Yorkshire, merchants, May 21...Robinfon J. Crosby-fquare, merchant, June 19 ...Richings, Stephen and Somerfet, late of Oxford, breeches-makers, June 5... Reeve E. Leeds, linendraper, June 2. Sharples R. Anderton, Lancashire, fhopkeeper, May 10...Simmonds J. Canterbury, Kent, linendraper, June 5...Sheppard S. Marlborough-ftr. Carnaby-market, victualler, June 5... Starey C. Newgate-ftreet, linendraper, June 5... Self S. Halefworth, Suffolk, corn-merchant, June 11...Sommervail J. Lancafter, merchant, June 9...Smith P. Farnhill, fhalloonmaker, June 11. Taylor J. Manche fter, merchant, May 18... Taylor E. Blackburn, Lancash. linendraper, June 7... Tuther T. P. Holborn-hill, linendraper, May 26... Tomlins William, Bridge-road, Lambeth, May 29... Taylor T. Birmingham, draper, June2...Thompfon F. Bow-lane, warehoufeman, May 5, and June 5... Travis J. and P. Nevill, Botton-le-moor, Lancashire, muslin-ma Whittaker J. and J. Pitt, Birmingham,* coachmakers, May 31... Warren J. Brentwood, publican, May 18...Warren G. Coventry-ftreet, Haymarket, upholder, May 18... White T. White-yard, Rolemary-lane, cooper, June 2... Wilfon R. Bread-ftreet, merchant, June 5... Walley T. Liverpool, merchant, June 5...Win dett J. Norwich, grocer, June 14... Waits J. Upper Thames-ftreet, grocer, June 9 ...Weft J. Somer's-place Eaft, Pancras, plasterer, June 2...Warner A. Maribro'. ftreet, flocking manufacturer, June 8... Weftmacott R. the elder, Mount-freet, ftone-mafon, June 9... Walton J. Ashtonunder-line, cotton-fpinner, June 9.... Whitby T. Making-place, merchant, June 11. Young J.Southampton, linendraper, June §. ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. The favour of Phyficus is under confideration. The Query fubmitted by T. H. is purely speculative: much may be faid on either fide, without reaching any thing like decifion; though there are many inftances upon record which would induce us to fuppofe that eloquence may exit without talent. The communications of Hiftorie Investigator came too late for infertion this month. Some of them will probably appear in our next. The Ejay On Marriage, by P. C. A., is inadmiffible. Errata in our laft Number: Page 380...col. 2...line 13 from bottom, for novel read hovel. 10 for Abbé Debille tead Delille. 1 for unfrequently read frequently. 10 dele he. 6 from bottom, for Fonti read Fronti. 36 for cacræ read canore. 33 for almost always violent vomitings, read and shecia almost always the, &c. THE UNIVERSAL MAGAZINE. No. VI......VOL. I. For JUNE 1804. WHATEVER blame and opprobrium may justly be thrown on certain characters who have diftinguished themfelves in the courfe of the French revolution, it cannot be denied that the individuals who compofed the armies infpired with the love of country, and daily risking their lives to fave it, deferve to be honoured. Indeed, if courage be, as it has often been affirmed, the first of virtues in a man, we may look to the military leaders of the new republic for the antient and best character of these our enemies. The profeffion of arms unqueftionably infpires fentiments of honour, and to the credit of the military of France, it must be allowed, that their conduct evinced as much when, on the 26th of May 1794, the furious decree at the inftance of the Committee of Public Safety was palled by the Convention, "that in future no quarters fhould be given to British or Hanoverian troops;" for upon a conference among the officers, it was refolved not to execute it, but govern themfelves by thofe rules of war which civilized nations have, as it were by compact, agreed upon as best calculated to foften its violence and its calamities. We have had occafion to obferve, in a former number of our work, that to write a hiftory of a brilliant campaign, as it is called, is but to paint fo many fcenes of carnage; and that, however the horrors of death and difafter may be diminished or concealed by the "pride, pomp, and circumftance of glorious war," it is no lefs to be deplored, that the jealoufies, the paffions, and the ambition of man, thould be able to fet one half of the human race upon destroying the other. The warfare it is our lot to treat of in the following pages, and VOL. I. NEW SERIES. which holds out the high military cha racter of Pichegru, is perhaps of as fanguinary a caft as any the hiftorian's pen can defcribe; for as the General at this period (in common with the generals of the day) lay under fome fufpicion of not being, what the French termed, "à la hauteur des circon ftance," the Convention fent two of its members to confult with him, or rather to direct him what river he thould pats, and what town he should take. Now, as thefe deputies (often styled Pro-confuls) were unacquainted with military affairs, they fometimes infifted upon the General taking the course they prefcribed, as appearing a more direct and defirable object; whereas, if the choice had