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of the Nature of God, and the Person of the Father is not here to be repeated, but fuppofed; for Christ is fet down at the right hand of that God and of that Father, which we understand when we fay, I believe in God the Fa ther. But because there is a difference in the Language of the Greeks be*In the first tween that word which is rendred * Almighty in the firft Article, and that Hex, which is fo rendred in the fixth, because That peculiarly fignified Authority in the fixth of Dominion, This more properly Power in Operation; therefore we have Пalodas referved this notion of Omnipotency now to be explained.

Article it is

Παντοκράτως,

Πανοδιώαμος.

See p. 50.

And this Di

ftinction is very material, and much obferved by the Greeks; as Dionyfius Areopagita (whosoever that is) in his Bock De Divinis Nominibus, in the 18th Chapter, explicates the dwaμavuμiar, or wavlodwaμor, and in the 10th Chapter wavloxogowe, as two diflinet Names with different Notions of God. Of the Пavloxogtag, which we have already confidered, he gives this account, Τὸ μ γάς λεγε) διὰ τὸ πάντων αὐτὸν εἶναι παντοκρατορικών έδραν ενέχεσαν και αειέχεσαν τὰ ὅλα, καὶ ἐνιδρύεσαν και θεμελιᾶσαν καὶ δειρίασαν, καὶ ἀραγὲς ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐπιτελᾶσαν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὰ ὅλα καθάπες εκ ρίζης παντοκρατορικῆς προάγεσαν, καὶ εἰς ἑαυ] τὰ πάντα καθάπες εἰς πυθηρα παντοκρατορικὸν ἐπιτρέφεσαν καὶ (ιέχεσαν αὐτά, ὡς πάντων έδραν παγκρατῇ τὰ συνεχόμθμα πάντα και μίαν ύπερέχεσαν πάντα συνοχίω ἀσφαλιζομβρίων καὶ ἐκ ἐῶσαν αὐτὰ διεκπεσόντα ἑαυτῆς, ὡς ἐκ παντελῶς ἐσίας κινέμμα τους απολέας. But of the διακομωνυμία he gives another account, as we fhall fee hereafter.

In which, two things are obfervable; the Propriety, and the Universality; the Propriety in the Potency, the Univerfality in the Omnipotency; firft, that he is a God of Power; fecondly, that he is a God of infinite Power. The Potency confifteth in a proper, innate, and natural force or activity, by which we are affured that God is able to act, work and produce true and real effects, which do require a true and real power to their Production: and in refpect of this he is often described unto us under the notion of a mighty God. The omnipotency or infinity of this Power confifteth in an ability to act, perform and produce, whatsoever can be acted or produced, without any poffibility of impediment or refiftance: and in this refpect he is reprefented to us as an Almighty God. And therefore fuch an omnipotency we afcribe unto him: which is fufficiently delivered in the Scriptures, firft by the Luke 1. 37. Testimony of an Angel, For with God nothing shall be impossible; fecondMark 10. 27. ly, by the Teftimony of Chrift himself, who faid, With men it is impoffible, but not with God; for with God all things are poffible. Now he, to whom all things are poffible, and to whom nothing is impoffible, is truly and properly omnipotent. Thus whatsoever doth not in it felf imply a repugnancy of being or fubfifting, hath in reference to the Power of God a poffibility of Production; and whatsoever in refpect of the Power of God hath an impoffibility of Production, must involve in it self a Repugnancy or

Contradiction.

This Truth, though confeffed by the Heathens, hath yet been denied by *The Argu- fome of them; but with poor and infufficient * Arguments, that we shall need ments which no more than an explication of the Doctrine to refute their Objections. the Heathen ufed are brief

