there was a powerful party in the country able to retaliate upon their perfons and their property. In juftice to the emigrant armies, he obferves, that their conduct has fufficiently fhown, that the nobility of France were eager to expofe their lives, where that could promote the fuccefs of their caufe: And if they had remained in the country, many of the maffacres would have been prevented by the apprehenfions of the cowardly affaffins who effected them. If the emigrants had remained in the country, they would have had no occafion to court the protection of foreign powers; and therefore, any negociations they entered into with them, would have been made upon a more independent footing, and they might have acted in concert with them without injuring their own caufe.

M. Puiffaye endeavoured to follow out the views of infurrection which he had formed. The inhabitants of Meuilles, who were fufficiently numerous to form a battalion, unanimously chose him their commander. The district of Devereux afterwards had recourfe to him to fuperintend its organization, and he obtained the command of about 4000 men. The measure of emigration now came to operate generally, and thofe who reforted to that measure adopted it with enthusiasm: on the other hand, those who did not concur in it, became violent on the other fide. The refufal of invitations to emigrate produced reproaches, which were followed by threats. The Royalifts even went fo far as to keep lifts of the dates of emigrations; and a week fooner or later was held to form a fhade of difference in their pretenfions. So confident were they of fuccefs, that they confidered thofe who were late in joining them, as intruders among thofe on whom the rewards of the restoration were to be bestowed. In thefe circumftances, few men could remain neutral, except thofe feeble fpirits who, in times of distraction, endeavour to fave themselves by keeping up connexions with both parties. The number of fuch men, we are told, was immenfe (Vol. II. 68, 69.); and it was only in Brittany, Poitou, Anjou, and fome of the fouthern parts of France, that any energy was fhown. M. Puiffaye, however, found a fufficient number of men whom he could depend upon, to intruft with the most important ftations. All that he could do with the reft, was to lead them indirectly to the object he had in view. While he was employed in procuring the information, and forming the arrangements neceffary for his purpofe, the horrors of the 10th of August took place. The electoral affemblies were at that time convoked, to elect their reprefentatives in the Convention. M. Puiffaye was upon the point of being chofen ; but the Jacobins had recourfe to

an

an intrigue, which prevented his election. Our author declares, that although he took no steps to obtain votes, he would have accepted the fituation. He had no longer the fame motives to reftrain him from acting, which had operated fo powerfully upon him in the Conftituent Affembly; and he thought that his efforts might have contributed to preferve the life of the King, and that the fituation would have been favourable to the plans he had in view.

Baron Wimpfen, the defender of Thionville, was one of the perfons whofe affiftance M. Puiffaye was moft defirous to procure. He did not at once disclose to him his ultimate defigns, but proposed to him the measure of raifing an army of the line in Normandy. He reprefented to him the probability, that undifciplined troops raised in other parts, would be fent there under the command of fome ignorant and inexperienced Jacobin, and that this inconvenience would be avoided by raising an army entirely compofed of men in the country commanded by M. Wimpffen. M. Puiffaye engaged to get the two departments of l'Orne and l'Eure to propofe the plan, while Wimpffen undertook for the departments of Calvados and La Manche. M. Wimpffen appeared to enter into all his views, and M. Puiffaye entertained hopes of faving the King, which were foon afterwards difappointed by his fudden trial and execution. After this event, General Wimpffen was chofen commander of the army which was to be raised in Normandy, and our author was placed at the head of his ftaff. The army was to confift of 17 or 18,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. There was at that time at Caën a regiment of light cavalry newly raised, commanded by Colonel Dumont, a brave and loyal officer.

While M. Puiffaye was employed in carrying on these arrangements, the downfal of the Girondifts took place. The members of that party who efcaped from Paris, endeavoured to prevail upon the provinces to take up arms in their behalf. *M. Puiffaye had no attachment to their characters or plans; and declares he has no doubt that, if they had fucceeded, they would have fubjected France to a tyranny not lefs odious than that which was ultimately impofed upon it, though probably more permanent, as the work of greater reflection. the prefent state of his preparations, he felt that adopting their caule would be ruinous to his defigns; though, if his preparations had been farther advanced, he might have availed himself of the opportunity to overthrow the power of the convention. He was invited to attend a general affembly of the members of the diftricts and municipalities at Alençon; and the meeting feemed disposed

In

to

to adopt the cause of the fugitives, when his opinion was asked. He prevailed upon them to take no further step than that of fending deputies to confült with the other departments. He was prevailed upon to go as one of thefe deputies; and on his way he received intelligence that Wimpfen had been forced to accept the command of the infurrection, and that when he at first refused to do fo, his life was threatened. M. Puiffaye felt himfelf called upon to abandon his own opinion, and join his commander. When they met, Wimpffen confirmed the accounts which he had received upon the road, and, from the language he held, fhowed he had no expectation of fuccefs. M. Puiffaye now felt himself bound to ufe every exertion to fupport his friend and commander. When he returned to Alençon, he found that a material change had taken place in the fentiments of the people. The Jacobins had ufed every measure to make themselves popular; and M. Puiffaye was reminded that he had held very different fentiments a few days before. It was in vain he reprefented that the other departments had not at that time declared themfelves, and that it was neceffary to do nothing with precipitation; but that after having determined, it was their intereft and duty to join in a caufe which was now no longer that of individuals. The intrigues and money of the Convention, however, prevailed, and it was with difficulty that our author escaped from Alençon.

