Now, admitting that France fhall fuddenly become much more expert than England and Holland in fisheries, and in the carriage of fish, and fhall thus engrofs the Mediterranean market, as well as fupply her own home confumption, we think our author's calculations are here, as ufual, made very much at random, and we know that in many points they are inaccurate. It would follow, for example, from his eftimate of the whale fishery, that the veffels engaged in it required above fixty-fix men each; whereas, the average of the crews in the British whalers, from 1798 to 1800, both inclufive, was only thirty-four; and if the French veffels are manned nearly at twice the expence, how is the blubber trade to be carried on in the face of British competition?-not to mention that he has affumed the creation of a French whale fishery in two years, nearly twice as extenfive as the British whale fishery is at this moment. Our author applies the fame fpecies of arithmetic to the colony and coafting trade of France: He fuppofes, that the former will employ 50,000 feamen of all kinds. We know that the British colonies do not at prefent occupy above one fourth part of this number; and that the French colonies, in their most flourishing ftate, never employed above 33,000, although the veffels were mauned on fo expenfive a fcale, as to render the price of freight a great deal higher than it ought to have been. Altogether, he concludes that the French fisheries and trade will employ 120,000 able feamen, and about the fame number of young men and boys. We have been thus minute in our remarks upon the first calculations in which the author indulges, that, after affording a fpecimen of his rafhnefs in treating one very important branch of the subject, we may be at liberty to follow him more generally in the remaining parts of his fpeculations.

One very prevailing opinion, which occurs in various forms through these sketches, is the extreme danger to which England is expofed by St Domingo remaining in the poffeffion of France. We extract the following obfervations upon this fubject as new, and affording a fair average fpecimen of his ftyle:

Of the numerous faults and blunders committed by the feveral parties concerned in the late revolutionary war, next to Great Britain, the government of America has made the moft irretrievable. To enter into war, for the mere purpose of acting upon the defenfive, is the most ridiculous of all political absurdities. Such parties generally receive more blows than they give; and in the end, they are fpurned at by their friends, and defpifed by their enemies.

As the United States are fituate, poffefling an immenfe length of coaft, a great number of mercantile ports, and the feveral provinces producing but little variation in their exportable commodities; to enable

their rapidly increasing population to maintain a profitable intercourfe with the rest of the world, a certain portion of the fugar-trade is indifpenfably neceflary. A fmall fettlement or two would be of little importance to America; nor can it be expected that this government will be fatisfied with fuch. But how are they now to acquire any great poffeffion?

During her warfare with France, or at any time prior to the deftruction of Toufaint, America might have eatily fecured St Domingo; a fingle proclamation, declaring that ifland an integral part of the fede ral republic, and an independent ftate in the union, would have inftantaneously rallied both Wacks and whites around her standard. And what had the United States to apprehend from France? Careffes and attention: but certainly no fort of danger.

The acquifition of St Domingo would have been, both in a commercial and political confideration, every thing that America could rationally defire: it would have enabled the United States to carry on a wide, extenfive, and profitable maritime trade; and, as it would have rendered the political and mercantile interefts of America and Great Britain reciprocal and mutual, by fecuring the British poffeffions in the Weft Indies, it would have raifed an infuperable barrier between the United States and their perfidious fifter, the French Republic.

The opportunity is now loft! The partial patriotism of her chief magiftrate, has, to all appearance, deprived America, perhaps for ever, of becoming that confpicuous nation, which nature, and the spirit of her inhabitants, certainly defigned her to be in a few years. The politics of the acting prefident feem to be guided by no other fyftem, than the perfonal animofities of Mr Jefferfon: he feems to bear malice against the British government; and that hatred is, with him, a fufficient reason to make America the unconditional dupe of the French Republic.

St Domingo loft, the Americans have turned their views towards the island of Cuba; they confider the acquifition of that fettlement, as the certain refult of a quarrel with Spain, and they pretend to have already a plaufible pretext to make a claim upon that forlorn monarchy. But will France, now military miftrefs of the gulph of Mexico, fuffer to fettle, under the lee of St Domingo, a power which might thereby become her rival in the colony trade? Certainly not; the very idea is repugnant to common fenfe. The Confulate may perhaps permit, and even encourage America to quarrel with Spain, with Portugal, or with Great Britain; but the Republic will referve to herself the objects of their differences, as a pledge of their future tranquillity.

Although the rulers of France know enough of the principles of found policy, not to build the permanency of their government upon the caprice or partiality of temporary minifters; yet we fee their leading fyftem is, to manage the official and public men in other countries, fo as to render their influence, ignorance, and credulity fubfervient to the confolidation of the Confular Republic, The Verfaillian

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policy

policy of the Confulate, being well feconded by a revolutionary audacity, and fupported with energetic firmness, has contributed more than all the Jacobin armies of France, to fubdue the corrupt and cowardly governments of other ftates. The Confuls have been remarkably fortunate in finding manageable men abroad, it is true, and it must be confeffed they have known to make use of them; for fhould the governments of Europe and America hereafter fee their errors, the Confulate has taken special care, that they fhall not have the means to retrieve them. The French are now in poffeffion of the whole island of St Domingo, with all their former fettlements in that quarter, and Louifiana is ceded in fovereignty to the republic; fo, in all probability, are the Floridas: With thefe poffeffions, fhe is indifputably miftrefs of the Gulph of Mexico; General Bowles and his Creek nations will foon become her auxiliaries; and fhe will either fraternize, or revolutionize the Southern States of America, already difpofed to break up the Union.

