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be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent, though what we conceive of it be clear and certain, I own that in this fenfe one ought to believe what is above Reason. But if by being above Reafon be meant a Doctrine, wherein we fee nothing Clear, a Doctrine which our Reafon lofes the fight of on all its fides, I mean that all the Propofitions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehenfible, fuch a one as this for example, that the three Divine Perfons make but one God, &c. It feems that to be above Reafon in this fenfe, is the fame as to be intirely inacceffible to Reafon, which differs nothing, but in words, from being Contrary to Reafon.

25. I fuppofe whoever has duely confider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Difcourfe, can neither be infenfible of the Deficiency of this Allegation, nor be long at a lofs what Answer to return to it. But to fpare my Reader this Trouble, My Reply is, that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Suppofition. He fuppofes here that to be Above Reafon must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent, or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it. Whereas I have fhewn before that 'tis neither of them; That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible, even as to the very Meaning of the Propofition, nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmoft extent, but only what is incomprehenfible to us as to the Truth of the thing, or the Manner of it. 'Tis true indeed if the Propofition were perfectly unintelligible, fo that (as he fays) we could fee nothing

clear

clear in it, even as to the very Senfe and Meaning of it, we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reafon, tho' even then it would not (as this Author confufely enough pretends) be the fame with it, because what is Contrary to Reafon is fuppofed to be well understood. But 'tis much otherwife if it be incomprehenfible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing. This as I fhall fhew hereafter may very well be Believ'd, though what is Contrary to Reason cannot, and what is utterly unintelligible cannot. And I have fufficiently fhewn already that what is thus only inacceffible to Reafon differs, a little more than in words, from being contrary to it.

26. And now if Human Nature were not a very unaccountable thing, I fhould stand great. ly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things fo vastly different as the parts of this Diftinction, of things above Reafon and contrary to it, moft. apparently are. There are indeed fome things which we are ordinarily taught to diftinguish, and yet when strictly examin'd and compared, will be found to have no real ground of Diftintion in them. And 'tis every whit as great (and almoft as Common) a Fault to diftinguish things that do not differ, as to confound those that do. And there are alfo other things of fuch near Refemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art, Subtilty and nice Infpection to discern their Difference. So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures,

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Natures, and divide them from one another. But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree, a Triangle and a Square, fo that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it, or be very infincere not to acknow. ledge it. And I cannot imagine why thofe efpecially who are known to ferve themfelves upon occafion of Diftinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure (unless you will fay Intereft) of those that ufe them, fhould yet reject fuch a folid and wellgrounded, as well as well Authorized, one as this, but only because it is not for their turn, and, if admitted, would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison, blow up and lay waft their Main Strength, and force them to defert and give up a Caufe which they are (now especially) moft zealously fond of, and feem refolv'd even against Reafon to Maintain.

27. For I muft further remark (and 'tis án Obfervation not lightly to be pafs'd over) that if this One Diftinction of things above Reason, and things contrary to Reafon be once admitted, or fhewn to be real, folid and well-grounded, the main part of the Socinian Controverfy is immediately, or at leaft in the very next Confequence, at an end. For the Reason why they will not -believe things above Reafon is because (as they pretend) Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Contrary to Reafon, and fo thofe things that are above Reafon are alfo as much contrary to it as above it, and what is Contrary to Reason is on both fides acknowledg'd

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impoffible

impoffible to be believ'd. Well, but then if it be made appear (as I think by this time is fufficiently done) that thefe two are quite different things, and that to be above Reason is not the fame as to be contrary to it, then even by their own Confeffion there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Believ'd. Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men ftand out fo fiercely and obftinately against this Diftin&tion (for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em) as it is also the reason why I have beftow'd fo much care and pains to clear and juftifie it.

28. And thus having given an Account of thefe great and Fundamental things, what Reafon is, what Faith is, and what it is to be Above, (and what Contrary to Reafon, we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Confideration of the Belief of things above Reason, the true ftate of which Question by what has been hitherto difcours'd appears to be this, Whether we may not Affent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to fuch things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them. Or, whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them, be a fufficient Reafon why we should not believe them. For the Refolution of which we have already laid the Grounds, and fhall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHA P. IV.

That Human Reafon is not the Measure

1.

WE

of Truth.

E have gain'd a moft wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter, by proving the Dinftinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason, and fuch as of it felt alone is fufficient. Not only immediately to decide, but even for ever to Silence the Controverfy between us and our Socinian Adverfaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason. For the only Objection that is or can poffibly be prétended against the Belief of things above Reafon being the fuppofed Contrariety of the fame things to Reafon, if it be fhewn that to be above Reafon involves no fuch Contrariety, then the Objection against the belief of fuch things is fairly and wholly removed, and confequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd. So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already, and thofe of our Adverfaries that have any reasonable: Measure of Penetration and Sincerity muft needs be fenfible of it. And I dare appeal even to their own Confciences whether they are not. However confider

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