The first question which divided the Nobles was, whether the powers they received from their conftituents fhould be examined by all the orders, or by each order feparately? Both the majority and minority of the Chamber of Nobles confidered this as decifive of the great question, whether the three orders fhould deliberate together, or feparately? Our author, with a degree of refinement which fuch queftions do not appear to admit, -voted for having the powers of each reprefentative examined by all the orders, though he, upon all occafions, declared his refo Jution to oppose the legislative junction of the three orders. In vindication of this conduct, M. Puiffaye maintains, that every member of the affembly had a juft right to be fatisfied with the powers of those who exercifed legiflative functions. The que ition he confidered as in itself too trifling to be contested, and as likely to exafperate the third eftate, from whom more fubftantial conceffions were to be required. We muft obferve, that, independently of the endless difputes to which fuch an examination would give rife, the members of every representative body are best acquainted with the rights of their conftituents, and are most interested to preferve them. It may fometimes be neceffary, in order to counteract the effects of partiality and intrigue, to delegate fuch a talk to a fmaller number, on whom the reftraints of character and refponfibility may operate more powerfully. But it never can be a wife measure, to place minute and tedious investigations in the hands of a more numerous body. Neither can we agree with M. Puiffaye, that fuch a conceffion was likely to produce any good effects.

Our author gives many striking inftances of the intrigues and cabals which prevailed at this time. He complains loudly of the monotony of talents which prevailed, and of the want of a man of commanding genius, able to awe and reprefs the filly orators, who daily came forward, and who were ready to facrifice every principle to the pleasure of making a fpeech. What our author lamented, was a matter of exultation to others. A courtier who fat near M. Puiffaye could not conceal his fatisfaction at having as yet heard nothing which made him feel any apprehenfions; and added, that he began to think that he would have fome weight. Vol. I. p. 223.

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M. Puiffaye then illuftrates his favourite pofition, that the downfal of the monarchy cannot be attributed to the effort of any individual, or of any party, by a sketch which he draws of Orleans. * It is too long to lay before our readers; but we ftrongly recom

Vol, I, p. 238.

mend

mend it to their perufal, as fhowing uncommon acuteness, and great powers of obfervation. The conclufion which he forms is, that no party exifted during the first years of the Revolution. No faction poffeffed that degree of union, attachment, or mutual cooperation which could entitle them to fuch appellation. The Orleans faction, he obferves, so far from forming a party, to which the fall of the state can be attributed, was merely the refult of the general relaxation of order, and the imbecility of the govern

ment.

M. Puiffaye, from having voted with the minority on the first queftion, was invited to attend their meetings, and was at laft perfuaded to go to one held at the Marquis of Montefquiou's, mafter of the horse to Monfieur, now Lewis XVIII. He was then surprised to find, along with the deputies of the minority, at least an equal number of those who in public acted along with the majority. Nothing remarkable took place at this meeting, or nothing which could induce our author to vary from the principles which he had already adopted, of avoiding all political connexions. In conformity with the instructions of his constituents, and his own opinion, he fteadily opposed the meafure of uniting the three orders into one chamber. This important measure was at length agreed to by the Court, after a feeble fhow of oppofition, which deprived them of any temporary popularity which fo important a conceffion might have produced. Our author confidered this as a measure which was calculated to lead to all the diforders which afterwards took place; and his first refolution was to refign his feat, and retire to his province, until he fhould be called upon to act. By the advice of his friends, however, and the entreaties of his conftituents, he was prevailed upon to remain; but when he returned to the Affembly, he gave in a proteft against the union of the three orders, and refused to deliver up the inftructions of his conftituents. After giving an account of the violent measures which were daily adopted by the Affembly, our author enlarges upon the difgraceful partiality with which they pafled over the riots of the 5th and 6th of October, in which, according to the report of the Chatelet, the Duke of Orleans, Mirabeau, and many others of the Affembly, were deeply implicated. Some of the minority figned a proteft against it. Our author, who had not been acquainted with their intentions, drew up a declaration of the fame nature for himself, which was inferted in the Gazette of Paris. * M. Puiffaye complains that

fome

* M. Puissaye cautions the reader against confounding the Gazette de Paris with the Journal de Paris,-papers diametrically oppofite,

fome of the agents of the Royalist party at Paris afterwards endeavoured to fpread a report, that he had belonged to the faction of Orleans; and he refers to a letter from Brothier and La Villebeurnay, which proves that they wrote to him that they intended to reprint M. Puiffaye's declaration, and to diftribute it anew, at the very moment when they were privately propagating these falfehoods. This, our author obferves, is but a fmall fpecimen of the intrigues and infamous devices by which he has been affailed for a long courfe of years.

