IT For the OXFORD MAGAZINE. Of the KNOWLEDGE of MANKIND. POPE. The proper fcience of mankind ss man. and whofoever will look into the ge neral world, will find, that these two effential parts of Human Wisdom ever advance in proportion to one another. The firft great step to this happy Science is not attended with fo many difficulties as the rigid Philofophers of old time have pretended; the most formidable enemies we have to encounter in our way to it, are prejudices, taken up early, and ftrengthening as we grow older; and that great and pow erful natural principle Self-love. T is a doctrine of more than two thousand years standing, and which has been more than twice two thousand times repeated, that the greatest, the moft ufeful, and the first of all branches of wisdom, is the Knowledge of ourfelves; but the extenfion of that doctrine, laid down in the motto to this paper, which enlarges the field of knowledge on this head, and takes in the rest of mankind along with the individual, is not lefs effential to our happinefs, though encumbered with lefs difficulties in the attainment. The Knowledge of Mankind, the understanding the nature, qualities, and affections of our fellow creatures, is of more efficacy to our well-being, and tends more, infinitely more, to the great end of anfwering the purposes for which we were created, than all the other Sciences put together; and, as a great encouragement to our attempting to excel in it, it is much cafier to arrive at, than any other Science whatever. Man is all in all to Man; his deepest purposes all terminate in the refolves of his fellow crea tures, and he can neither forefee, nor understand any part of his misfortunes or fucceffes, unless he firft understands thofe agents on whofe concurrence they depend. Before a Man prefumes to study others, it is neceffary that he hould know himself; when this is arrived at, Men are fo like to one another, that the reft is eafy; and the Man who can certainly tell, from his juft Knowledge of himself, what he would do in any particular circumftance making proper allowances for the known Paffions, will not so often as once in a thousand times be mifta ken, in concluding by it what another Perfon would do in the fame cafe. It is on this Principle, that we venture to advance, that the Knowledge of Mankind is fo eafy, after the Know ledge of ourselves is once arrived at; Every man takes a delight in deceiv ing and betraying himself: there is no fpecies of cunning, of which we are naturally fo fond, as that of hiding ourselves from ourselves: In confequence of thefe original defigns, we eternally flatter ourselves; fet an infinitely higher value on any thing that is good in us than it deferves; and extenuate our defects to nothing: in fhort, we are continually winking purpofely, left we should see ourselves too clearly. Every Man who knows his own heart, knows, that this is more or lets the ftate of it, as he is more or less removed from that knowledge we are inculcating; and every one muft own, that these are qualities rather habitual than natural to us; that they are founded on a compelled, not a neceffary ignonorance, and kept up by force, not by any involuntary affections. If this be the cafe then, where is the mighty difficulty of overcoming them? There feems, indeed, little more neceffary, than occafionally to throw afide our habitual prejudices, to put ourselves in the place of other People; and, in fhort, to leave our eyes at liberty to open. "The truth is that this fort of Knowis not fo often miffed in the research as neglected, and not fearched after. Few People, very few, ever enquire about it, or, indeed, will give themselves leave to receive it; and if fo, where is the wonder that fo few among us have any are of that Knowledge, Of the Knowledge of Mankind. which it is fo much their intereft to cultivate, fince they will not fuffer themselves to be inftructed in the firft leffon of it? If we enter feriously and difintereft edly on this plan of study, we fhall fee but a bad portrait of Human Nature, but we thall fee a true and accurate one fo far as it goes; we shall find Man, on the one hand, a poor, weak, low, and miferable being, whom we cannot but heartily pity, and on the other, we fhall find him proud, infolent, puffed up with ill-grounded prefumption, and requiring little less than adoration of us, though, in reality, he can justly claim nothing but contempt. We fhall be thus taught to think fomewhat lefs haughtily of Human Nature than we ufually do, and confequently fomewhat lefs proudly of ourfelves; but we shall think much more justly of both : our natural Pride, which, in fpite of all their efforts, will be continually exerting itself, will make up the better fide of the portrait; and by this, we fhall be guarded against the poifon as well of particular, as general flattery, and be upon our guard against the contagion, whether threatning us from the world, or in ourselves. These are the two great enemies to all true Knowledge; the first external and open, as in the popular opinions, the vices, and the follies of the world; the other internal, from our Paffions. The true means then, by which we have any rational profpect of arriving at this difficult, this uncommon, yet this moft effential and advantageous Wifdem, must be by freeing ourfelves from this double occafion of error. popular prejudices, and domestic paffions. The innumerable errors that we find the generality of the world running into, in regard both to judgment and to will, prove too evidently to us, that vice and error are the most powerful agents. What reafon then can we have to let fuch a multitude decide for us? The beft and wifeft men of all ages have been forced to acknowledge, that the generality of the world in their time was foolish and wicked; that, among a thousand, there have not been found one wife or good perfon; that the number of fools was infinite; and 227 that vice ever seemed to plead u..iverfally