be found in Massachusetts who would adopt so discreditable a method of adjusting a difference of opinion about the amount of wages that ought to be paid to the women and girls employed by him. In some instances, as would naturally be expected, when the Board has held the position of mediator, and in cases submitted by one side only, the advice given has not been at once accepted and acted upon by the persons who appeared to be in the wrong or were advised to do something distasteful to them. But in some cases of this kind even the moral influence of the Board has been so strong that its advice has in the end prevailed. The few instances in which the employer or employes have declined to accept the advice or receive the assistance proffered by the Board in the name of the State can for the most part be easily accounted for. Their reluctance may arise from doubt as to the justice of their cause, or from a plentiful lack of information concerning the Board and its methods of proced ure, or, most preposterous of all, it may proceed from the selfish determination manifested by some men to have their own way simply because it is theirs, or, as one coolly expressed it, "right or wrong," he would have it so. Pride, selfishness, and ignorance are the chief obstacles in our path. They are old offenders, and the world has been a great sufferer by reason of them. I have touched upon a few points which were suggested by the practical workings of arbitration and conciliation in Massachusetts. Many others urge themselves upon our notice, but I must hasten for. ward. The history of our Board is a short one, covering a period of less than three years, but it has certainly exceeded the expectations of many who were willing that the experiment should be tried, but were not very sanguine as to results. It has, I believe, favorably impressed those with whom it has come in contact; and with the community at large it has won a reputation for honest, painstaking endeavor to promote kindly feelings and just relations between employers and workingmen. The influence of the Board in this direction is certainly great, but it can no more be measured and weighed than can the moral influence which issues every week from the two hundred pulpits of Boston. The Board is not invested with any compulsory powers; it simply advises and recommends, and when unable to induce the parties to come to any understanding whatever, it may pass judgment in the name of the State, and assign the blame for the existence or continuance of the controversy. However the advice offered may be received in particular cases, the Board never forgets that it is a board of conciliation as well as a tribunal empowered to judge and report. In view of some recent events I will, with your permission, quote from the Board's annual report, which was submitted to the General Court last month. Reference is there made to the obstacles to mediation in certain cases of difficulty, arising between an employer and a labor organization to which his employes for the time being do not belong. The same remarks are applicable when on the one side is a compact, well organized association of manufacturers, acting through their executive committee, and on the other a labor organization, acting also by its committee. The report says: "Such contests, although sometimes unavoidable, are generally productive of loss to both parties, of more or less disturbance of the public peace, and the mental and moral unsettling of many individuals. So long as the contest rages, with no desire on either side for a settlement of real or imagined grievances, there is obviously no place for a board like this. If the persons directly involved prefer to carry on a controversy in this manner, after being informed of a better way to effect a settlement, the public can only stand aloof and insist on preserving the peace. Even under circumstances like these the Board has always held itself in readiness to respond to any change of disposition that might show itself on either side, and so afford an opportunity for milder councils to bring order out of chaos. We can afford to wait, for the results of such cases invariably prove the superior practical value of arbitration and conciliation." Whenever a strike or lock-out occurs, involving a considerable number of people, and the parties, one or both, prefer for any reason to neglect the means provided by law for the settlement of disputes of this character, the complaint is certain to come from some quarter that the power of the Board should be increased, and that there ought to be some way provided for compelling people to be reasonable and just in their relations to those with whom they are associated in productive industry. The mere suggestion that the Board should have power to enforce its decisions is in itself gratifying evidence that the 16-07 decisions thus far made are in the public estimation worthy of enforcement. Without expressing any opinion of my own concerning the wisdom of these suggestions, it should be borne in mind that if any form of compulsory arbitration, as it is called, is ever adopted, some way must be devised by which employer and employes may come equally under its influence. The employer being an individual, a copartnership, or a corporation, could always be found and identified by a person armed with a legal process; but the employer must necessarily be left at liberty to abandon his business rather than pursue it at a loss under an unfavorable decision of a board of arbitration. