The word virtue has an ambiguous signification. In general, however, it means excel. lence, or rather that kind of excellence which is most highly valued. Among the Greeks and Romans, it signified courage or intrepidity in military enterprises; among the modern Ita lians, it means taste; applied to women, it has been used to signify the single virtue of chastisy; and among the poor in this country, in former times, it meant frugality. By modern philosophers or moralists, the word virtue has been very generally employed to signify good intention, or an attempt to do what is right. This explanation has arisen from considering mankind as acting under certain laws prescribed either by society or by the Author of their existence. By the laws of civilized nations, nobody can be punished who does not positively intend to violate the law; and hence it has come to be supposed, that to mean of intend well is virtue.

These notions have all arisen from a defective idea of what constitutes the perfection of the human mind. Courage, good taste, chastity, frugality, and an honest intention, are all good qualities; but taken separately, they do not constitute excellence or worth. A brave man may be a robber; a man of good taste may be a cheat; a chaste woman may be prodigal; and a frugal woman may be immodest; a well-meaning man may be very weak; and

a man of resolution may entertain very bad purposes.

It is chiefly in consequence of the mischief that. persons called men of talents often do in the world, that virtue and ability have come to be considered as distinct qualities. But the perfection of our nature, as already stated, consists of two things; wisdom, and self-command or fortitude. If a man possess wisdom, which enables him to discern what is good and fit to be done, he is so far a virtuous or excellent being; but if he want self-command, that is, if he is led away 'by his passions, and want resolution to do what he approves, he is so far a defective being, and destitute of excellence or virtue. Wisdom also consists of two branches; a man may discern clearly what ought to be the proper object of human pursuit, and he may seriously wish to promote the improvement of himself and others. So far he is a wise, a virtuous, and a well-intentioned man; but if he want discernment or skill to perceive the proper and adequate means of attaining to the great object of which he approves, he is so far destitute of wisdom; and consequently he so far wants worth or virtue. He may even do much mischief by ill-judged efforts in support of a good cause. On the contrary, a man may be very skilful and dexterous in devising the best means for accomplishing his designs; and to this extent he unquestionably

possesses wisdom or virtue, and excellence of nature but if he is the slave of his passions, and blinded by them, and pursue what is not truly valuable, he is so far destitute of worth; his mind is irrational, for it approves of what is not worthy of approbation, and the labour of his life can produce nothing valuable.

When the words virtuous; good, and right, then, are hereafter applied in this Work to human actions, I wish them to be thus understood: That action is virtuous, and good, and right, which is well adapted to increase the intellectual perfection of our nature, or to augment the quantity of wisdom and of self-command that exist in the world; whereas that action is vicious, evil, and wrong, which has a tendency to render our nature imperfect, by producing ignorance, error, and weakness; of which has a tendency to diminish the quantity of improved mind or intellect that is to be found among men. In other words, I under stand virtue to mean intellectual excellence; and that an action is virtuous when it is productive of this excellence.

The word duty may also here be taken notice of, as it is often applied to human actions. It means, in common language, any service that is due, or that ought to be performed by an inferior to his superior. It is borrowed from religion, and proceeds upon the supposition that

we ought to acquire all virtue as a service duè to God. When the word hereafter occurs, it will be used as synonymous with virtue, or to express what reason or what wisdom requires us to perform. This remark is only made for the sake of precision, as the common acceptation of the word duty is far from being erroneous; for reason is a law given by the Author of this world for the regulation of our actions; and to obey reason is to obey Him.

CHAP. III.

OF FORMER SYSTEMS OF MORALITY.

THE ancient philosophers, as already remarked, considered happiness as the ultimate object of human pursuit. Their systems of morality, therefore, were so many devices for enabling 'men to attain to this end in the most successful manner.

The Epicureans asserted, that happiness was best found in ease and sensual pleasure; and therefore that men ought to direct their whole efforts towards the attainment of these objects. But the followers of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno,

alleged that happiness is best found by acting rationally, or according to propriety. Hence they represented propriety of conduct as the great rule of morality.

The Platonists contended, that the human mind or character consists of three parts, and that virtue consists in acting upon the principle of justice towards each of these parts. The first part consists of the more vehement passions, such as ambition, pride, or revenge. The second consists of passions founded on the love of pleasure, such as the bodily appetites and the love of ease. The third and most excellent part of our constitution is the reason or understanding. They asserted, that human conduct is only to be regarded as proper when the two orders of passions are exerted in their due degrees under the dominion of reason; when pride leads us to act with intrepidity, but not with rashness; and when the love of ease leads us to caution, but not to cowardice. A man of a sound judgment, acting in this balanced and rational manner, was said by them to live according to propriety or justice.

Aristotle makes the great rule of morality to consist of habitual moderation of conduct. Virtue, said he, consists in a middle course; for all extremes are faulty or vicious: courage is the middle point between rashness and cowardice: frugality stands between avarice and profusion;