophy may be made to exert their influence on the actual condition of fociety. M. Dumont has exhibited, in his preface, a fhort catalogue of the articles which Mr Ben tham has enabled him to finish by delivering the manufcripts to his cuftody; and declares that they form but a part of the gigantic fyftem upon which he is still engaged. What Mr Ben tham has already executed, is as follows: 1. The general prin ciples of morals and legiflation: 2. The principles of law as applicable to civil queftions: 3. The principles of criminal law: 4. A detailed code of criminal law in terminis: 5. The principles of a code of remuneratory law: 6. A plan for the organization of the judiciary function: 7. A complete fyftem of legal procedure, comprehending the whole law of evidence, and all the forms of litigation? 8. A fyftem of political economy: and 9. A fyftem of tactics for legiflative affemblies, or of the rules according to which they should be conftituted and hould conduct their deliberations. There are, befides, fix fe parate treatifes on Invention in the Science of Legiflation; on the art of accommodating law to a change of time or place; on the methods of promulgating the law,' &c. &c. The prefent volumes do not by any means contain the whole of thefe differ tations; but M. Dumont affures us, that all the materials are in his hands, and that he has already brought them, into fuch form and order, as to fecure their fucceffive publication at no great diftance of time. The work now before us confifts of four principal parts... A general view of the principles of legiflation, compofed, in a good degree, from the Introduction formerly published in English A 2 English in 1789: 2. A general sketch of the complete system of laws which Mr Bentham proposes to erect upon those principles: 3. The application of thofe principles to the law in civil queftions: and 4. The application of the fame principles to the law with regard to crimes. To thefe are added, three detached treatises; one on the establishment of a new fort of house of correction, to be called the Panoptique; another on the method of promulgating the law; and the third on the influence of time and place in queftions of legiflation. From this fhort account of the contents of this publication, our readers will easily perceive that the merit of the whole fyftem must depend upon the foundness of the principles upon which it is profeffedly founded, and that the character of the book must be determined, in a great degree, by the manner in which the first part of it is executed. As the fubjects which are there treated of, are of the greatest intereft in themselves, and as they are difcuffed in a manner which the author at leaft conceives to be perfectly original, we fhall endeavour to lay before our readers, a full view, both of the doctrines which he has delivered, and, of the obfervations which have been fuggefted to us by their perufal. M. Dumont, who has more than the common right of an edi tor to be partial to the work he has brought into the world, is perfuaded that this publication muft make an epoch and a revolu tion in the fcience of which it treats; and affures us, that the • Introduction,' upon the principles of which it is founded, though not hitherto distinguished by any great fhare of popular applause, is already confidered in that light by the fmall number of compe tent judges by whom its merits have been appretiated. To this privilege, he fays, Mr Bentham's fpeculations are entitled, because they have fet the example of a new method of philofophifing in politics and morality, and because they contain the elements of a new system of logic, by means of which ethics and legislation are for the first time advanced to the dignity of a fcience. These pretenfions, it cannot be denied, are fufficiently magnificent; and the confidence with which they are announced, naturally leads us to inquire into the facts by which they are fupported. The principle upon which the whole of Mr Bentham's system depends is, that utility, and utility alone, is the criterion of right and wrong, and ought to be the fole object of the legiflator. This principle, he admits, has often been fuggefted, and is familiarly recurred to both in action and deliberation: but he maintains that it has never been pursued with fufficient fteadiness and refolution, and that the neceflity of affuming it as the exclufive teft of our proceedings proceedings has never been fufficiently understood. There are two principles, he alleges, that have been admitted to a fhare of that moral authority which belongs of right to that of utility alone, and have exercised a controul over the conduct and opinions of fociety, by which legiflators have been very frequently mifled. The one of these he denominates the afcetic principle, or that which enjoins the mortification of the fenfes as a duty, and profcribes their