ly touched by Plutarch, but were more largely delivered by Pliny. Angna go' (Onois) Cui Karriμáxw to déyovlı, Ei Θεὸν οἶπα, π ̓ ὅτι καὶ ῥέξαι Δαίμονι πᾶν δεκατόν· (fo it muft be read) δὲ γδ ὁ Θεὸς διύαται τῶν ποιεῖν. Επεί τοιἱε εἰ Θεός ἐςι ποιείτω ἢ χιονα μέλαιναν, τὸ ἢ πᾶς ψυχρον, τὸ ἢ καθήρθρον ὀρθὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον. Plutarch de Plat. Philof. L. 1. c. 7. Imperfectæ verò in homine naturæ præcipua folatia ne Deum quidem poffe omnia. Namque nec fibi potest mortem confcifcere, fi velit, quod homini dedit optimum in tantis vitæ pœnis, nec mortales æternitate donare, aut revocare defunctos, nec facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores geffit non gefferit, nullumque habere in præterita jus præterquam oblivionis: atque (ut facetis quoque argumentis focietas hæc cum Deo copuletur) ut bis dena viginti non fint, ac multa fimiliter efficere non poffe, per que declaratur haud dubiè naturæ potentia, idque effe quod Deum vocamus. Plin. Nat. Hift. I. 2. c. 7. Add unto these that Objection of Elymas the Sorcerer, recorded by Dionyfius, Καίτοι φησὶν Ελυμας ὁ μάγΘ, Εἰ παν]οδιακός ἐσιν ὁ Θεὸς πῶς λέγεται τι μὴ διύα και πρὸς τὸ καθ' ὑμᾶς Θεολόγος. Λοιδορείν ) ἢ τῷ Θείῳ Παύλῳ φήσαντι, μὴ διαὺς ἢ Θεὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀρνήσας. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 8.

First then we must fay God is omnipotent, because all Power whatsoever is in any Creature, is derived from him; and well may he be termed Almighty, who is the Fountain of all Might. There is no activity in any Agent, no influence of any Caufe, but what dependeth and proceeded from the prin

* Ἡ ἀπειρο

Θεῖ διάδοσις

εἰς πάντα τὰ

cipal Agent or the first of Causes. * There is nothing in the whole Circumference of the Universe but hath some kind of Activity, and confequently dur fome Power to act; (for nothing can be done without a Power to do it :) Os didoris and as all their Entities flow from the firft of Beings, fo all their feveral and w various Powers flow from the first of Powers: and as all their Beings cannot dis be conceived to depend of any but an infinite Effence, fo all thofe Powers Tayal.. cannot proceed from any but an infinite Power.

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λῶς ἀφήρη
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ή νοεραν, ἢ λογικίω ή αισθητικών ή ζωτικώ, ἡ ἐσιώδη διώαμιν ἔχει· Καὶ αὐτὸ 5, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, τὸ εἶναι δαύαμιν, εἰς τὸ Évas éxes ay siegeois duvaμews. Dionyf. Areopag. De Divin. Nom. cap. 8.

veraciter ob

fectus. S. Aug.

Secondly, God may be called omnipotent, * because there can be no re- *Neque enim fiftance made to his Power, no oppofition to his Will, no rescue from his aliud vocatur Hands. a The Lord of hofts hath purpofed, and who shall difannul it? his omnipotens, hand is ftretched out, and who shall turn it back? He doth according to nifi quia quicquid vult pohis will, in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: teft; nec voand none can stay his hand, or fay unto him, What doft thou? According luntate cujufto the degrees of Power in the Agent and the Refiftent, is an Action per- ræ voluntatis piam creatuformed or hindred: if there be more degrees of Power in the Refiftent than omnipotentis the Agent, the Action is prevented; if fewer, it may be retarded or debili- impeditur eftated, not wholly hindred or fuppreffed. But if there be no degree of Power Ench.ad Laur. in the Refiftent in reference to the Agent, then is the Action totally vigo- cap. 96. rous; and if in all the Powers, befide that of God there be not the least de-fa. 14. 27. gree of any refistance, we must acknowledge that Power of his, being above all oppofition, to be infinite. As Jehofaphat faid, In thine hand, Oc2 Chron. 20. God, is there not power and might, fo that none is able to withstand. thee? From hence there is no difficulty with God to perform any thing; no greater endeavour or activity to produce the greatest than the leaft of Creatures but an equal facility in reference unto all things: which cannot bet imagined but by an infinite excess of power above and beyond all re-† Nifi omnififtance.

C

b Dan. 4. 35.

potens effet, non una eâ

ciffet. Ful

cap. 3.

nia poteft?

