Page images
PDF
EPUB

to which all men are agreed, than if he refolves to fet them altogether at defiance, and to be guided by nothing but those perceptions of utility which he muft collect from the fame general agreement. It is now, we believe, univerfally admitted, that nothing can be generally the object of moral approbation, which does not tend, upon the whole, to the good of mankind; and we are not even difpofed to difpute with Mr Bentham, that the true source of this moral approbation is in all cafes a perception or experience of utility in the action or object which excites it. The difference between us, however, is confiderable; and it is precifely this-Mr Bentham maintains, that in all cafes we ought to difregard the prefumptions arising from moral approbation, and, by a refolute and fcrupulous analyfis, to get at the naked utility upon which it is founded; and then, by the application of his new moral arithmetic, to determine its quantity, its compofition, and its value, and, according to the refult of this investigation, to regulate our moral approbation for the future. We, on the other hand, are inclined to hold, that these feelings, where they are uniform and decided, are by far the fureft tefts of the quan tity and value of the utility by which they are fuggefted; and that if we difcredit their report, and attempt to ascertain this yalue by any formal procefs of calculation or analyfis, we defert a fafe and natural standard, in pursuit of one for the construction of which we have yet no rules nor materials. A very few obfervations, we truft, will fet this in a clear light.

The amount, degree, or intensity of any pleasure or pain, is afcertained by feeling, and not determined by reafon or reflec tion. These feelings are tranfitory in their own nature, and are not easily recalled with fuch precifion as to enable us, upon recollection, to adjust their relative values. When they prefent themselves, however, in combinations, or in rapid fucceffion, their relative magnitude or intenfity is perceived by the mind without any exertion, and rather by a fort of immediate feeling, than in confequence of any intentional comparison. When a particu lar combination or fucceffion of fuch feelings is repeatedly fuggested to the memory, the relative value of all its parts is perceived with great readinefs and rapidity, and the general refult is fixed in the mind without our being confcious of any act of reflection. In this way, moral maxims and impreffions arife in the minds of all men, from an inftinctive and involuntary valuation of the good and the evil which they perceive to be connected with certain actions or habits; and thofe impreffions may fafely be taken for the just refult of that valuation which we may afterwards attempt unfuccefsfully with great labour to repeat. They

may

may be compared, on this view of the matter, to thofe acquired perceptions of fight by which the eye is enabled to judge of dif tances; and by which we fhall be much more fafely and commodiously guided, within the range of our ordinary occupations, than by any formal fcientific calculations, founded on the faintnefs of the colouring, and the magnitude of the angle of vifion, compared with the average tangible bulk of the kind of object in question.

The comparative value of fuch good and evil, we have already obferved, can be determined by feeling alone; fo that the interference of technical and elaborate reafoning, though it may well be fuppofed to disturb thofe perceptions upon the accuracy of which the determination must depend, cannot in any cafe be of the fmallest affiftance. Where the preponderance of good or evil is diftinctly felt by all perfons to whom a certain combination of feelings has been fuggefted, we have all the evidence for the reality of this preponderance that the nature of the fubject will admit, and must try in vain to traverfe that judgement by any fubfequent exertion of a faculty that has no jurifdiction in the caufe. The established rules and impreffions of morality, therefore, we confider as the grand recorded result of an infinite multitude of experiments upon human feeling under every variety of circumftances, and as affording by far the nearest approximation to a juft standard of the good and the evil that human conduct is concerned with, which the nature of our faculties will allow. In endeavouring to correct or amend this general verdict of mankind in any particular inftance, we not only fubftitute our own individual feelings for that large average which is implied in the prevalence of moral impreflions, but we run the common risk of omitting or mistaking fome of the most important elements of the calculation. Every one at all accustomed to reflect upon the operations of his mind, must be confcious how difficult it is to retrace exactly thofe trains of thought which pafs through the understanding almost without giving us any intimation of their existence, and how impoffible it frequently is to repeat any procefs of thought when we propofe to make it the fubject of obfervation. Our feelings are not in their natural state when we can study their afpects attentively; and their force and direction are better eftimated from the traces which they leave in their fpontaneous vifitations, than from any forced revocation of them for the purpose of being measured or compared. When the object itself is inacceffible, it is wifeft to compute its magnitude from its fhadow; where the caufe cannot be directly examined, its qualities are most fecurely inferred from its effects.

One

One of the most obvious confequences of difregarding the gea neral impreffions of morality, and determining every individual queftion upon a rigorous estimation of the utility it might ap pear to involve, would be, to give an additional force to the principles by which our judgments are apt to be perverted, and entirely to abrogate the authority of thofe general rules by which alone men are commonly enabled to judge of their own conduct with any tolerable degree of impartiality. If we were to difmifs altogether from our confideration thofe authoritative maxims which have been fanctioned by the general approbation of man kind, and to regulate our conduct entirely by a view of the good and the evil that promifes to be the confequence of every particular action, there is reafon to fear, not only that inclinas tion might flip in a falfe weight into the fcale, but that many of the most important confequences of our actions might be overlooked. Thofe actions are bad, according to Mr Bentham, that produce more evil than good: but actions are performed by individuals, and all the good may be to the individual and all the evil to the community. There are innumerable cafes, in which the advantages to be gained by the commiffion of a crime are incalculably greater than the evils to which it may expofe the eriminal. This holds in almost every inftance where unlawful paffions may be gratified with very little risk of detection. A mere calculation of utilities would never prevent fuch actions; and the truth undoubtedly is, that the greater part of men are only withheld from committing them by thofe general impreffions of morality, which it is the object of Mr Bentham's fyftem to fu perfede. Even admitting, what might very easily be denied, that, in all cafes, the utility of the individual is infeparably connected with that of fociety, it will not be difputed, at least, that this connexion is of a nature not very striking or obvious, and that it may frequently be overlooked by an individual deliberating on the confequences of his projected actions. It is in aid of this overfight, of this omiflion, of this partiality, that we refer to the general rules of morality; rules, which have been suggested by a larger obfervation, and a longer experience, than any individual can dream of pretending to, and which have been accommodated by the joint action of our fympathies with delinquents and fufferers to the actual condition of human fortitude and infirmity. If they be founded on utility, it is on a utility that cannot always be difcovered, and that can never be correctly eftimated in deliberating upon a particular meafure, or with a view to a fpecific ourfe of conduct; it is on a utility that does not discover itfelf till it is accumulated, and cply. becomes apparent after a large collection