gratification as a fin; and the other, which has had a much more extenfive influence, he calls the principle of fympathy or antipathy, under which name he comprehends all those fyftems which place the bafis of morality in the indications of a moral fenfe, or in the maxims of a rule of right, or which, under any other form of expreffion, decide upon the propriety of human actions by any internal, unaccountable feelings, without any view to their confequences. In this place he introduces, by way of parenthefis, a technical enumeration of the fources and caufes of antipathy, of which he reckons fix-the repugnance of the senses-mortified pride-disappointed endeavours, &c. &c. He then fets himself to fhow that these principles have in many inftances fuperfeded the lawful authority of utility in the laws of moft countries; and imputes to this caufe the illufion which has led fo many legiflators to neglect the fubftantial happiness of their country, while they limited all their exertions to the promotion of its riches, its power, or its freedom, In the next place he combats, with great ability, the arguments of those who have affected to confider the principle of utility as a dangerous guide for our conduct, and endeavours to fhow that fuch reafonings really amount to a contradiction in terms; fince, to fay of any action that it is hurtful, dangerous, or improper, is just to say that it cannot have been adopted upon the principle of utility. As utility is thus affumed as the test and standard of action and approbation, and as it confifts in procuring pleasure, and avoiding pain, Mr Bentham has thought it neceffary, in this place, to introduce a catalogue of all the pleafures and pains of which man is fufceptible, fince thefe, he alleges, are the elements of that moral calculation in which the wisdom and the duty of legiflators and individuals must ultimately be found to confift. The fimple pleafures of which man is fufceptible are fourteen in number, and are thus enumerated-1. pleasures of fenfe: 2. of wealth: 3. of dexterity: 4. of good character: 5. of friendship: 6. of power: 7. of piety: 8. of benevolence: 9. of malevolence: 10. of memory: 11. of imagination: 12. of hope: 13. of affociation: 14. of relief from pain. The pains, A 3 our our readers will be happy to hear, are only eleven, and are almoft exactly the counterpart of the pleafures that have now been enumerated. The conftruction of thefe catalogues M. Dumont confiders as by far the greatest improvement that has yet been made in the philofophy of human nature. It is chiefly by the fear of pain that men are regulated in the choice of their deliberate actions; and Mr Bentham finds that pain may be attached to particular actions in four different ways, 1. by nature: 2. by public opinion: 3. by pofitive enactment: and 4. by the doctrines of religion. Our inftitutions will be perfect when all thefe different fanctions are in harmony with each other. The molt difficult part of our author's task remains. In or der to make any ufe of thefe elements of moral arithmetic, ' which are conftituted by the lifts of our pleasures and pains, it was evidently neceffary to afcertain their relative value, fo as to enable him to proceed in his legislative calculations with fome degree of affurance. Under this head, however, we are only told that the value of a pleasure or a pain, confidered in itfelf, depends, 1. upon its intenfity, 2. upon its proximity, 3. upon its duration, and 4. upon its certainty; and that, confidered with a view to its confequences, its value is farther affected, 1. by its fecundity, i. e. its tendency to produce other pleasures or pains; 2. by its purity, i. e. its being unmixed with other fenfations; and 3. by the number of perfons to whom it may extend. Thefe confiderations, however, the author juftly confiders as inadequate for his purpofe; for by what means is the intenfity of any pain or pleafure to be measured, and how, without this knowledge, are we to proportion punishments to temptations, or adjust the measures of recompenfe or indemnifica tion? To folve this problem, Mr Bentham feems to have had recourfe to his favourite fyftem of enumeration, and to have thought nothing elfe neceffary than to make out a fair catalogue of the circumftances by which the fenfibility is affected.' Thefe he divides into two branches-the primary and the fecondary. The firft he determines to be exactly fifteen, viz. temperament-health-ftrength-bodily imperfection-intelligence-ftrength of understanding-fortitude-perfeverancedifpofitions-notions of honour-notions of religion-fympathies -antipathies-folly or derangement-fortune. The fecondary circumftances that determine the degree of fenfibility to good and evil, are only nine, viz. fex-age-rank-education-profeffion-climate-creed-government-religious creed. By attending to these circumftances, Mr Benthain is of opinion that |