сар. 7.

d Job 42.1, 2. be;

Thirdly, God is yet more properly called omnipotent, because his own demque faciactive Power extendeth it felf to all things; neither is there any thing ima- litate fumma ginably poffible which he cannot do. Thus when God feveral ways had atque ima fedeclared his Power unto Job, d Job answered the Lord, and faid, I know gent. de Fide that thou canst do every thing. Now that must needs be infinite activity ad Petrum, which anfwereth to all kinds of poffibility. Thus the power of God is infi- Quis eft + nite extenfively, in respect of its object, which is all things; for whatfoever omnipotens effects there be of his power, yet ftill there can be more produced; inten- nifi qui omfively, in respect of the action, or perfection of the effect produced; for s. Aug. dewhatsoever addition of perfection is poffible, is within the fphere of God's Trin. lib. 4. omnipotency. The object then of the Power of God is whatfoever is fim-7: ply and abfolutely poffible, whatsoever is in it self such as that it may and fo poffible every thing is which doth not imply a contradiction. Again, whatsoever implieth a contradiction is impoffible, and therefore is not within the object of the Power of God, because impoffibility is the contradiction of all Power. For that is faid to imply a contradiction, which if it were, it would neceffarily follow that the fame thing would be and not be. But it is impoffible for the fame thing both to be and not to be at the famë time and in the fame refpect: and therefore whatsoever implieth a contradiction is impoffible. From whence it followeth, that it may be truly faid, God cannot effect that which involveth a contradiction, but with no derogation from his Power: and it may be as truly faid, God can effect whatfoever involveth not a contradiction, which is the expreffion of an infinite

Power.

Now an action may imply a contradiction two ways, either in refpect of

the

*To loves
Τὸ γεγονὸς
ἐκ ἐνδέχε)
cudé
μὴ κρέας, διό
ὀρθῶς ̓Αγά-

the Object or in refpect of the Agent. In refpect of the Object it may imply a contradiction immediately or confequentially. That doth imply a contradiction immediately, which plainly and in terms doth fignifie a Repugnancy, and fo destroys it felf, as for the fame thing to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been. And therefore it must be acknowledged that it is not in the Power of God to make that not to have been, which hath already been but that is no derogation to God's Power, because not within the object of any Power. And he may certainly have all Power, who hath Sav. Movs not that which belongeth to no Power. Again, that doth imply a contraTsdiction confequentially, which in appearance feemeth not to be impossible, hina w but by neceffary confequence, if admitted, leadeth infallibly to a contraradiction. As that one Body fhould be at the fame time in two diftinct places, Arift. Ethic. fpeaks no repugnancy in terms; but yet by confequence it leads to that Eud. 1. 5. c. 2. which is repugnant in it felf; which is, that the fame Body is but one Body, and not but one. Being then a covert and confequential contradiction is as much and as truly a contradiction as that which is open and immediate, it Deus, faciat followeth that it is as impoffible to be effected, and therefore comes not

σερίσκε). Α

προγρθρα.

Quifquis di

cit, Si omni

potens eft

ut quæ facta funt facta non fuerint,

under the Power of God.

non videt hoc fe dicere, fi omnipotens eft faciat ut ea quæ vera funt eo ipfo quo vera funt falfa fint. S. Aug. contra Fauftum, 1.26. c. 5. It is granted therefore to be true, which Pliny objects, Deum non facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores geffit, non gefferit; as this proves nothing against Omnipotency because it is no Act of Poffibility. Had the Act objected been feizable, and God had not the Power to effect it, then had he wanted fome Power, and confequently had not been omnipotent. But being it is not want of Power in the Agent, but of Possibility in the Object, it proveth no Deficiency in God.

