CHAP. systems. Yet, which of these systems can vie with the Ethics of Aristotle, in compactness and solidity, any more than in beauty, utility, and sound science? Conclu sion. Many parts of this discourse might have been extended with pleasure to myself, and perhaps with some little profit to my readers. But in this age of novels and party-politics, enough has probably been said, at one time, on philosophy: and being now in my seventy-sixth year, I would avoid, if possible, being tiresome in, perhaps, my last publication. I give it to the world without cold indifference, and without anxious solicitude. The gratification of communicating to others, truths that delight my own mind, is a pleasure that praise will not greatly augment, or censure considerably diminish. My chief aim has been to make Aristotle more read, and better understood; and thereby to confer a benefit on men of letters, which may possibly, in course of time, circulate through other classes of the community. His various writings, when carefully collated, and studiously meditated, will be found highly consistent with truth and with each other. They proclaim a genius truly admirable; equally penetrating and comprehensive; and, in the longest succession of time, their use can never be superseded, nor will their value ever sink in the estimation of those capable of perceiving that, in the works of original thinkers, there is an intimacy of union between the thought and the expression, a raciness, a vigour, a calm intellectual elevation, and a persuasive authority, that is no where else, in the same degree, to be II. met with; and that the powers of the mind, CHAP. whether belonging to reason or to taste, will be very differently exercised in studying such works, and in gathering, were that possible, precisely the same information from compilements and dictionaries. In concluding this introduction, it is fit to observe that I saw not any necessity for speaking in it of preceding translators or commenters of the " Rhetoric," not having derived any assistance, or borrowed a single sentence from any of them. ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC. BOOK I. ARGUMENT. Rhetoric, natural, how improved into Art.- Its connection I. natural, into art. RHETORIC is the counterpart of logic; for both CHAP. are conversant with subjects not falling within the distinct province of any particular science, Rhetoric, and are superficially understood by all, even the improvable most unlearned. To a certain degree, all men are rhetoricians and logicians, all being ready, on occasion, to provoke or to sustain an argument, to praise or to blame, to accuse or to de BOOK fend. I. This art ill under stood, and secuted. This, indeed, is performed ill, and at random, by the multitude; a few only do it tolerably well, and that chiefly through practice. A way, however, is thus laid open for attaining higher proficiency; for when a speaker has fortunately hit the mark at which his discourse aimed, we may investigate and discover the causes of his success; and from the contemplation of these causes, derive rules of art, productive of like success in all similar cases.1 Hitherto, writers on Rhetoric have confined themselves to the least important parts of the worse pro- art. Enthymemes or arguments, form the main central body; the rest is mere outwork. Yet of enthymemes, in which the whole weight of proof consists, dependent on the speaker's skill, they make not any mention; while they expatiate on calumny and aggravation, pity and anger, and other extraneous matters not bearing any essential reference to the merits of the cause, but calculated solely to bias the decision of the 1 This passage is highly extolled by Mr. Stewart in the Preliminary Dissertation to his Philosophical Essays. He ascribes it "to an obscure author quoted by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and placed in the front of his Academical Discourses." The supposed obscure author is no less a man, however, than Aristotle, in the very first chapter of his Rhetoric. I subjoin the Latin translation, as quoted by Mr. Stewart, (Essays, Preliminary Dissertation, p. lxiii.) "Omnia fere quæ præceptis continentur ab ingeniosis hominibus fiunt; sed casu quodam magis quam scientia. Ideoque doctrina et animadversio abhibenda est, ut ea quæ interdum sine ratione nobis occurrunt, semper in nostra potestate sint; et quoties res postulaverit, à nobis ex præparato adhibeantur." 2 Other proofs, such as writings, witnesses, &c. will be spoken of hereafter. |