CHAP. Principle of Self-Love, which is naturally fo XVI. " prevailing in us, being no way moderated or "reftrain'd, but rather improv'd and made "stronger every Day by the Exercife of the "Paffions in a Subject of more extended Self"Intereft; there may be Reason to apprehend "left the Temper of this kind fhould extend "itself in general thro' all the Parts of Life. "For if the Habit be fuch as to occafion, in every Particular, a ftricter Attention to Self 66 good and private Intereft, it must infenfibly di"minifh the Affections towards publick Good, "or the Intereft of Society; and introduce a "certain Narrownefs of Spirit, which (as fome pretend) is peculiarly obfervable in the de"vout Perfons and Zealots of almost every religious Perfuafion ." 66 HERE. are several Things fuppofed: That the Deity influences Mens Actions but two Ways, by the Way of Power, or by the Way of Example. Yet afterwards, in order to give the Preference to Theifm above Atheism, he admits of another, the Inspection of the fupreme Being for producing the Shame of Ill-doing, and the Honour of Well-doing, in this prefent Life. THE Deiftical Scheme will admit of no higher End of the Deity's being Spectator of human Action Because the Shame and Honour to be divulged hereafter in Retrofpect to paft Behaviour here, fuppofes a folemn Judgment to come, which neceffarily moreover fuppofes pofitive legal Rewards and Punishments (for what Occafion for a Judge to diftribute Rewards and PuIbid. pag. 57. Charact. Vol. II. pag. 57, 58. nishments, XVI. nishments, which, according to them, are and CHAP. can be no other than the natural Confequences of Virtue and Vice?) And as pofitive legal Rewards and Punishments cannot influence, because they can't be known without Revelation; as long as they reject this, they can do no lefs, confiftently with themselves, than reject the Influence of the other; and fo confine Shame and Honour refulting from that Inspection to this Scene of Things only where, I am of Opinion, it will have no Influence upon private Actions, but upon a Suppofition of their being brought to Account in the open publick Judgment declar'd by the Gospel. HE allows of the Influence of the Deity by way of Inspection to the End mentioned; and alfo of Example in Benevolence and Beneficence, as the only genuine virtuous Spring of Action, as far as the Confideration of Deity has any Share in it: And difallows the Influence of his Power, as the Oppofite of it. But then he should not have connected to that Confideration, as he does, Rewards and Punishments. For all the Ideas of them, with refpect to their taking place, are relative, not to Power, but to Justice: And in order to depreciate the Motives that are virtuoufly and dutifully drawn from Rewards and Punishments, he places the Deity in a quite different Afpect before thofe who make ufe of those Motives, than what they behold him in, who are actually influenc'd by them. THEY don't at all view him in bis Picture of Power, exercifing an abfolute Will, or enforcing Obedience by particular Rewards and Punishments. Who but a Deift has fuch an Idea of E 2 God, CHAP. God, in his reveal'd Will? No, they look upon XVI. his Will, not as abfolute, or capricious, but as governing by the Reason and according to the Nature of Things, as has been fhewn t; and that his particular Rewards and Punishments flow from his Wifdom and Goodness, and will be duly put in Execution by his Juftice. The previous denouncing fuch Sanctions is a Contradiction to an arbitrary Will, because it gives every Body an Opportunity to act fo, as to escape any ill Effects from fuch a Will. Whether there is indeed Virtue and Goodness, which he denies to be in Actions influenc'd by fuch Motives, will be confider'd in its Place. HE fuppofes further, that Self-Affection or Regard to private Good in this World, being itfelf a vicious Motive with Regard to ferving the Publick and confulting the Good of others, as he had maintain'd before ; fo here the Exercife of that Self-Love improved and made ftronger in a Subject of more extended Self-Intereft, i. e. future Reward in another World, spoke of in the Paragraph before, has a Tendency to diminish the Affections towards Publick Good or the Intereft of Society: And he confirms this by the Example of the Narrowness of Spirit obfervable in devout Perfons and Zealots of every Religion. I fhall not answer for every devout or zealous Perfon even of the Chriftian Religion, because several exert a Zeal without Knowledge where to place it, or Prudence when to use it; and therefore the Fault is wholly in them, if they are found wanting in that, or any Inftance of Mora Throughout Vol. I. Ibid. pag. 58. lity, and not in the Chriftian Religion, which CHAP. infpires the contrary. To the reft of his Affertions I anfwer, and hope to make appear both from the Nature of Things, and from the reveal'd Will of God, That moral Obligation is founded upon Self-Affection or Regard to private Good, influenced and directed by the Authority of God as its Bafis. And that the Practice of Morality is primarily, and most frongly influenc'd from Motives and Confiderations of the Good and Happiness of the Agent. BY SELF-AFFECTION I mean the Affection a Man regularly has, or ought to have for himself, in the compleat Senfe of Self. As the main Duration of his Being lies in Futurity, his chief Good or Happiness, or Confideration of Self must therefore lie there; which he is to love and regard as the ultimate End of his Actions. The Nature and Kind of his Good and Happi-ness must be according to the Nature and Kind of his Being. If that is complex in the Union of Body and Mind now, it will be more perfect hereafter in the greater Perfection of both of them: If the Mind confifts of Faculties fuited to the Perception and Enjoyment of Good (fuppofe Understanding, Will, and Affections) there must be relative Objects suitable to those Faculties both here, and hereafter. In order to enjoy Happiness here and hereafter, our wife Maker has accordingly conftituted us reasonable, fociable, accountable or religious Creatures. To confider the Relations we ftand in, regulate our Affections, diftinguish natural Good from moral, true Happiness from E 3 false, XVI. CHAP. falfe, fhort Pleasure or Pain from what is laftXVI. ing and more concerning, in order to reform and regulate the Election of the Will, and fuperintend all Action to the ultimate End as fociable, made to enjoy our Good not folitarily, but in Society, both in this World and the next; and being made fenfible of the fame, we are impress'd with natural Love and Affection to Society, as well as to our private Selves, as we are Accountable and Religious: We fubmit our Reason to his who gave us our Being with our Reason, in cafe he has truly revealed any Directions to our ultimate Happiness, which we could not otherwise have found out; and think ourselves bound to understand, and do his Will, and be affected with the Sanctions he has annex'd thereto. MAN then being conftituted to enjoy his Good or Happiness in Society, his Good, as a fociable. intelligent Agent, must be implicated with, and connected to the Good of others, intelligent of their Good as we are of ours; our Mores or Manners respecting their Good, the Rules and Directions concerning it, in Conjunction with our own, makes it moral Good; and others being fenfible of that Communication with and Refpect had to them, gives it the Idea of Good. BUT all that Neceffity, Force, Compulfion being fet afide, which fubvert the Liberty of the Will, and for that Reafon are Contraries to Virtue and Morality, the Qualification; and no less so to Happiness itself, which is the End. Since Happinefs fo much depends upon the Choice of the Will, that if it was forc'd upon, it would infallibly disgust a free Agent: it remains that VirLue and Morality must be the Choice of the Will, and |