& vitam Dei

That doth imply a Contradiction in refpect of the Agent, which is repugnant to his effential Perfection; for being every Action floweth from the Effence of the Agent, whatsoever is totally repugnant to that Effence, must *Neque enim involve a Contradiction as to the Agent. Thus, we may fay God cannot & præfcienti- fleep, God cannot want, God cannot die; he cannot fleep whofe Being is am Dei fub fpiritual; he cannot want, whofe Nature is all-fufficient; he cannot die, who is effentially and neceffarily existent. Nor can that be a Diminution of his ponimus fi dicamus, Ne- Omnipotency, the contrary whereof would be a Proof of his Impotency, a ceffe eft De- Demonftration of his Infirmity. Thus it is a impoffible for God to flye, to um femper whom we fay nothing is impoffible; and, he who can do all things, b cannot

neceffitate

vivere & cun

eta præfcire,

"

ficut nec poteftas ejus minuitur, cùm dicitur mori fallique non poffe., Sic enim hoc non poteft, ut potiùs fi poffet, minoris effet utique poteftatis; Rectè quippe Omnipotens dicitur qui tamen mori & falli non poteft. Dicitur enim Omnipotens faciendo quod vult, non patiendo quod non vult. Quod fi ei accideret, nequaquam effet Omnipotens. Unde propterea quædam non poteft quia Omnipotens eft. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 5. c. 10. Nam ego dico quanta non poffit. Non poteft mori, non poteft peccare, non poteft mentiri, non poteft falli. Tanta non poteft, quæ fi poffet non effet Omnipotens. Autor. Serm. 119. ad Temp. a Heb. 6. 18. Nunquid mentitur Deus Sed non mentitur; quia impoffibile eft mentiri Deum. Impoffibile autem iftud nunquidnam infirmitatis eft? Non utique; Nam quomodo omnia poteft, fi aliquid efficere non poteft? Quid ergo ei impoffibile? Illud utique quod naturæ ejus contrarium eft, non quod virtuti arduum. Impoffibile, inquit, eft ei mentiri, & impoffibile iftud non infirmitatis eft, fed virtutis & majeftatis ; quia veritas non recipit mendacium, nec Dei virtus levitatis errorem. S. Amb. Annot, in Num. Si volunt invenire quod Omnipotens non poteft, habent prorfus, ego dicam, mentiri non poteft. Credamus ergo quod poteft non credendo quod non poteft. S. Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. 22. c. 25. b 2. Tim. 2. 13. This was the Argument of Elymas the Sorcerer before-mentioned, to which Dionyfius gives this answer, H cau78 agnois x=7wσις ἀληθείας ἐσίν· ἡ ἢ ἀλήθεια ὅν ἐσιν· καὶ ἡ δ' ἀληθείας ἔκπλωσις τῷ ὄν@ ἔκπλωσις. Εἰ τοίνω ἡ ἀλήθεια ὅν ἐσιν, ἡ ἢ ἄρνησις τ ἀληθείας τὸ ὄνον ἔκπλωσις, ἐκ τὸ ὄντα ἐκπεσεῖν ὁ Θεὸς & διύα· καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐκ ἔσιν, ὡς ἄν τις φαίη τὸ μὴ διώκυς διύαν, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι καὶ σέρησιν εκ οἶδεν. De Divin. Nom. cap. 8. Φαρμ 3 καὶ ότι ο διύα) αιχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσαι ὁ Osos duwank in eivas Osos ei go aig ogv dęã • Oèòs, 8x és sós. Orig. cont. Celf. 1. 5. Jobius gives this Solution 10 the fame Obje&tion. "Α Φαμπρ μὴ διώαπς τὸ θεῖον ταῦτα 7 μήτε ὄντων ἐςὶ μήτε διατῶν ὅλως ὑφεσάναι, τε γὰ ὑφέσηκε τὸ αρνήσας - Θεὸν ἑαυτὸν, ἢ ἡ τροπὴ, ἢ ἡ ἀγαθότητα ἔκπλωσις, ἢ τ' ἀλήθειαν ψεύδω χρέος; Πανοδιώαμς ἢ ὑμνεῖς καὶ λέγ) ὡς τάτε πρέποντα, αυτες και σωτήρια ο δεμιας ημάτων πάντα δεκάρια ότε βέλε). Job. de Verb. Incarn. l. 3. apud Photium in Biblioth. Ο Απόςολος φησι δε το Θεό καὶ πατρός, Εν οίς αδιύατον τούσαπς Θεόν· ἐκ ασθένειάν τινα καλη χορῶν τὰ παγκρατές διευάμεως, ἀλλὰ μεγίς! ῥώμῳ, ὅτι ἀνεπίδεκτός ἐσι το ψούδες ὁ δ ̓ ἀληθείας παλὴς· Καὶ ἀλλαχόσε ἢ ταύτίω ὀχυρῶν τ' ἔννοιαν ἔφη. Ἐὰν ἀρνησώμεθα αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον πισὸς μέρες αρνήσας δ' ἑαυτὸν & διώα). Καὶ τέτο γδ ἐκ ἀθενείας ἐσὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ' ἀνυπερβλητε ἰμύθ, ὅτι ἐκ ἐγχωρείς τ' θείαν φύσιν ἑαυτῷ ἀρνήσεως. Iid. Peluf. Εp. 335. 1.3. Theodoret upon that place of S. Paul, It is impoflible for God to lie, Οὐκ ἀσθενὲς τὸ ἀδιύατον, ἀλλὰ ἄγαν αὐτὸ δεικνὺς δικα τόν. Ούτω γδ, φησὶν, ἐςὶν ἀληθὲς ὡς ἀδιώατον εἶναι ψεῦδα εν αὐτῷ χέως ποτέ. Τὸ διατὸν ἄρᾳ (ita lege non αδιύατον ὧν) τ' ἀληθείας διὰ τὸ ἀδιάτε ζημαίνει. And upon that, He cannot deny himfelf, πάλιν ἐν τὸ ἐ διώα; ἢ ἀπήρε δικά μέως υπάρχει δηλώτικον, σε, Theod. Dial. 3.