been left to the commander himself, he might by a detour of only a few days delay have been equally affured of gaining the point, and at the fame time of faving three, five, or perhaps ten thoufand lives. This is fact which every one who followed the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 can testi fy. The French armies, however, from their multitudes, refembling impetuous torrents, bore down every thing before them. Deriving a kind of fupernatural courage, too, from the ob ject they were taught to believe they contended for, it would not have appeared furprising if the leaders of the armies opposed to them had expreffed their doubts, as Lord Howe did in the American contest, whether any force that could be brought against them would ultimately prevail. Pichegru was born the 16th of February, 1761, at Arbois, in the Department of Jura. He was about five feet eight inches high, of a dark complexion, black eyes, and very full eyebrows. His nofe was rather large, and his mouth wide, but he had good teeth. His forehead was low, but his whole figure was manly, and his countenance expreffed a gravity and penetrating fineffe. Pichegru received a good education, and was originally intended for the church. He was even admitted into 4 E the Minimas, as a Frère of that order; but the ecclefiaftical life not fuiting the activity of his difpofition, he made a fecond election for the choice of arms. This was, however, long before the revolution, nor did it take place till he had obtained the age of twentyfeven. It was in the year 1783 that he made a journey to Strafburgh, and first entered into the artillery, the regiment of Metz, then in garrifon in that city, danger of the precipice up which they were climbing. About the year 1786 he was feverely wounded in the right hand at exercife: one of his fingers was reveried, and his hand almoft divided in two. As this accident was fuppofed to have incapacitated him for farther fervice, the minifter was applied to for the ordinary penfion afligned to artillerifts; but the thort period of his fervice proving an obstacle to this defign, the major of the regiment, by reafon of his good and regular conduct, and from motives of humanity, propofed to make him a ferjeant, the pay of which would be à fupport to him. His wound, however, thewing a favourable difpofition to heal, and his manners partaking more of the fcholar than of the private foldier, he was perfuaded to perfift in the career he had adopted by choice, He enjoyed the general efteem of his comrades, and the friendship and Countenance of his field officers; fo that in less than three years more he was placed on the ftaff of his regiment as adjutant, and a little time after had the commiffion of third lieutenant. Early in the year 1792 he quitted the artillery to difcipline a regiment of national guards. After the above battalion, by his rigorous attention, had been rendered in a very fhort time completely fit for fervice, his reputation obtained him an appointment on the Aaff of Cuftine's ariny, and it was in this fituation that he acquired the knowledge of that fpecies of fervice which was beft adapted to develope his military talents. It was at this epoch that the military fervice in France bore a firiking_refemblance to that of Turkey. The generals in chief, like the Grand Viziers, were extolled on a victory, but loft their heads after a defeat. Notwithftanding this, as the Grand Signior never was at a lofs for a military leader, fo the French officers pulled on for promotion, without confidering the fate of their predeceffors, and the The execution of Cuftine and Houchard opened the way for the rapid promotion of Pichegru, whofe name was fcarcely known to the public till Milhaud, the deputy from Cantal, with the army of the Lower Rhine in 1793, made an eulogy on him to the Jacebins. In the fame year, Pichegru him. felf made a report of the victory of Haguenau to the Convention, and foon after announced his fucceffes near Landau. In 1794, he fucceeded Jourdan in the command of the Army of the North, when he wrote to the Jaco bins, fwearing to exterminate tyrants, and to adopt for his latt words, * Vice la Republique! Vive la Montegne!" The new generals of the Republie have not improperly been compared to comets; they dazzled; their movements were out of all rule; they threatened deftruction, and often as fuddenly dif appeared. Pichegru's farther dispatches to the Convention form an uninterrupted nomenclature of fuccefies. H took the camp of Cæfar almoft as food as he was at the head of the Army of the North; on which occafion Barrere, who reported the victory to the Convention, made a confiderable display of his oratory. After feveral other advantages gained at the head of his army, he proceeded with rapid ftrides through the maritime Flanders. on the fall of Robespierre, his army expreffed its gratitude to the Conven