The relations of language to thought |
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The Relations of Language to Thought (Classic Reprint) William Roscoe Burgess No preview available - 2018 |
Common terms and phrases
actual word Adam Smith adduced adjective Adverbs analysis of language analytical appears Aryan assertion attributes Bain bundle of ideas called cave cavea Chap cognition connotation consciousness copula Cratylus demonstrative element distinct ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE error express fact finger Greek guage hand hinthan idea of distance ideas are produced implies impressions indefinite article indicated intuitive predications J. S. Mill jectively l'état l'idée s'est exprimée langues Latin Latin language Logic Max Müller meaning merely denotable object mind monstrative Müller nature nominal element nominal roots notion noun substantive objective existence observe ocular origin origin of language particular perception phenomena phenomenon predication concerning Prof pronouns proposition Provençal quicklime Realism reference relation Renan Romance Languages Sanskrit seems Semitic languages sensations sense shines sition speak speech strative substantive verb suppose synthetical form theory thou thought tion tive tout son cortége triliteral true ultimate elements unconsciously received δείκνυμι
Popular passages
Page 30 - The assignation of particular names to denote particular objects, that is, the institution of nouns' substantive, would, probably, be one of the first steps towards the formation of language. Two savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had been bred up remote from the societies of men, would naturally begin to form that language, by which...
Page 65 - The researches of the chemist have revealed a no less striking uniformity of material composition in living matter. In perfect strictness, it is true that chemical investigation can tell us little or nothing, directly, of the composition of living matter, inasmuch as such matter must needs die in the act of analysis...
Page 16 - Is this a dagger which I see before me, The handle toward my hand ? Come, let me clutch thee. I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Page 55 - ... one of the most fatal errors ever introduced into the philosophy of Logic ; and the principal cause why the theory of the science has made such inconsiderable progress during the last two centuries.
Page 2 - Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed.
Page 33 - They all express originally one out of the many attributes of a thing, and that attribute, whether it be a quality or an action, is necessarily a general idea. The word thus formed was in the first instance intended for one object only, though of course it was almost immediately extended to the whole class to which this object seemed to belong.
Page 66 - But objectors of this class do not seem to reflect that it is also, in strictness, true that we know nothing about the composition of any body whatever, as it is. The statement that a crystal of calc-spar consists of carbonate of lime is quite true, if we only mean that, by appropriate processes, it may be resolved into carbonic acid and ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE quicklime.
Page 32 - Antrum, therefore, meant originally what is within or inside the earth or anything else. It is clear, therefore, that such a name could not have been given to any individual cave, unless the general idea of being within, or inwardness, had been present in the mind. This general idea once formed, and once expressed by the pronominal root an or antar, the process of naming is clear and intelligible. The place where the savage could live safe from rain and from the sudden attacks of wild beasts, a natural...
Page 31 - ... to them. The particular cave whose covering sheltered them from the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the particular fountain whose water allayed...
Page 6 - Matter, then, may be defined, a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked, whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter : and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm with confidence, that this conception of Matter includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical, and sometimes from theological, theories.