Thefe, we think, will in all probability be the confequences of Prefident Jefferson's fhort-measured politics. p. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

We fhall very briefly point out a few of the various confiderations which are here overlooked. In the first place, admitting that a proclamation might have fecured the colony to America, fhe would have been involved in war with France upon Weft Indian territory, and would in all time coming have been implicated both with Britain and France in the fame part of the world. Secondly, The jealoufy of Britain muft have been excited against a neighbour like the United States, independent and fubject to none of the checks neceffarily impofed on colonial dominions, extending herself in a quarter where the British fettlements are peculiarly valuable, and, unfortunately, not lefs weak, than worthy of being retained. Thirdly, It is unlikely that France, after lofing almoft all her dominions in the Weft Indies, would be prepared (as our author thinks, p. 32, note) to unite with her natural enemy in preventing the farther progrefs of the new Weft Indian power. It is rather to be apprehended, that she would affift America in her defigns upon the reft of the iflands. Lafly, The author forgets in what ftate St Domingo has been for thirteen years; how long a period muft elapfe, after the nominal restoration of the mother country's authority, before a complete reestablishment of order and confolidation of refources can be effected; how heavy a burthen the colony muft in the mean time prove to every political movement; and how material a diverfion its rebellious population will for many years create in all military operations which France may undertake in the Gulph of Mexico. He has argued as if that ifland were as peaceful as it is fertile, and as fecure for defence, or for a point of attack, as any department of the mother country. While we agree with him, in wifhing that France could, by any fafe means,

be deprived of the colony, we conceive that much lefs danger can refult from her retaining it, than from its being transferred to the negroes, or even to the United States, poffeffed, as the federacy now is, of Louisiana. And even if France regains her authority in the island, we are convinced it must be for many years a pledge of peaceful conduct, in fo far as its commerce and cultivation may be deemed valuable, and in as much as its internal organization must remain infecure.

From the commercial refources of France, our author proceeds to confider her profpects in a military point of view. After remarking that the national preeminence, acquired by accidental circumstances, such as the appearance of illuftrious individuals, is neceffarily fhort-lived, he inveighs against the invidious doctrine,' as he terms it, that a people, fighting in their own cause, are more energetic and effective, than a nation contending for lawful rulers. He maintains, that the rabble will always pafs from one master to another; that national fpirit is of no avail, without obedience to a chief; and that a country poffeffes military ftrength exactly in proportion to its population and means of fubfiftence. On this, it is obvious to remark, that the fpirit with which a nation is animated, must always enter as an element into the calculations of the force which may be derived from its numbers and wealth. An undifciplined rabble is not, indeed, a very dangerous enemy, in whatever cause it attempts to act. But it is to be hoped that order may eafily be united with zeal, and that the feeling of intereft which infpires a multitude in a particular conteft, may lead them to act against the enemy with the force derived from difcipline, as well as the vigour that may be excited by the paffions--may at once increase their fpirit of fubordination, and inflame their defire of conqueft. We fondly cherish such hopes, more especially in the prefent crifis, because we conceive there is no other profpect of fafety for England.

The natural advantages of France in a military point of view, our author conceives to be juft twenty per cent. higher than those of any other continental territory equally extenfive and populous, Auftria, he allows, may, with a population of twenty millions, maintain a peace establishment of 260,000 men. And France, having thirty millions of inhabitants, must, by the proportion just now ftated, be able to fupport an army of 450,000. By a fimilar application of his rule, he estimates the war eftabithments of Auftria, Pruffia, Sweden, Denmark, and the Germanic powers, at 760,000; of which 370,000 woula be neceffary for the internal arrangements of thofe ftates, while France could fend beyond the frontiers an acting army of 390,000 men.

In point of revenue, her advantage is ftill greater. She can raife, by an average affeffment of 15 per cent. on the national income, as much as all the other independent powers of the continent can procure by a burthen of 30 per cent. The data by which this part of his calculation is fupported, are peculiarly gratuitous and unauthorifed. How can this man, or any man, tell, that the Austrian landholders pay altogether just 33 per cent. of their income, the cultivators or peafants 50 per cent., and the burghers 20 per cent.? We know that the Bavarian peafantry have generally been reckoned the moft opprefied of any in the empire; and Mirabeau computes their burthens at only 44 per cent. of their income, eftimating the latter fo low as 5 per cent. on their stock. But we give almost as little credit to the one as to the other of thefe random valuations.

The military organization of France is defcribed by our author as peculiarly well adapted to call forth the whole energies of the people. There are more than fix millions able to bear arms, and two millions and a half of these are between eighteen and twenty-three years of age. No degree of rank or wealth exempts men from confcription; and this evil, fo much inveighed againft, is only hard upon the opulent and indolent part of the community. We doubt extremely if the confcription be practically of this univerfal and unfparing operation. If it be, the danger from the republican conftitution is indeed imminent to the rest of Europe; but we imagine it must be fhort-lived in the fame proportion. A ftate of things, more incompatible with internal ftability and the developement of national refources, could not eafily be figured.

The frontier of the republic, always ftrong and flanked as it now is by the most advantageous works (Holland, Switzerland, and Italy), is confidered by our author, and we think moft juftiy confidered, as formidable to all her neighbours in an unprece dented degree. Her colonies, however unneceffary to a nation poffefed of fuch internal capabilities, are extremely important as ftations from which Great Britain may be attacked in her tendereft point-her foreign fettlements and trade; and as the means, alfo, of commanding either the property, or, if it fhall be deemed more advantageous, the commerce, of the Spanish and Portuguese territories in the New World. In Europe, we are told, that France may foon add a navy to her prefent enormous forces; but that her fhips of war will probably be ftill found unequal to cope with thofe of Britain-and that mott danger is To be apprehended from her light flotillas, not only in Europe, but in the colonies. Our author adds, that depôts are preparing along the north coast of France for 1590 or 2000 light veficia always