Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common SenseOpen Court Publishing Company, 1911 - 267 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
acquired active power Adam Ferguson agreeable appears Association of Ideas attend axioms Beattie Berkeley body called colour common sense conceive conception conclusion conduct connected conscious consequence consider constitution degree denied desire distinct notion distinguish doctrine DUGALD STEWART effect efficient cause evidence expressed feeling give habit hath human nature Hume Hume's scepticism Ibid ideal philosophy imagination immediate implies infer Inquiry intellectual intuition JAMES BEATTIE judge Kant kind knowledge language laws of belief less Locke Locke's Lord Monboddo mankind manner Marischal College means memory natural judgments natural philosophy natural signs necessary observation operations original particular perceive perception philo Philosophy of Common present existence principles of action principles of common proposition reason reflection regard Reid Reid's relation remember rose Scottish Philosophy secondary qualities self-evident sensation sentient shew simple apprehension Sir William Hamilton smell suggested suppose taste THOMAS REID thought tion truth understanding vulgar words
Popular passages
Page 145 - Euclid's, and show by construction that its truth was known to us ; to demonstrate, for example, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal...
Page 77 - A second class is that wherein the connection between the sign and thing signified, is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience.
Page 34 - Could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath past in the mind of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason — how its infant faculties began to work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and...
Page 3 - For my own satisfaction. I entered into a serious examination of the principles upon which this sceptical system is built ; and was not a little surprised to find, that, it leans with its whole weight upon a hypothesis, which is ancient indeed, and hath been very generally received by philosophers, but of which I could find no solid proof.
Page 189 - ... all our reasonings concerning causes and effects, are derived from nothing but custom ; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.
Page 125 - Sensation. taken by itself. implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object. It supposes a sentient being. and a certain manner in which that being is affected: but it supposes no more, Perception implies an immediate conviction and belief of something external — something different both from the mind that perceives. and from the act of perception.
Page 37 - ... the dictates of Common Sense. But these decline this jurisdiction; they disdain the trial of reasoning, and disown its authority; they neither claim its aid, nor dread its attacks. In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishonour and loss...
Page 230 - According to the doctrine now stated, the highest, or rather the only proper object of Physics, is to ascertain those established conjunctions of successive events, which constitute the order of the Universe ; to record the phenomena which it exhibits to our observations, or which it discloses to our experiments ; and to refer these phenomena to their general laws.
Page 122 - Almost all our perceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly accompany them, and, on that account, are very apt to be confounded with them.
Page 155 - Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be.