always to be kept in readiness, and that the fame fyftem is to bet extended to America and the Weft Indies. This we really believe was written during a period of apparently profound peace, and deferves fome attention.

The remaining part of the fpeculations on France, is occupied with an inquiry into the line of conduct which the will probably purfue towards the only two powers which can now give her any trouble, Ruffia and England. The fubftance of our author's opinion upon this interefting topic, may be comprised in a few fimple propofitions.

1. France and Ruffia are the only powers in modern Europe that have acted fyftematically for any confiderable length of time. (He feems to forget the whole hiftory of Pruffia.) The plans of Louis XIV. have now been completed; the dependence of Spain fecured; the fovereignty of Holland acquired, and Auftria greatly weakened. Between France and Ruffia there is only a frontier and a few neutral ports. The object of the former is to overcome the latter; and for effecting this, it will be enough if the obtains an afcendancy in the affairs of Turkey; a confideration which fufficiently explains her uniform repugnance to take any joint measures with Ruflia against the Porte. But,

2. France will begin by endeavouring to rid herself of all incumbrances which might hang upon her rear; and will, therefore, remain at peace with Ruffia, until the can fecure the defenfive inactivity of Great Britain. This fhe expects to command, by affording no points of attack, and by completing the ruin of our finances; an object easily attainable, the thinks, by forcing us to keep up expenfive preparations, and by excluding us from the commerce of the continent.

3. Our author conceives the rupture of France and Ruffia to be the most fatal iffue of the prefent crifis to the other powers of Europe. It must terminate in the univerfal fovereignty of either one or other of those overgrown ftates.

We fhall now fhortly indicate what appear to us the fundamental errors in all thofe dogmas. Admitting that France could reduce Britain to inactivity by the means above specified, it does not feem to follow that fuch inactivity would be more than temporary. As foon as the rest of the plan was attempted,—as foon as France began to attack the rest of the European powers,--Britain would be at full liberty to repay, as the has often before repaid, their cowardly or jealous backwardnefs in her caufe, by making a diverfion in their favour, and aflifting them to repel the common enemy. But farther-Although we were to admit that Auftria and Pruffia are unable, by their union, to refift the power of France or of Ruffia, it would by no means follow, that

they

they could oppofe no barrier to her attacks upon Ruffia, or that they could not give a check to Ruffia, were the to form the defign of penetrating into the weft of Europe. And it is very evident, that while the existence of those states is continued, even if they are reduced to a fubordinate rank, they must be ready to avail themselves of the rupture which may take place between the great eastern and western members of the federal commonwealth. Nay, fuch a rupture will even give the still more dependent branches of the community, the northern powers, Italy and Spain, the power of throwing off that yoke under which they at present groan. While Britain is attacking France, and while Spain, for example, fhall be able to maintain a fleet of fixty fail of the line, according to our author's estimate (p. 65, note), is it not clear, that fo important a ftate will find it eafy to fhake off its dependence at the first change of fortune which may attend the French arms? If, on the other hand, Ruffia fhould remain master of the field, can fhe at once retain her dominion over the enemy whom the fhall have subdued, and forge chains for the allies by whofe affiftance fhe has conquered? We fee no proof whatever in these Sketches,' that the prefent fituation of affairs, difmal as it is in fome refpects, particularly in regard to the leffer ftates of Europe, will lead to a total dereliction of thofe found and natural principles of policy which have hitherto preferved the independence of the chief nations in the European commonwealth.

We have one more remark to offer upon the unqualified licenfe of calculation which our author uniformly affumes, whenever it is neceffary for his argument, to exalt the probable force, He thinks it or wealth or energy of either France or Ruffia. fufficient to confider the natural advantages of thofe ftates, and to contemplate the tendency of fuch refources to expand in the courfe of a few years. He forgets that a proportional or a greater augmentation may in the fame time be preparing the other ftates for coping with the increased forces of thofe two powers; and that nothing is more likely to accelerate this contemporary progrefs, than the very circumftance which renders it fo defirable. This confideration is too obvious to require far ther illuftration. It is exemplified in the whole courfe of modern hiftory; it is prefented to us by a view of the comparative advances which the nations of Europe have made in all the branches of their wealth, their accomplishments, and their di rect military power; it applies to every fpeculation in which our author has indulged-to his eftimates of manufacturing and mercantile refources, as well as to his estimates of revenue and force; and it tends, in no fmall degree, to difpel the apprehen