deny

deny himself. Because a Lye is repugnant to the Perfection of Veracity, which is effential unto God as neceffarily following from his infinite Knowledge, and infinite Sanctity. We who are ignorant may be deceived, we who are finful may deceive; but it is repugnant to that Nature to be deccived which is no way fubject unto Ignorance; it is contradictory to that Effence to deceive, which is no way capable of Sin. For as it is a plain Contradiction to know all things, and to be ignorant of any thing; fo is it to know all things and to be deceived, as it is an evident Contradiction, to be infinitely holy, and to be finful, fo is it to be infinitely holy and deceive. But it is impoffible for any one to lye, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Therefore it is a manifest Contradiction to fay that God can lye, and consequently it is no Derogation from his Omnipotency, that he cannot. Whatfoever then God cannot do, whatsoever is impoffible to him, doth not any way prove that he is not Almighty, but only thew that the rest of his Attributes and Perfections are as effential to him as his Power; and as his Power fuffereth no refistance, so the reft of his Perfections admit no repugnance. Well therefore may we conclude him abfolutely* omnipotent, who Theodoret by being able to effect all things confiftent with his Perfections, fheweth in- having profinite Ability: and by not being able to do any thing repugnant to the fame ved that there Perfections, demonftrateth himself fubject to no Infirmity or Imbecillity. things which And in this manner we maintain God's Omnipotency, with the † beft and fell not under eldest, against the worst and latest of the heathen Authors.

were many

the Power of

God, at laft thusconcludes,

Πολλὰ τοίνω βρήκαμῳ ἀδιύατα ὄντα, τῷ παντοδεκάμῳ Θεῷ. ̓Αλλὰ τὸ μὴ διηθίώαι τί τέτων, απείρε δυνάμεως, εκ άσενείας τεκμήριον· τὸ ἢ γὲ διηθῶσιν, ἀδιωαμίας δήπεθεν, ο διωάμεως. Ὅτι τέτων ἕκασον τὸ ἄτρεπλον το Θιὅ κηρύττει καὶ ενε annoialov. Dial. 3 And Origen cont. Celf. l. 3. gives this for the Chriftian's general Rule. Awa xat nas warla à Θεὸς ἅπερ δικάμθρο τὸ Θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζοφὸς εἶναι ἐκ ἐξίσα). And the words of Celfus, though ill intended, are yet very true. Αυτός ο (ο Θεός) ἐσὶν ὁ πάντων όντων λόγο, δεν ἐν οἷον τε άλογον δὲ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐρω γδ igγάσας. Apud Orig. 1. 4. And Jo Origen in his Anfwer confefes. ̓Αλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐδὲν οἶς σε παράλογον ἔτε πας ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐσιν Θεός. It was the conftant Opinion of the most ancient Heathens, as appeareth by Homer,

who expreffeth it plainly, Odysf. x'.

