Knowledge. When again it fhall be further Confider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Affiftance of that Commanding Key unlock in this ftate of Mortality, we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation, when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh, and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels, and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and diftinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehenfive Intellect of God, I fay he that fhall but ferioufly enter into this fingle Reflection muft needs discover himfelf much wanting in that Stock of Senfe and Reafon he pretends to, if he ftill continue to Measure the Poffibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding, or Conclude any thing Falfe or Impoffible, when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it. CHAP. CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehenfibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, Human Reafon would then be the Measure of Truth. S there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an infeparable Connexion with very bad Confequences,and yet not profeffedly to hold thofe Confequences, because either they do not attend to them, or are not fenfible that they do indeed follow from fuch Principles, whereof we have two very pregnant Inftances in the Maintainers of the Predeftinarian and Solifidian Systems, so on the other hand, and for the fame Reason there are those who take up, and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Confequences without Profeffedly holding thofe Principles from which they truly flow, and to which (if traced to the Head) they will infallibly lead them. 2. Of this we have a very particular Inftance (where I confefs one would not expect to find it) in thofe of the Socinian Perfuafion. The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Myfteries of the Chriftian M 4 ftian Faith, is because they are above their Reason, they cannot Comprehend them. Whereby they plainly imply, that they will believing Nothing but what they can Comprehend, or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehenfible, which is alfo a common Maxim among them, who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the fame thing. And whereas 'tis only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith, in faying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend, they do as good as fay that what they cannot Comprehend is not True, and fo that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is a juft warrant to conclude it Falfe. And all this they own and exprefly declare, if not in thefe very terms, yet at least in fuch as are equivalent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Citations for the proof of it. But now though they do thus profeffedly own that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing by Reafon is an Argument of its not being true, yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, or that all Truth is Comprehenfible by it, are (as I take it) Propofitions which they do not openly and profeffedly avow. For as I noted in the Intro duction 'tis fuch an Odious and Arrogant Affertion that they cannot with any Face of Modefty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profeffion of it, though at the fame time 'tis moft Certain, that this is the true Principle of that Confequence which they do profeffedly hold, . hold, viz. that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be true, and that this Confequence does as neceffarily lead back to that Principle. 3. For as if Human Reafon be the Measure of Truth it follows in the defcending line as a direct Confequence that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be true, fo it follows as well Backwards per viam afcenfus, that if the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be True, then Human Reafon is the Mealure of Truth. Since if it were not, the Incomprehenfibility of a thing (as is fhewn in the Preceding Chapter) would then not argue it not to be True. If therefore it does, 'tis plain that Human Reafon is the Measure of Truth. Which Principle whoever difowns ought also to renounce the other Propofition, viz. That the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument of its untruth, which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding, 'tis plain he holds the Confequence without its Principle, and has indeed no Reafon for what he Affirms. 4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth, denies yet that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being true is therefore inconfiftent with himself, because in fo doing he fuppofes the Contradictory to what he had before granted, viz. that Human Reafon is not the Measure of Truth. So he that Affirms that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True, and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, is alfo as in confiftent confiftent with himself, because in fo doing he fuppofes the Contradictory to his own Affertion, and does in effect fay that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True, as most certainly it would not be in cafe Human Reafon be not the Measure of Truth, as the foregoing Chapter has fufficiently fhewn. The fhort is, if the Not being of 4 proves that C is not, then the being of C proves that A is, fince if it were not, according to the first Suppofition C could not be. And fo here if Reafon's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True, then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of its not being true 'tis plain that Reafon is the Meafure of Truth, fince if it were not then according to the first Suppofition the Incomprehenfibility of a thing would not be an Argument of its not being True. 5. For how I pray comes the Incomprehenfibility of a thing to conclude the untruth of it? I cannot comprehend fuch a thing, therefore it is not True, where's the Confequence? By what Logick does this latter Propofition follow from the former? Why we have here the Minor Propofition and the Conclufion, and to make a Compleat Argument of it we must add another, thus; If it were true I fhould Comprehend it, but I do not Comprhend it, therefore it is not true. Whereby it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwife an Argument of the untruth of it, than |