Lions

fions which his gloomy pencil might have raifed in thofe whe contemplate his very partial Sketches' of our political views.. II. The next object of attention is the Ruffian empire; and in this branch of his fpeculations the author has, in our opinion, displayed both more fobriety and more acuteness of thought. The introductory obfervations, however, bear the fame marks of a prefumptuous and hafty investigation, which we fo frequently recognised in the former part of his work.

He lays it broadly down, that the interests of Ruffia (which form the fole guide of the government), are as little connected with thofe of other nations, as the court etiquette at Peking is with the ceremonies of the conclave at Rome. She has no natural ally. Her frontiers are

one half furrounded with an unnavigable ocean; fix-sevenths of the other half are covered with Afiatic nations and wandering tribes, and miftress of the Baltic and Black Sea; the remaining part is inacceffible; that is, the space, we may fay ifthmus, between Riga and Ocza kow, is the only frontier the Ruffian government has to guard; and Europe cannot organize a force that could now make any impreffion on that quarter. Were the hero of Marengo, with all his veterans, on the banks of the Borifthenes, it is by no means likely that he would risk a journée de Pultava.' p. 108.

Instead of enumerating any of the various arguments which immediately fuggeft themfelves to refute this ftrange doctrineftrange at least in the extent to which it is here pufhed-we may only refer to the greater part of the fpeculations into which the author has himself entered in the preceding half of his work; more especially to the following paffage, fo fingularly demonftrative of his detached and exclufive manner of viewing each part of his fubject.

In the prefent ftate of things, can Ruffia and republican France go mutual fharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire ? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to fay, it is impoffible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretenfion? The cabinet of Petersburgh muft certainly know, that should the Confulate be allowed to affume an afcendancy at Conftantinople, or to interméddle in the affairs of Turky, the fate of Mofcow nay again be difputed at Pultava! p. 72.

We likewife find him roundly afferting, by fome unaccountable miftake or caricature of the economical theory, that the inhabitants of any country who live by trade and manufactures, are not only themselves unprofitable confumers, but their fubfiftence and gains are taxes or burthens on the induftry and confumption of others.' (p. 182.) The expence of this clafs in England is greater,' he adds, than that of the whole Ruffian army; but While the latter is now and then adding a new kingdom to the

they could oppose no barrier to her attacks up they could not give a check to Ruffia, were i fign of penetrating into the weft of Europ evident, that while the existence of those state if they are reduced to a fubordinate rank, to avail themselves of the rupture which may the great eastern and western members of th wealth. Nay, fuch a rupture will even give pendent branches of the community, the no and Spain, the power of throwing off that they at present groan. While Britain is att while Spain, for example, fhall be able to fixty fail of the line, according to our autho note), is it not clear, that fo important a ft to fhake off its dependence at the first chan may attend the French arms? If, on the fhould remain mafter of the field, can the dominion over the enemy whom she shall forge chains for the allies by whose affifta: ed? We fee no proof whatever in these present fituation of affairs, difmal as it is ir ticularly in regard to the leffer ftates of F total dereliction of those found and natura which have hitherto preferved the indepe nations in the European commonwealth.

We have one more remark to offer up cenfe of calculation which our author unif ever it is neceffary for his argument, to exa or wealth or energy of either France or fufficient to confider the natural advantages to contemplate the tendency of fuch refo course of a few years. He forgets that greater augmentation may in the fame ti other ftates for coping with the increased powers; and that nothing is more likely t temporary progrefs, than the very circun it fo defirable. This confideration is too ther illuftration. It is exemplified in the dern hiftory; it is prefented to us by a vic advances which the nations of Europe ! branches of their wealth, their accompli rect military power; it applies to every f author has indulged-to his estimates mercantile refources, as well as to his e force; and it tends, in no finall degree,