A ( 249 ) MAGAZINE. For the OXFORD HOUSE of LORDS of IRELAND. Die Mercurii 18o. die Decembris 1771. Motion was made by the Lord Viscount Mountmorres, that an humble Addrefs be prefented to his Majefty, representing, that it is the opinion of this Houfe, that the appointment which his Majefty has been advised to make, of five Members of Parliament, to examine and pass certain of the accounts of this kingdom, with the powers fpecified in his Majefty's letters, dated the 31st of October, 1771, the prefent circumstances of this country being confidered, is unneceffary and inexpedient, and praying that his Majefty will be graciously pleased to direct his Attorney-General, to caufe the legality of faid appointment to be tried according to due course of law. It passed in the negative. Diffentient, Ift. Because we conceive that the appointment of five new Commiffioners for examining and perfecting the imprefted or extraordinary accounts of this kingdom, is unneceffary, inafmuch as the ancient Commiflioners appear to have been deemed fufficient for fome centuries past, and to have been fo held by his Majesty's ministers in both kingdoms at his acceffion; and even at a later period, viz. in 1766, when his Majefty's laft appointment of the faid Commiffioners was made, requiring them to state and examine all the public accounts four times, inftead of once in the year; fince which time, it cannot be pretended that any increase in that department, or in the other public occupations of the faid Commiffioners, hath arifen to require fuch a new establishment as that in question; and we think it might imply an unmerited cenfure on the eminent perfons who at prefent confitute the antient commiffion, if the neceffity of fuch a new arrangement were now, for the first time, to be discovered and admitted. VOL. VII. 2dly. Because it is to be prefumed, if the old board had not been deemed by his Majesty's minifters to be fully fufficient, that they would not have rendered it lefs fo, by fuffering it to be deprived of one of its members, viz. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who doth not refide in this kingdom, nor execute any part of the duty of that office; and we conceive, if any infufficiency in the old board could rea fonably be alledged, in confequence of the avocations of the other great offcers of the law, who compofe it, that it might and ought to be remedied, by ordering the Chancellor of the Exchequer to attend, whereby, instead of loading this country with a new expence, the falary of that great office would circulate within this king dom, whereas now it is expended abroad. 3dly. Because the neceffity of this appointment, if any, muft arife either from the arrear of unpaffed accounts heretofore incurred, and which is the only argument we have heard in fupport of this new establishment, or 'it inuft arife from the nature and extent of our accounts respecting the future. Now, firft, we conceive that the new Commiffioners are directed to call be fore them, not fuch perfons as have, but fuch as hall receive any fum or fums by way of impreft, that is, to act for the future, and not for the past; and that therefore the neceffity of thefe new Commiffioners cannot be maintained on the ground of an arrear, which they are not directed to examine and fettle: Moreover, we think, that even if they were to have a retrofpect, it is utterly abfurd to establish a permanent board for all time future, for the occafional purpose of settling an arrear incurred in time paft; a temporary appointment being fufficient for fuch a temporary office, whereby the expence to the public would ceafe with the occafion which produced it. Again, I i as as to our accounts in future, we think it cannot be denied, that one Board of Commiffioners of accounts would be fufficient to discharge the whole bufinefs, if properly conftituted; now, either the old Board is fo constituted, or it is not; if it is fo conftituted, it is fufficient, and another is unneceffary; if it is not fo conftituted, either it ought to be corrected, if capable of being rendered fufficient, or if incapable thereof, it ought to be abolished by due authority; and one Board properly regulated and fufficient, substituted in its room; whereas the prefent measure of Government is to do neither; for it is to continue the old Beard in its antient form, which, if it is infufficient, is abfurd; and to add another to do part of its duty, which is abfurd, if it be not infufficient. It proposes, in a word, not that we should have one Board properly regulated and fufficient, but that we thould have two, each of which fhall be fo contrived as to be at leaft feparately inadequate, and that not for the purpofe of the one being a check and controul on the other, but wholly independent and diftine, which can be productive of evil confequences only, as we apprehend, without one benefit. 4thly. Becaufe we think it to be inexpedient, inafmuch as no new expence that can be avoided, ought to be incurred, at a period, when from the growing difficulties of the public, the wildom of Parliament hath found it neceflary, both in the Seffions of 1769, and in the prefent Seffion, to reduce very confiderably, the fum ufually expended on the internal improvement of the kingdom, and towards the fupport of its great charitable foundations; when, notwithstanding fuch a retrenchment, Government was obliged. to borrow in the two lak years 130,000l. in aid of the General Re. venue; when the next two years feem to threaten a fill greater encreate of rational debt, the Commons, having deemed it neccilary to vote in this Setfion, a loan of 200,000l. in aid of the General Revenue, for the ordinary fervice of the two years enfuing; when his Majesty's Revenue, by decay of trade and credit is dening, when notwithstanding this Country is more heavily burdened in proportion to her ability than Great-Britain: And, notwithstanding that the taxes of this kingdom exceed in their annual amount the whole circulating fpecie of the nation, yet the expence of the Public is greatly fuperior to the Revenue thereof, even though the latter fhould rife again to as high an amount as it hath reached, at any period heretofore, which we cannot promife to ourselves at prefent that it will; when, unless; instead of encreafing, we fhall diminish the public Charges, this kingdom will incur a larger debt, in a few years of profound tranquility, than it contracted during the whole of the late War, in which, this country undertook a larger fhare of expence, than ever it had done in any War before: And when the speech from the Throne this Seffion of Parliament, hath stated fo emphatically the neceffitous condition of this Kingdom, and hath dictated œconomy in fuch alarming terms. 