The events which followed are minutely detailed, and are fuch as might be expected to take place in an infurrection of men, whofe fentiments and ideas were fo widely different. Scherer, afterwards minifter of war, was appointed to command the troops oppofed to them by the Convention. M. Puiffaye was fent to stop his march; and took the poft of Cofberil, after a flight refiftance. In this command, he had many dif ficulties to contend with. Each of the battalions of volunteers brought along with them one or two commiffaries from their refpeclive departments, who claimed a right to direct, or at least to be confulted upon all occafions. Bougon, procureur-general of the department of Calvados, was particularly abfurd and troublefome. Some perfons fufpected him of holding a correfpondence with the Convention. M. Puiffaye acquits him of that charge; but, at the fame time, defcribes him as one of thofe vain and weak characters, who, while they grafp at every perfonal advantage, in cafe their party fhall fucceed, endeavour to fecure a retreat in cafe of failure. When M. Puiffaye determined to attack the enemy, Bougon, after ufing every expedient to prevent a meafure fo oppofite to his fentiments, confoled himself, by drawing up a proclamation, which

he

he infifted on having read, even after the enemy had begun their fire, in order, as he faid, that it might at leaft be known that they had begun first. The engagement took place upon the 14th of July, near the Caftle of Brécourt, which is fituated between the forefts of Vernon and Pacy. The troops of the convention began the attack. They were, however, thrown into confufion upon the first charge. M. Puiffaye was then defirous to purfue them; but he found that his cavalry, who were not accustomed to the found of cannon, were thrown into confufion -the enemy got into the woods-and the commiffaries infifted upon the danger of ambufcades and mafked batteries in cafe they purfued. M. Puiffaye then wifhed to return to Pacy, where he would be fecure from furprife; but the commiffaries oppofed this alfo, and magnanimoufly infifted upon keeping poffeffion of the field of battle. After giving orders for placing the proper guards, M. Puiffaye, who had fuffered feverely from exceffive fatigue and the heat of the weather, which had brought on an attack of the erysipelas, had not been above two hours in bed, when he was awaked by an attack of the enemy. Finding that they were not purfued, the conventional troops had rallied, and had paffed the outpofts, without being perceived by the guards, who had fallen afleep. The greater part of M. Puiffaye's troops immediately took flight, and cried out they were betrayed. One corps alone remained. In the midst of the confufion, M. Puiffaye, with fome difficulty, got two guns pointed at the enemy, which difmounted one of their cannon. They immediately ceafed firing, took to flight, and their cavalry did not ftop until it arrived near Verfailles. The confufion on the part of the victorious troops was however irretrievable. Although there was no enemy near them, no perfuafion could induce them to return to the ground they had occupied. Even the patroles that were fent out, were fo much terrified, that before they had gone a mile and a half, they returned with affurances that the enemy was in their immediate neighbourhood. This panic was decifive of the fate of the infurrection. The money diftributed by the emiffaries of the convention completed what terror had begun; and M. Puiffiye was obliged to follow his troops to Evereux, and afterwards. to Caen. Wimpfen propofed, if he could have obtained a thoufand men, to have maintained a strong pofition before Caën; but none were willing to engage in the fervice, and they were obliged to feparate.

The whole of thefe tranfactions are extremely charcteristic of the ftate of the country, and of the conduct of the perfons and troops engaged in the bufinefs upon both fides. The infurgents either retired to places of concealment, or endeavoured to obtain terms from the convention, Carrier VOL. IV. NO. 7.

H

entered

entered Rennes, and made all that affected difplay of humanity which the revolutionary cut-throats at one time thought proper to profefs. Tranfparent lamps, reprefenting the national colours, were hung up in the ftreets upon a rejoicing which took place. Carrier went up and down the streets breaking with his flick thofe tranfparencies which were red. That colour,' faid he, fills me with horror-it conveys ideas of blood. Carrier held this language! Vol. II. p. 216.

M. Puiffaye, with fome other affociates, retired into Brittany, where he remained for fome time in concealment. We do not wish to diminish the intereft our readers will take in reading the book, by anticipating the account of the many efcapes and adventures he pailed through. He found a great party of the people difcontented with the Convention, and others decided Royalifts. Most of their pricfts ftill remained among them in difguife, and were concealed in mines and places under ground. M. Puiffaye vindicates them from the charge which has been made against them, of endeavouring to excite their parishioners to revolt, by employing tricks and fanatical devices. Our author declares, that in the midft of all their perfecutions, they uniformly preached doctrines of the pureft morality. M. Puiffaye gradually obtained the confidence of the people among whom he was concealed, and was invited to place himself at their head. His plan was, to form his partizans into very fmall parties, and to accustom them gradually to face an enemy. He was aware that if men are undifciplined, it is impoffible for them to act with effect in large bodies. His reflections upon this fubject, though they have rather the air of a moralift than of a revolutionary leader, fhow great powers of difcrimi

nation.

True courage,' he obferves, is the refult of reflection. It is a proftitution of that word to apply it to the effects of any paffion, although they fometimes fupply its place. Experience confirms and developes it. I have feen a man who had run away before my eyes at the firft found of a fhot, after fome experience face the greatest dangers with intrepidity. It is abfurd to fay fuch a nation is brave-fuch another is not. There is not a nation, on the face of the earth, which has not at fome periods been diftinguifhed for its valour. If we go back to thofe periods, we shall fee, that this courage, fo much celebrated, proceeded from long fervice. There is no more merit in being brave after a few battles, than in making good fhoes after a long apprenticeship. A foldier is formed like an artizan. The firft National Guards of France began by flying tumultuously before the allied armies. Hardened by experience, they would have removed the frontiers of their country to the boundaries of Europe, and overturned the world. In this refpect, thofe powers, whofe armies took but a fmall

fhare