Χαλεπὸν ἢ τ' ὀρύσσειν

*Ανδράσι γε θνητοίσι, θεοί δέ τε πάντα διύανται.

And the fame fenfe is attributed to Linus in a Diftich cited for his by Stobæus; but may rather be thought to have been made by fome of the Pythagoreans. For this was the plain Doctrine of Pythagoras, who taught his scholars to believe Miracles, and to doubt of nothing faid to be done by the Gods, because all things were poffible to them; O zồ eivas τὰ μὲ δικατὰ τὸ θεῶν, (vel potius τοῖς θεοῖς) τὰ ἢ ἀδιύα]α, ώσσερ οίεως της (οριζομθώος, ἀλλὰ πάντα δεκα]ά· καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐςι ὃ ἐπῶν, ὁ ἐκεῖνοί φασι μὲ εἶναι Λίνα, ἐπὶ μθύτοι ἴσως ἐκείνων,

Ελπις χρὴ πάν'· ἐπεῖ ἐκ ἐς' ἐδὲν ἄελπ7ον.

'Pádia wavla Otw teλéra, xì ávývolov der. Iamb. de Vit. Pythag. c. 28.

So Epicharmus a Difciple of Pythagoras: 'Aduvalov de Os. So Pater Omnipotens, and Jupiter Omnipotens, familiar in Virgil and the Poets before and after him. Thefe do far out-weigh the authority in Plutarch, and that of Pliny, with the addition of Galen, who oppofeth the Opinion of the Philofophers to that of Mofes exprefly, and to our Saviour obliquely, Οὐ γδ δὴ τὸ βαληθιναι, τοιαύτας χυές μόνον τὸ αὐταρκες· ἐδὲ γδ εἰ 7 πέτραν ἐξαίφνης ἐθολήσειεν, ἄνθρωπον ποιῆσαι διωατὸν airy Which feems to be opposed to those words of our Saviour, God is able to raise children unto Abraham out of thefe Stones. Καὶ τὅτ' ἔτι καθ ̓ ὅ τῆς Μωσέως δόξης ήθ' ἡμετέρᾳ καὶ ΠλάτωνΘ καὶ ἡ ἳ ἄλλων παρ' Έλλησιν ὀρθῶς μεταχειρισα Μύρων της πεὶ φύσεως λόγες διαφέρς. Τὸ μ γδ ἀρκεῖ τὸ βαληθιναι τ Θεὸν κοσμῆσαι τ' ύλίω, ἡ δ ̓ οὐθὺς κεκόσμη· πάντα η δεξ και τῷ Θεῷ διωατὰ νομίζει, κἂν εἰ 7' τέφραν ἵππον ἢ βῶν ἐθέλει ποιεῖν· ἡμεῖς δ ̓ ἐχ ὅτω γινώσκομθυ, ἀλλ ̓ εἶναι γάρ τινα λέγοκαι αδιαλα φύσει, καὶ τέτοις μηδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅλως ὶ Θεὸν ἀλλ' ἐκ ἳ δικακῶν θυέως το βέλτιον αἱρείας. De Uiu Part. 4. 11.

Thus God is omnipotent, and God only. For if the Power of all things befide God be the Power of God, as derived from him, and fubordinate unto him, and his own Power from whence that is derived can be fubordinate to none, then none can be omnipotent but God.

Again, we fay, that God the Father is Almighty; but then we cannot fay, that the Father only is Almighty: for the Reason why we fay the Father is Almighty, is because he is God; and therefore we cannot say that he * only * Non ergo is Almighty, because it is not true that he only is God. Whofoever then is quifpiam audebit quamlibet creatu

ram five cœleftem five terreftrem dicere Omnipotentem, nifi folam Trinitatem, Patrem fcilicet & Filium & Spiritum
Sanctum. Non enim cùm dicimus nos credere in Deum Patrem Omnipotentem, ficut Hæretici Ariani, negamus filium
Omnipotentem, aut Spiritum San&tum. Author Lib. de Symbolo ad Catechum. 1. 2. c. 3.
PP