in its favour. There can be no wonder, as this has been always the state of Mankind, that they have been deceived who truftsd general decifions; nor can there be any true Wifdom hoped for in the world, till those, who are ready to take up opinions from others, will first take the pains to know who, and what those are, from whom they take them : Such a Knowledge will generally teach us not to take them at all, and will keep us clear of the great fource of vice and folly, ill-example. Vice is never fo dreadfully contagious, as when it spreads itself by means of number and example; it is a plaufible obedience, and feems to carry with it the appearance of humility and justice, to follow the method, and join in the way, frequented by others; but the beaten way too often deceives, and it is not more true, that broad is the way that leadeth to death, than that broad is the way that leadeth to folly. The appearances that make for us in going with the multitude, are indeed but appearances, and the more true ftate of the cafe is, that we follow the wild-goofetrain, without knowing where it goes; we join one another, like sheep, for company; we never enquire into the reafon of what we are about, nor remember that we are a part of that multitude we feem to be guided by ; and that while every other individual that makes a part of it is as careless about the whole as ourselves, that body, whofe will and determinations we follow, has no will or determina,^ tions at all, but is led on by mere accident, and falls on good or ill, juft as' they chance to prefent themselves in its way. We are no fooner drawn away, we know not why, than we make a part of the attractive body, and draw on others to follow us, who no more know why, than we do why we follow those, who, in the fame thoughtless manner, fell into the crowd hefore us.. *1 228 Of the Knowledge of Mankind. borrow our own overthrow, and perish upon credit? He who would' arrive at wifdom, must always fufpect whatever pleases, and has the fanction of vulgar authority, and must credit that alone which demands fuch credit in itself, and on its own bottom; that which is true and good in itself, not which has the good fortune to appear fo to others; he fhould account ehe multitude, when in the wrong, as one man, when in the right, as a multitude; and when an Antagonist would overbear his reafon, by telling him all the world believes a thing, he may anfwer; fo much the worse, fince the beft and trueft things are esteemed and believed only by a few, and little except falfity and error, by that imaginary, infallible body, all the world. All the world believed that the earth ftood ftill; yet was not he, who alone difcovered that it moved round the fun, the lefs in the right, because of this general contrariety of opinion. Socrates had fo little relifh for this general opinion, that, when a diffolute fellow, a favourite of the mob, faid,. as he paffed by, There goes the honefteft man upon the earth," he ftarted, and afked aloud, "What have I done, that fuch a fellow fhould fpeak well of me? The known ill character of the perfon who gave the encomium here pleaded againft it; but Phocion, who had as jut an opinion of a multitude as any man, carried this fort of cenfure much farther: He was fpeaking in public, with his ufaal strength of reafon, when the peopie fet up a general fhout of approba-, tion at fomething he had faid, on which, inftead of that confcious pride, which we fee in a Ga rick, at a like huzza from the upper gallery, this judicious man turned round to thofe, who were about him, and asked them, with a blush," Has any folly efcaped me, or any loofe word flipped from my tongue, that thefe people are fo pleafed with me?" The reproof was uttered loud enough to be heard by the people who had occafioned it; and the confequence was, a difcontinuance of all thele noify teftimonies of fatiffaction on the like occafion for the fu ture; and the fpeaker in public never knew the fenfe of the people till he had finished all he had to fay among them. Perhaps the fenfible part of a modern audience would not be dif pleased, if the Gentlemen juft now mentioned would take example by Phocion, and find fome way of fuppreffing that disturbance which arifes over their heads, and which he ought to know, is an applaufe from fuch ignorant hands, that a man, who has merit enough to deferve any other, ought to be ashamed of it. The multitude are fo far from meriting our regard as patterns and examples, that it was nobly said by an ancient Heathen, who had not the general plaudit of the vulgar, Qui placere poteft popula, cui virtus placet ? Who can pleafe the multitude, to whom virtue is pleafing? We ought in general to avoid the company of these mislead-. ing guides, and, above all these behaviours, which, he who knows man kind, will always know, is the more likely to err, as there are the more opinions concerned in it. When a man, has, on fuch principles as thefe, put himself upon his gnard against this external enemy, the next he is to conquer is the yet more dangerous, internal one, his. paffions: The confufion and flavery. thefe bring on, are-only to be guarded against by, our difcarding them from our thoughts, at least while employed on thefe important fubjects. A man ought to disfurnish himself as much as poffible of thefe, before he attempts to arrive at real knowledge in the moral world, and to make his heart a white paper, that it may receive every impreffion of true wildom, against every offer of which, one or other of these internal enemies is always ready to oppose itself. ་་ However difficult a task this may feem, there are many ways of arriving fufficiently near it for this great purpofe; the one is, to affect an infenfibility to them, to refufe to perceive the things they offer them; but this is an imperfect remedy; it is not fo properly curing the difeafe, as not feeling the effects of it. A fecond method is, that by contradiction; the destroying |