collection of examples have been embodied in proof of it. Such fummaries of utility, fuch records of uniform obfervation, we conceive to be the general rules of morality, by which, and by which alone, legiflators or individuals can be fafely directed in determining on the propriety of any courfe of conduct. They are obfervations taken in the calm, by which we must be guided in the darkness and the terror of the tempeft; they are beacons and ftrongholds erected in the day of peace, round which we mut rally, and to which we muft betake ourselves in the hour of cont:it and alarm.

For thefe reafons, and for others which our limits will not permit us to hint at, we are of opinion, that the old established morality of mankind ought upon no account to give place to a bold and rigid inveftigation into the utility of any courfe of ac tion that may be made the fubject of deliberation; and that the fafeft and the fhorteft way to the good which we all defire, is the beaten highway of morality, which was formed at first by the experience of good and of evil.

But our objections do not apply merely to the foundation of Mr Bentham's new fyftem of morality: We think the plan and execution of the fuperftructure itfelf defective in many particul Jurs. Even if we could be perfuaded that it would be wifer in general to follow the dictates of utility than the impreffions of moral duty, we thould be fully at liberty to fay that the fyftem. contained in the fe volumes does not enable us to adopt that fubftitute: it prefents us with no means of meafuring or comparing utilities. After perufing M. Dumont's eloquent obfervations on the incalculable benefits which his author's discoveries were to con fer on the fcience of legiflation, and on the genius and good fortune by which he had been enabled to reduce morality to the precision of a fcience, by fixing a precife ftandard for the good and evil of our lives, we proceeded with the perufal of Mr Bentham's endlefs tables and divifions, with a mixture of impal Kence, expectation and difappointment. Now that we have nilhed our tafk, the latter fentiment alone remains; for we perceive very clearly, that M. Dumont's zeal and partiality have impofed upon his natural fagacity, and that Mr Bentham has just left the fcience of morality in the fame imperfect condition in which it was left by his predeceffors. The whole of Mr Bentham's catalogues and diftinctions tend merely to point out the number of the caufes that produce our happinefs or mifery, but by no means to ascertain their relative magnitude or force; and the only effect of their, introduction into the fcience of morality feems to be, to embarrass a popular fubject with a technical 'nomenclature,

menclature, and to perplex familiar truths with an unneceffary intricacy of arrangement. Of the juftice of this remark, any one may fatisfy himself, by turning back to the tables and claffifications which we have exhibited in the former part of this analyfis, and trying if he can find there any rules for eftimating the comparative value of pleasures and pains, that are not perfectly familiar to the most uninstructed of the fpecies. In the table of fimple pleasures, for inftance, what fatisfaction can it afford," to find the pleasure of riches fet down as a diftin&t genus from the pleasure of power and the pleasure of the fenfes, unlefs some scale were annexed by which the respective value of thefe pleasures might be afcertained? If a man is balancing between the pain of privation and the pain of fhame, how is he relieved by finding these arranged under feparate titles? or, in either cafe, will it give him any information to be told, that the value of a pain or pleasure depends upon its intenfity, its duration, or its certainty? If a legiflator is defirous to know whether murder or forgery be the greatest crime, will he be contented to hear that the evil of every crime is either of the first, the fecond, or the third order, and that all crimes produce the two firft, and have a tendency to produce the latter alfo, if they be not vigorously repreffed? If he wish to learn what degree of punishment is fuitable to a particular offence, will he be greatly edified to read that the fame punishment may be more or lefs fevere according to the temperament, the intelligence, the rank, or the fortune of the delinquent; and that the circumstances that influence fenfibility, though commonly reckoned to be only nine, may fairly be fet down at fifteen? Is there any thing, in fhort, in this whole book, that realifes the trimphant Introduction of the editor, or that can enable us in any one inftance to decide upon the relative magnitude of an evil, otherwife than by a reference to the common feelings of mankind? It is true, we are perfectly perfuaded, that by the help of thefe feelings, we can form a pretty correct judgement in moft cafes that occur; but Mr Bentham is not perfuaded of this; and infifts upon our renouncing all faith in fo incorrect a standard, while he promises to furnish us with another that is liable to no fort of inaccuracy. This promife we do not think he has fulfilled; because he has given us no rule by which the intensity of any pain or pleasure can be determined, and furnished us with no inftrument by which we may take the altitude of enjoyment, or fathom the depths of forrow. It is no apology for having made this promife, that its fulfilment was evidently impoffible.

In multiplying thefe diftiations and divifions which form the bafis of his fyftem, Mr Bentham appears to us to bear lefs re

femblance

« PreviousContinue »