of Man is not capable of Comprehending. After which he Concludes with a very grave and ufeful Reflection, which for the great advantage and Pertinency of it to the prefent Affair, though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter, I fhall here fet down. The Profit (says he) that one may draw from thefe Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them, which of it felf is barren enough, but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding, and to force it to confefs that there are things which it cannot Comprebend. And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties, the better to tame its Prefumption,and abate its confidence and daringness in oppofing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion, under the Pretence that it cannot comprebend them. For fince all the Force of Human Understanding is constrain'd to yield to the leaft Atom of Matter, and to own that it fees Clearly that it is infinitely divifible without being able to Comprehend how this may be. Is it not apparently to tranfgrefs against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Omnipotence, Merely for this Reafon, that our Understanding cannot Comprehend them? Yes without doubt it is, as will better appear in the fequel of this Difcourfe. In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter, I have a double Remarque to make upon it.

34. The First is, that fince Truth in its full extent is Incomprehenfible, we fhould not vainly go about to Comprehend it, but be contented to be ignorant in many things. And fince there

are

are fome special Truths in particular that are incomprehensible we should not apply our Thoughts to the Comprehenfion of all things at a Venture, as fome who are for understanding every thing, but fit down firft and Confider whether they are proportionate to our Capacities or No, and, as far as we can learn to diftinguish what Truths may, and what may not be Comprehended by us, that fo we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them, which might be profitably imploy'd in the Confideration of other things, better futed to our Capacity. As a great many do, who bufie themfelves all their Lives long about fuch things which if they fhould ftudy to Eternity they would not Comprehend, and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them. Whereas the fhortest Compendium of Study, and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to ftudy only what we can Master, and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties, and never fo much as to apply our felves to what we can never Comprehend.

35. The other Remarque is that the Conclufion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was undertaken to be made out in the laft Concerning the Diftinction of Things Above, and Things Contrary to Reason. For if there are Truths which we cannot Comprehend, then it seems what is above our Comprehenfion may yet be True, and if True then to be fure not Contrary

to

to Reason, fince whatever is Contrary to Reafon is no lefs Contrary to Truth, which though fometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it.

CHA P. V.

That therefore a thing's being Incompre· benfible by Reafon is of it felf no Concluding Argument of its not being True.

A

S there is nothing in Man that deferves his Confideration fo Much, and Few things without him that deferve it More than that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker, fo there is Nothing more worthy of his Confideration in that part, or that is at least more neceffary to be Confider'd by him, than the Defects of it, without a due regard to which it would not be very safe for him to dwell much upon the Confideration of the other, as being apt to feduce him into Pride and Vanity, to blow him up with Self-Conceit, and fo by an imaginary Greatness to fpoil and corrupt that which is Genuine and Natural.

2. Now the Defects of our Intellectual part Confider'd in their general Heads are I fuppofe Sin, Ignorance, and Error. And though Sin in

it felf must be allow'd to be of a worfe Nature and Confequence than either Ignorance or Er• ror (however fome may fancy it a greater Reproach to 'em to have their Intellectuals queftion'd than their Morals) and fo upon that score may require more of our Confideration, yet upon another account the Defects of the Understanding seem to need it more than those of the Will, fince we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intellectuals than of our Morals, but also to Conceit our felves more Free and Secure from Error than we are from Sin, though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and supposes Error.

3. Pride the prefumed Sin of the Angels is alfo the most Natural and Hereditary one of Man, his dominant and most cleaving Cor ruption, the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion. And that which we are most apt to be proud of is our Understandings, the only Faculty in us whofe limits we forget. In other things we are Senfible not only of the general Bounds of our Nature, but also of the particular narrowness of them, and according ly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Measure, but contain our Selves pretty reasonably within Our Line, at least are not fuch Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place, or to fet our Mouths to drink up the Sea, or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars. But there is hardly any Diftance but to which we fancy our Intellectual Sight will reach, scarce

any

any Object too bright, too large, or too far remov'd for it. Strange that when we Confider that in us which makes us Men, we should forget that we are fo. And yet thus it is; when we look upon our Understandings 'tis with fuch a Magnifying Glafs that it appears in a manner boundless and unlimited to us, and we are dazzled with our own Light.

4. Not that it is to be prefumed that there are any who upon a deliberate Confideration of the Matter have this Form'd and express Thought that their Understandings are Infinite. Human Nature feems hardly capable of fuch Excess. But only as the Pfalmift fays in ano ther Cafe of fome Worldly Men, that their Inward Thought is that their houses shall continu: for ever, Pfal 49. Not meaning that any could be fo groffely abfurd as pofitively and explicitly to Conceive that their Houses any more than their own Bodies, fhould laft always, and never decay, but only that they had fuch a kind of a wandring and Confufe Imagination fecretly lurking in their Minds, and loofely hovering about them; fo in like manner there are a fort of People who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confuse and unform'd Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an exprefs and diftinct Thought, that their Understandings have no bounds or limits belonging to them, tho' they cannot deny but that they have, if directly put to the Question.

5. Accordingly you fhall find those whose Conduct betrays this inward Sentiment, who

venture