5thly. Because it appears, that at fo late a period, as in the year 1757, the whole expence of the public in the article of Commiffioners of Accounts amounted only to 360l. which expence, fince that time, principally by the innovation of quarterly, instead of annual accounts, hath increased to fe ven times that fum, without any advantage to the public therefrom, as we apprehend and which, in confe quence of this new establishment, will, at the lowelt eltimate, be augmented, upon the whole, in more than a twentyfold proportion-and that in a featon of public diftrefs, and of accumulating debt; whereas, in the first-mentioned period, this nation having recently dif charged the whole capital of its antecedent debt, was free from all incumbrance whatsoever, and in a profperous and rifing condition :--Wherefore we humbly conceive, that it would be more feasonable and expedient to reduce this article of the public Charge, than to encrease it; and that nothing can be more prepofterous in this light, than the prefent propofition, by which this new Board of inferior Commif fioners, for taking a very finall portion of the public acconnts, will coft the kingdom Proteft of the Irish Lords. kingdom, on the moft moderate calculation, above Sixteen times the fum, which was paid in 1757, to the antient Commiffioners for the whole accounts of the nation. 6thly. Becaufe we conceive, that as any two of the faid five Commiffioners are authorised by thefe letters, to exercife all the extenfive and fingular powers vefted thereby in the said Commiffioners, great inconveniencies, and much confufion may follow therefrom; and that contradictory orders may be iflued, each figned by two of the faid Commiffioners, without any apparent precedence, or ground of preference, in the one order over the other, whereby the perfons required to obey the fame, may regulate their conduct, or be able to afcertain, which they are to regard. 7thly. Because, we conceive, if any encrease of expence in this depart ment were at all expedient, or admiffible, that the public intereft would require, that the fame thould be incurred rather by a moderate addition of profit to the antient Commiffioners, than by the creation of new ones, for many weighty reafons, and especially for that, by multiplying unnecessary offices, the undue influence of the Crown must be extended; for which purpofe alone this appointment feems to us, indeed, to have been ca culated; whether we confider that fignal mifmanagement and mal-administration, which hath rendered the arts of intrigue and corruption more than ufually requifite, to counteract the force of juft and national indignation; or whether we confider the perfons appointed to thefe offices, who, inftead of being selected from amongst those who have had public opportunities of teftifying their peculiar fitness for, and experience in, the department of the national accounts, have been all taken, without afingle exception, from amongst the reprefentatives of the people. 8thly, Because we wish that the vaKidity of the letters patent in queftion to be brought to trial, inafmuch as we apprehend that the fame are illegal, for that the Court of Exchequer is a Court of ancient jurifdiction for the 251 purpofe of hearing and determining all matters of account and revenue, with fufficient officers and powers for adjufting and determining the fame, and for recovering all fuch balances as may appear to be due thereon; in which Court all questions of legal doubt, must be decided by the Barons who know the law; and all questions of fact, by the constitutional trial by Jury. And we conceive, that the executive power cannot, at this day, confiftently with the laws of the land, appoint any new judicature; nor any perfon or perfons whatfoever, save only the ancient Judges and Officers of the faid Court, to hear and determine any matter or matters incident to the jurisdiction thereof; or to exercise any powers which may interfere with the faid jurifdiction. But the five new Commiffioners of Accounts, appointed" by his Majefty's letters patent, bearing date the 31st of October 1771, or any two or more of them, are autho rifed by faid letters," To call before them, once in every year, the Master of the Ordnance, the Clerks and Receivers of Fines and Cafualties, the Treasurer of the Barrack Board, or Board of Works, and every Accomptant and Accomptants, whofe accounts, by virtue of any former commiffion, the faid Commiflioners or others exercising or occupying their places, were required and authorised to examine, except the accounts of the Vice-Treasurer and Receiver, or Receivers-General, and the Treasurer at War, or Paymaster-General, to call before them all fuch perfons who fhall, or may, from time to time, receive any fum or fums of money, by way of impreft, either by warrant or order of government for his Majesty's fervice, to exhibit to the faid Com miffioners all fuch accounts, books, certificates, warrants, bills and muniments whatsoever, as shall touch or concern the charge or discharge of the faid accounts remaining in their hands or cuftody, or remaining in the hands, cuftody, or poffeffion of any of his Majefty's Officers or Minifters within this kingdom; and them, and every of them, by all ways and means they poffibly can, to perufe, caft up, Ii 2 try, |