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24. From explaining false appearances ; -- 25. From
the improbability of the cause to that of the effect;
26. From the contrast of designs ;27. From incon-
sistency with former actions; 28. From names.
Arguments less convincing than Replies; and why.
The most impressive are those natural, but not obvious.

The eight kinds of sophisms. - Solutions and Objections; their nature and number. The topics to be employed to impel or to chAP.

I. restrain, to praise or to blame, to accuse or to defend, have now been enumerated and explained : Deliberathe objects ever to be kept in view, are utility, tive elohonour, and justice ; on approved notions of mainly dewhich, respectively, all propositions must turn, favourable calculated to persuade and prevail in the three opinion of kinds of oratory. But as every discourse is er, and juproposed to the judgment of the hearers, for, quence on in matters of deliberation, the advice which we a favour

able dispagive is submitted to their consideration, and in sition in

the hearjudicial trials, we plead and argue with a view to obtain their favourable sentence; it is of mighty importance that we should exhibit ourselves to these hearers in an advantageous light, and appear to be actuated by great good-will towards them; and also that they, on their part, should be in a frame of mind and temper consonant to our views. The effect of political speeches, that is, of deliberative eloquence, depends mainly on the opinion conceived of the orator or statesman : in pleadings before courts of justice, on the other hand, the principal point is the favourable disposition of the judges ; for their decisions will vary according

ers,

II.

The three

BOOK to their love or hatred, and accordingly as they

are stirred to the asperities of anger, or soothed into the softness of pity. Through those dif. ferent affections their opinions will be shaken, and sometimes totally changed. Thus, under the impression of good-will or compassion for a delinquent, his judges will often declare him innocent, and always regard him as far less culpable than hatred or bare indifference would represent him. To a man goaded by desires, and sanguine in hope, the prospect of imagined pleasures will appear to be easily realised, and to be fraught with the purest joy : the reverse of this will appear to men of despondent tempers, adverse to such pleasures, or barely indifferent to them.

To procure credit for our discourse through requisites for gaining means of our own character, and independently discourse,

of proofs or arguments, there are three requiindepend- sites: the hearers must repose confidence in our argument. wisdom, and in our virtue, and in our good-will

towards themselves. If any of these three be wanting, the speaker may be safely disregarded; for either through ignorance, he will be incapable of discerning what is best, or careless of proposing it; and that, either through the general pravity of his nature, or through want of zeal in the cause. Beside these three, there can be no other source of deception; so that he who is exempt from them all, must be entitled

to complete credit. Transition

How the speaker is to give this favourable trine of the impression of himself, has partly been explained

credit to a

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above, in treating of the virtues, for, with the chap. same propositions and inferences by which he has set off and emblazoned the merits of others, passions : he may exhibit, and do justice to his own: but necessity how he is to create the opinion of his good. ing it. will for his hearers, and their favourable disposition towards himself, we proceed now to explain, in the following disquisition on the passions. The judgments of men change with these agitations of the mind, and their accompanying pains or pleasures; I mean, with anger, pity, fear, and all such like emotions, and their contraries. In explaining each of them dis- In explaintinctly, three points must be attended to: in ing the anger, for example, we must first consider who each pas

sion, ihree are the persons most susceptible of this passion ; points secondly, who are they most likely to be its must be objects; thirdly, what are the causes and circumstances which most naturally produce or occasion it. The knowledge of one or two of these things will not suffice : they must be all known exactly in order, to manage any of the passions; to move or to appease them. We proceed, therefore, to investigate the topics relative to this subject, in our accustomed manner.

nature of

examined.

II.

fined its

“Let anger, then, be defined an emotion ac- CHAP. companied with pain; impelling us to inflict open punishment for any apparent contempt towards Anger deourselves or those belonging to us."

If this be natural oban accurate description of anger, it follows, that jects. individuals only can be its objects. We cannot be

angry with things taken in the abstract; for in

ll.

BOOK stance, with man in general, but with a particular

man, as Cleon; who insults, or is prepared to
insult ourselves, or those dear to us. It follows
also, that all anger contains in it a mixture of
pleasure, arising from the prospect of its gratifi-
cation : for it is pleasant to obtain the objects
of our desires; but manifest impossibilities can
never constitute such objects. The passion of
anger is directed, therefore, to things possible
and practicable; the expected attainment of
which darts a spark of gladness into the bosom.
Wherefore, Homer says, —

But, oh! ye gracious powers above,
Wrath and revenge from men and gods remove;
Far, far too dear to every mortal breast,

Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste. I
But, further, that this, the angry emotion work-
ing on the fancy, exhibits the desired vengeance
as actually taking place; we dwell with delight
on this illusive phantom till the waking dream

assumes a character of reality. Excited by Contempt is the open expression of our opitestified in nions and feelings concerning objects of no three ways. value; things incapable of producing pain or

pleasure, of doing good or harm ; for whatever may cause much of the one or the other, will be treated, not with contempt, but, on the contrary, with very serious regard. Contempt may be

testified in three ways; by disdain, by offence, 1. Disdain. and by insult. Things of no value are disdained 2. Offence. as below our notice. Offence is opposition to

the views of another, merely for the sake of opposing them. It is that wanton vexation, which

· Iliad xviii. v. 140.

could never be exercised towards one supposed CHAP.

II. capable of hurting us, for then we should fear him ; nor towards one supposed capable of benefiting us, for then we should endeavour to conciliate his good-will. Insult consists in the 3. Insult. infliction of such injuries as are accompanied with shame, and that, not from any past grudge, or for any future profit, but merely to enjoy the mortification of the person affronted. Those who retaliate, do not insult, but requite; and are pleased in gratifying their resentment; but the pleasure of himn who affronts is derived from the conceit which the insult committed gives him of his own superiority. The young Who most and the rich are therefore prone to insolence; offer insult, for thus they think that their respective advan- and who tages are most signally displayed. To affront,

strongly dishonours; and he who dishonours, contemns, provoked

by it. holding the dishonoured in no estimation. By this Achilles is provoked, not by the loss of Briseis.

O parent Goddess! since in early bloom
Thy son must fall by too severe a doom,
Sure to so short a race of glory born,
Great Jove in justice should this span adorn:
Honour and fame at least the Thund'rer ow'd,
And ill he pays the promise of a God,
If yon proud monarch thus thy son defies,

Obscures my glories, and resumes my prize.”?
And again,

Oh! soul of battles, and thy people's guide,
(To Ajax thus the first of Greeks replied)
Well hast thou spoke; but, at the tyrant's name,
My rage rekindles, and my soul's on flame:
'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,
Disgrac'd, dishonour'd, like the vilest slave. S

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