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive how any process could be framed under which hundreds of men and women should be compelled to work in accordance with the terms of a decision which, in their estimation, would not provide for them a fair return for their labor. Any legislation proposed with such an end in view would be justly liable to the objection that it was attempting to legalize slavery. I apprehend that the popular notion that the State Board should be endowed with greater power and a larger jurisdiction arises from a misconception of the power that is now exercised by it, and the extent of the beneficent influence now exerted by it on a plan that is purely voluntary. I believe that the modern practice of providing for the exercise of some of the important prerogatives of government by the agency of State commissions had a wise origin, and is founded on a true appreciation of the power of public opinion, and the desire and capacity of the people to judge fairly and with accuracy the acts of the masses, and individuals who form the community in which we live. In process of time, and that, too, before many years have passed over our heads, we shall wonder at our distrust of the efficacy of public opinion as a compelling force; and that men, or associations of men, be they employers or workmen, who shall dare to assert a selfish preference for a course that meets with the condemnation of an intelligent public sentiment will be seen of all men in their true light, as opponents of the power which gives rise to all legislation, and makes possible the enforcement of laws for the protection of life and property. "It is not Lord Granville himself," says Matthew Arnold, "who determines our foreign policy and shapes the declara tions of Government concerning it, but a power behind Lord Granville. He and his colleagues would call it the power of public opinion." If this be a true statement, as it no doubt is, of the influence which controls the relations of Great Britain with other countries, how infinitely more important it is that this influence be not neglected nor underrated in a country where "all men are born free and equal,” and the principles of popular representative government are more firmly established. MEETING 388. Prison Reform. BY PROF. FRANCIS WAYLAND. The 388th meeting of the SOCIETY OF ARTS was held at the Institute, on Thursday, April 11th, at 8 P. M., President Walker in the chair. After the reading of the records of the previous meeting, and the election of new members, the President introduced Prof. Francis Wayland, of Yale College, who read a paper on "Prison Reform.” The speaker contended that the conceded increase of crime beyond the increase of population was due partly to the ignorance, partly to the indifference, and partly to the cowardice of the community. He illustrated this by the action of New York with reference to prison labor during the last quarter of a century, terminating in the passage of the "Yates bill," at a special session of the Legislature of that State, last July, which virtually condemned the entire prison population of the State to a condition of absolute idleness. To the question, Has there been no improvement in our prisons for the last fifty years? Prof. Wayland replied by describing the deplorable condition of all the prisons one half century ago, when prisoners of all ages and all degrees of crime were indiscriminately mingled in vile dens of filth, Connecticut leading the way with her prison in a disused copper mine in Simsbury. Today, in most prisons in the northern and western States, the condition of the prisoner as to light, heat, ventilation, drainage, and food is reasonably good. Some attention, moreover, is paid to mental and moral instruction. But the fact remains that crime is on the increase. How shall we account for it? Not alone by the importation of foreign convicts, though that is a factor too important to be overlooked; nor by the condition of our county jails, which, as a rule, are. schools of crime. We must go deeper than this, and pronounce the underlying theory of punishment radically wrong. Though no longer vindictive, as it was a century ago, it is in purpose largely retributive; that is, it is an attempt "to make the punishment fit the crime,"—to weigh out so many years of confinement against such a measure of crime. Now this is impossible, and would be undesirable if it were possible. It is impossible, first, because no legislative decree can ever predetermine the true measure of guilt to be attached to any given offence. There are circumstances to be considered in estimating the amount of criminality which cannot be foreseen. Secondly, it is impossible, because no magistrate is mentally or morally capable of weighing out, with even a faint semblance of fairness, so much punishment against so much crime. The object of judicial inquiry is to ascertain whether the accused committed the offence with which he is charged. The antecedents of the prisoner, his early environment, and the like, the sentencing magistrate can know nothing of. The evils resulting from this lack of knowledge are daily demonstrated in our courts of justice. There is no uniform principle in accordance with which judicial sentences are awarded. Frequently their severity or mildness depends upon the temperament or disposition of the presiding judge. This was illustrated by several instances. A shrewd criminal lawyer will see to it that his client comes bofore a tender-hearted judge. Moreover, it is a part of the unwritten law, that a prisoner who, by pleading guilty, saves the officials the trouble of trying his case, will escape with a comparatively light sentence. Often courts are influenced by public feeling as to the prevalence, at the time, of some variety of crime. suffers for the undetected residue. in support of this. Then the earliest culprit caught |