II. BOOK ral use, that it forms the whole of the art of rhetoric as delivered by Pamphilus and by Callippus.47 22d topic argues from im itself. Another topic, of a most opposite nature, is to reason from improbability itself; that is, from probability things so unlikely to happen, that they could never have been believed, unless they had actually occurred. Truth and probability are the causes of assent: when, therefore, assent is given to things highly improbable, this must happen because they are true. In the arraignment of a law, Androcles said, "Laws require laws." And when the assembly murmured, he subjoined, “Yes; laws, to be good, require laws; as olives do oil; and fish, salt; though olives produce oil, and fish are produced in the salt sea." 23d topic refutes from incongruities. 48 The following topic is only applicable to refutation. It consists in bringing together particulars incongruous in point of time, place, word, or deed. This incongruity may either be confined to the proceedings of your adversary, as, "He pretends to be a patriot and to love his fellow-citizens, yet he is known to have conspired with the thirty tyrants, and to have abetted their usurpation:" or it may be confined to the proceedings of the speaker in order to show the inconsistency of the imputations charged on him: "He accuses me of being litigious, yet he cannot mention any one lawsuit 47 Pamphilus is mentioned with little respect by Cicero de Orator. 1. iii. c. 21. Callippus is spoken of above, but rather inconsistently with what is here said: his name is probably interpolated. 48 According to the yрapn apavoμwv. See History of Ancient Greece, P. I. vol. iii. c. 32. XXIII. in which I was ever previously engaged:" or it CHAP. may extend to the proceedings of both parties: "When did the accuser ever make the smallest disbursement for a generous purpose? whereas many of you, at my expense, have been ransomed from slavery." futes false cause. Another topic serving also for refutation, and 24th refor destroying aspersions cast on us by false ap- appearpearances, is to explain the cause in which those ances, by showing appearances originated. When this cause is the real produced, the transaction immediately assumes a new character. In the public place, a woman was seen under a young man, clinging to him with such immoderate passion, that the byestanders were shocked at her indecency. The error ceased when it became known that a dearly beloved son had been fond embraces of his mother. restored to the in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses destroys the false opinion of his inferiority to Ajax, by giving the reason why, though really a braver man, he did not appear to be so. 25th topic argues from the lity of the that of the Another topic is to reason from the existence or non-existence of the cause, to the existence or non-existence of the effect; since no- improbabithing happens without a cause, and that cause cause to and effect mutually imply each other. LeodaLeoda- effect. mas employs this argument against Thrasybulus. The latter reproached Leodamas with being posted on the pillar of infamy in the citadel 49, though his name had been erased during the usurpation of the thirty tyrants. Leodamas 49 A stone pillar, in a cavern, with the names of traitors and other II. BOOK maintained this to be impossible: "Why should the thirty have destroyed a monument of my hatred to Athens, which could only have rendered me the more trust-worthy to them, and the more zealous in abetting their tyranny?" 26th repels the accusation of designs, be cause far better were in our power. 27th topic argues from inconsistency with action. Another topic of refutation is afforded by considering whether the designs or actions imputed to us, might not have been better planned, or better executed. None can be suspected of doing, or of having done, under certain circumstances, what might, under other circumstances, have been done far more profitably: for in no deliberation will the worse measure be preferred, willingly, when the better is in our power. The argument, however, drawn from this topic, is not always to be relied on; for oftentimes the ground of preference, though unperceived before decision, may afterwards become manifest. Another is derived from considering whether any thing is proposed contrary to that which has been before done. Thus Xenophanes, any former when consulted by the people of Elea about the ceremonies due to Leucothea, whether they should honour her by mourning, and also by sacrifice, he replied, "If she be regarded by you as a divinity, you must not mourn for her; if as a mortal, you must not worship her by sacrifice." 28th topic converts errors Another is to convert our errors themselves into a source of accusation or defence. An ex themselves ample of this occurs in the Medea of Carcinus.5 50 Carcinus, an Athenian poet, who wrote 160 tragedies, of which one only was successful. Vid. Gyrald. Ferrarens. p. 375. XXIII. As her children had disappeared, Medea was CHAP. accused of their murder: and, indeed, she exposed herself to this suspicion, by sending them into away secretly. She says in her defence," If I grounds of killed the innocent children, how grievous was or defence. my error in sparing the guilty father ?" This form of argumentation is the only one touched on by Theodorus "1, in his first treatise on rhetoric. 51 accusation argues Another source of argument is derived from 29th topic playing on the name, as that branding the from the monstrous cruelty of Draco's laws. guments "They name. were the work, not of a man, but of a dragon."'52 In argumentations equally well conducted, Why arthe first discourse is less impressive and less con- less convincing than the reply; for in refuting an ad- vincing versary, an orator is obliged to grapple more plies. closely with his subject, and to dwell on oppositions and contrasts. Things are known by their contraries; an argument to demonstrate or prove, is confined to one of the contraries only; 51 Theodorus, a sophist of Byzantium, often mentioned by Plato. 52 The author here introduces a few more verbal allusions which cannot be translated. Thrasybulus was reproached by Conon as rash in counsel, and Thrasymachus by Herodicus as rash in fighting; such being the respective significations of their names: Hecuba, in Euripides, calls Venus the Goddess of Folly; such being the meaning of the first two syllables in her name, Aphrodité; Chæremon says of Pentheus (signifying grief), that his name betokened his approaching calamity; and the name of " Iron," belonging to one of his female characters, is employed by Sophocles, for stigmatising the hardness of her heart: and in the praises of the gods, their names are frequently converted by poets into topics of panegyric. Ζευς ὁ χορηγος της Swns. Jupiter, quasi juvans pater. than re II. BOOK but an argument to disprove or refute, must embrace both; and by comprising them within a narrow compass, and placing them parallel to each other, the strongest conviction is impressed, and with the greatest clearness. The most arguments are those that are natural without being obvious. Whether to prove or disprove, to attack or to impressive defend, the best and most efficacious arguments are those of which the hearer either anticipates the conclusion, or of which he is prepared to admit the conclusion, as soon as it is pronounced. This flatters him with the notion of his own discernment and sagacity, especially when the conclusion, which he anticipates, does not lie too near the surface: the most striking arguments, therefore, are those that are natural, without being obvious. CHAP. SYLLOGISMS, as we above explained, are genuine XXIV. or spurious. In genuine syllogisms, the conclu1. Fallacy, sion really follows from the premises. In the argument- spurious, it is only thought to follow by an ation void ignorant or inattentive audience. The same the form of of sub stance. holds with regard to those less formal syllogisms, called enthymemes, or arguments. In these, one great source of fallacy lies in the form of diction; to talk argumentatively and conclusively, when no strict conclusion has been drawn. Thus, after a pretended enumeration of the different causes by which any effect may have been produced, we argue, "It was not occasioned by the first, or by the second, or by the third, therefore it must have been brought about through the |