Though M. Puiffaye had retained his feat in compliance with the wishes of his conftituents, and occafionally attended the meetings of the National Affembly, he determined to take no active hare in its deliberations. He felt that even reafon, eloquence, and truth, could have no effect upon men who were determined to refift conviction; and he therefore refolved not to fanction the proceedings of an Affembly which he confidered as illegal, by becoming one of its orators. He then lays before his readers a letter addrefied to the Compte d'Artois, in 1797, in which he vindicates himself from the charge of having fat on the left fide of the Affembly. He throughout kept the fame feat which had been appointed for him as a reprefentative of the nobility; and when the members afterwards came to arrange themfelves according to their factions, the one upon the extremity of the left fide, and the others upon the right, he, along with fome other reprefentatives of the nobility, retained the feat which had been originally affigned him. He conceived that ftruggles and intrigues in that place could now be of no avail; and he endeavoured to form those connexions which might be of ufe in the more ferious conteft which he forefaw to be approaching. He occafionally attended the Affembly, to prevent any fufpicions being entertained with regard to him; but he refufed to become a member of any of the committees for which he was elected, and avoided all connexion with clubs or fecret affemblies. When the King came to the Afiembly, M. Puiffaye took the conftitutional oath along with the other members. He was, however, by no means blind to the gharing defects which that Conftitution contained. After expreffing his contempt for its authors, and enumerating its defects, he obferves-

This is, however, that conftitution which I have fworn to maintain along with twenty-nine thirtieths of France. I do not blame thofe who refufed to do fo; but I confidered it as the laft refource, as the only weak prop which might ftill fupport for a time the ftate, which was already on the point of diffolution: and I have not hesitated to facrifice my own ideas and perfonal interefts to that motive.' Vol. I.

P. 372.

The

The ftate of affairs, at this period, was widely different from what it was at the commencement of the Revolution, when delay and uncertainty were moft pernicious; but, now, it was by delay alone that a favourable opportunity could be obtained. The next remarkable circumftance which occurred after the King's acceptance of the conftitution, was his flight to Varennes; a step, which was occafioned by the outrages of the one party, and the folicita tions of the other. Our author obferves, that on this, as well as on many other occafions, the Royalist party adopted the very ineafures which their enemies wished them to take. After the King's flight to Varennes, and his arreft, he no longer enjoyed even the appearance of freedom which made his orders binding; and our author felt that the constitutional oath was annulled in point of fact, and that the time was come when force alone could refcue France from the abyfs in which it was almost swallowed up. Our author had to choose between two measures-that of emigration or infurrection; and he preferred the latter. Subfequent events, he affures us, have not affected his opinion upon that fubject. He felt that it was his duty to fave his King and his country; and it did not occur to him to begin by abandoning both. (Vol. II. p. 6.) The interior of the kingdom offered much greater refources for the formation of a Royalift army; and the measure of affembling an army in a foreign country, where they must be entirely dependent on the powers with which they connected themselves, was calculated to defeat the fuccefs of the plan.

M. Puiffaye enters into a difcuffion of the policy which it was expedient for foreign nations to obferve when the French Revolution broke out; and he maintains, that the true interest of foreign powers was to avoid all offenfive measures, and to form a defenfive league to prevent any encroachment upon the part of the Revolutionary government. Before the Revolution, France was an object of jealousy to the other powers of Europe, from the extent of its territory, and the character of its population. When it changed its government, it was likely to become ftill more formidable. Offenfive operations were, however, directly calculated to increafe the power of the Revolutionary rulers, and to afford the means of forcing various claffes of men to concur in their measures, who were otherwife difpofed to oppofe them. The fame conclufions are drawn from a particular confideration of the policy of each individual nation. The combined powers, according to M. Puiffaye, deviated from that policy, from views of aggrandizement which they were encouraged to entertain from the affurances they received of the weaknefs of the French government. The retreat

of

of the Duke of Brunswick, which has often been confidered as fo great a mystery, may thus be explained upon obvious principles. He entered France with the idea that he was to meet troops without courage or difcipline, and an army whose officers were either ignorant of their profeffion, or difpofed to betray them. The arrangement which had been made in that perfuafion, and the expectations which had been built upon it, fell at once to the ground, when he found himfelf oppofed by an army commanded by a moft skilful general, who, after retreating from one strong pofition, was able to occupy another ftill more formidable. It is natural to fuppofe, that Pruflia then perceived its mistake, and returned to that system of policy which the ought at first to have obferved. It is noway improbable, however, that many fecret intrigues may have taken place at this period. They would depend upon the state of the Pruffian Court, and may have been as extraordinary and as myfterions as fome writers have reprefented them. They are however to be confidered, in that inftance, as the refult of a change of policy which naturally took place when that power discovered the grofs error upon which it had proceeded, and not as the caufes which produced it.

M. Puiffaye, although he expofes the errors committed by the emigrants, profefies the highest veneration for many individuals. who were the victims of a high sense of honour, and of the moft difinterested attachment to the caufe of Royalty. The measure of emigrating, he obferves, was adopted at the inftigation of men who were ftrongly influenced by their own perfonal fituation; whereas thofe who were able to remain in France, and who were by far the most numerous body, were the perfons whofe interefts ought to have been principally confulted. M. Puiffaye calculates that the emigrant army, before it was difmiffed, amounted to no more than 30,000 men; while fome infolated individuals in Poitou, in Brittany, and Anjou, raifed at different times upwards of 500,000 men. M. Puiffaye therefore conceives that he does not overrate the magnitude of the army which might have been raifed, if the French noblemen had remained in the country, when he states it at a million. He then answers the objection, that if the nobles had remained in the country, they would have been maffacred in detail without being able to make any refiftance. He obferves, that the greater part of thofe who enigrated, were obliged to leave their aged relations, their wives, and their children behind them, expofed to all the violence of the reigning tyrants; and from his own experience, he declares, that the republicans were not fo much difpofed to indulge in maffacre or pillage, when they knew

there