God,

God, hath the fame reafon and foundation of Omnipotency which the Father hath, and confequently is to be acknowledged properly and truly omnipotent as the Father is. But we have already fhewed that the Son of God is truly God; and fhall hereafter fhew that the Holy Ghost is alfo God, and that by the fame Nature by which the Father is God. The Father therefore is Almighty, because the Father is God; the Son Almighty, because the Son is God; and the Holy Ghoft Almighty, because the Holy Ghoft is God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft are God by the fame Divinity: therefore, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft are omnipotent by the fame Omnipotency. The Father then is not called Almighty by way of exclufion, but is here mentioned with that Attribute peculiarly, because the Power of God anfwereth particularly to the right hand of God, as being the right hand of ther Authors power. The Father therefore is here defcribed by the Notion of Almighty, to make ufe to fhew, that Chrift having ascended into Heaven, and being fet down at Omnipotens, the right hand of God, is invefted with a greater Power than he exercised rather in re- before: and that Power which was then actually conferred upon him, aclation to the knowledgeth no Bounds or Limits; but all Power in the ultimate extent of fion, than in its infinity is given unto him, who is fet down on the right hand of him who is God the Father; and, being fo, is therefore truly and properly Alwho is faid mighty.

* Nor is it

unusual in o

of the word

prefent occa

reference to the Perfon

o be omnipo

tent; as is obferved by Servius upon that Verfe of Virgil, Eneid. 9.

Jupiter omnipotens audacibus annue cœptis.

Hoc epitheton interdum ad gloriam numinis ponitur, interdum ad caufam dicentis. Namque hoc loco dicendo Omnipotens oftendit eum etiam his qui per fe minùs valent præftare poffe virtutem.

Deut. 10. 7.
Luke 12.5.

It is necessary to profess Belief in God Almighty; First, because the acknowledgment of his Omnipotency begetteth that Fear and Reverence, Submiffion and Obedience which is due unto his infinite Majefty. Our God is a great God, a mighty, and a terrible; therefore terrible because mighty. I will forewarn you, faith our Saviour, whom ye Jhall fear: Fear him which after he hath killed hath power to caft into hell, I say unto you fear him. Three times we are commanded to fear, and one only Reafon rendred, but fufficient for a thousand Fears, the Power of him who is able eternally to punish us. God gave a general Command to Abraham, and with it a powerful perfuafion to Obedience, when he said unto him, I am the almighty God, walk before me, and be thou perfect. It was a rational Advice which 1 Pet. 5. 6. the Apoftle gives us. Humble your felves under the mighty hand of God, that he may exalt you in due time. And it is a proper Incentive to the obfervation of the Law of God, to confider that he is the one Law-giver who James 4. 12. is able to fave and to deftroy.

Gen. 17. I.

Secondly, The belief of God's Omnipotency is abfolutely neceffary, as the foundation of our Faith. All the Miracles which have been feen, were therefore wrought, that we may believe; and never Miracle had been seen, if God were not omnipotent. The Objects of our Faith are beyond all natural and finite Power; and did they not require an infinite Activity, an Affent unto them would not deferve the Name of Faith. If God were not Almighty, we fhould believe nothing; but being he is fo,* why should we the Argument disbelieve any thing? what can God propound unto us, which we cannot af which the Py- fent unto, if we can believe that he is Omnipotent?

*This was

thagoreans

ufed, who be

lieved many miraculous Actions, which others looked upon as fabulous; because they would disbelieve nothing which was referred to the divine Power: and the reason of that was, because they thought all things poffible to God, as we shewed before. Tas TOISTWY 5 (faith Iamblichus, having related several strange Actions either fabulous or miraculous) & dex&vτων μυθικών επιμνημονούσσιν ὡς μηδὲν ἀπισἔν]ες ὅ, τι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγη. And whereas others looked upon them as weak and fimple People for giving credit to Such fabulous relations, πρὸς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐχὶ αὐτὸς βνήθεις νομίζεσιν, dλλÁ TÓS Áπ587. Iambl. de Vit. Pythag. cap. 28.

Thirdly,

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