tion for the vengeance it had excited. Up The fignal victory gained by Jourdan at the village of Fleurus over the combined armies gave rite to a plan for a winter campaign, which has immortalized the naine of Pichegru. The above battle, fo hardly fought by the French, was as decifive of the fate of Flanders, as that of Marengu has fince proved with refpect to Italy, for it left no infurmountable obstacle on Pichegru's right to the entry of his army in Holland, and on his left all was clear, fince the attack on Duukirk by the Duke of York had failed; and Glend, Bruges, and Ghent, as well as every place to Antwerp on the Scheldt, were quickly in the polletion of the republicans. To the credit of Pichegru's talents, it ought to be mentioned in this place that the campaign of this year would have made a much more brilliant figure if he had been allowed to follow his own judgement; but he received orders from the Committee of Public Safety, which were too imperative not to be implicitly obeyed. He had formed the project of paffing the Scheldt near Oudenard. His defign was to feparate Clairfait from the English army under the Duke of York, and to prevent his retiring to Bruffels, thereby to fight both commanders feparately. After this he propofed to place himfelf behind the enemy's army then acting on the Sambre, in which cafe he would, in all probability, have deftroyed it, or put it in a state of impoffibility to act with the other armies. By thefe meafres he could not have failed to make ■ junction with Jourdan. The project was allowed at the time to be vaftly well conceived, and has fince been highly extolled by David, who has written an accurate journal of the campaigns of Pichegru. The General's own plan would undoubtedly have greatly economised human blood, and he has been blamed for not endeavouring to convince the Committee of its fuperior advantages: but the writer abovementioned obferves, that, on the subject of difobedience of orders, the ultima ratio of the then government of France was, The Tribunal Revolutionnaire. He, nevertheless, fucceeded in carrying the defigns of the French government in Holland into full effect, and completing, in a few months only, a conqueft which Lewis XIV was a long while attempting in vain, Now, although Lord Moira with his five thousand men had, by a skilful march from Oftend to Ghent, faved that little army of his own, and contributed to the fafety of that of the Duke of York, yet the latter, thus reinforced, was not able to relift the French in their determination to pafs the Scheldt, Notwithstanding the French had fet at nought the antient military maxim of not leaving ftrong pofts behind them in the hands of the enemy, yet they grew very impatient at not having in their poffeffion Valenciennes, Condé, Quefuoy, and Landrecies, which had been taken froin them the year before. At the fame time therefore that Pichegru was ordered to prepare for befieging Breda, came out another wild degree from the Committee, fignifying that, if the garrifons of thofe places refufed to furrender at the firft fummmons, they thould not be allowed to capitu late, but every man be put to the fword. The brave commander of Quefnoy did his duty, and by his anfwer taught a leffon to all thofe extravagant legiflators who would fet the laws of war and the rights of nations at defiance. He faid he fhould act as became a foldier, and added that "no nation has a right to decree the dijhonour of another nation." The French troops were as eager as Pichegru to commence the fiege of Breda; but as the army of the Sambra and Meufe had not yet driven the Auftrians from the banks of the Meufe, the right of the General would, of confequence, have been very much expofed. This confideration, together with the difficulty of obtaining fuch vaft fupplies of provifions as were ne ceffary for him, determined Pichegru to let the army remain in the neighbourhood of Antwerp eighteen days. Perhaps there is no part of Pichegru's conduct which does him more honour as a general than his forecast and caution at this moment. The chief fupply of bread for his army had been drawn from Lifle; and, if he had been too hafty to advance into the heaths of Dutch Brabant, his army might have been unprovided for, and the whole expedition fail. Sufficient carriages could not be had for conveying the first article of life to the troops; and the horfes deftined for that service were fo bad, and fo ill ufed, that thirty or forty were faid to die out of every convoy. In the above interval, therefore, eftablishments for affording him thefe indifpentable fupplies were formed at Ghent, Mechlin, and Antwerp. He was now enabled to fecond the movements of the army of the Rhine in the Palatinate, and alfo thofe of the armies of the Sambre and Meufe. He left Antwerp the 20th of August, and on the 24th took a pofition near Juruhout. The Duke of York, apprifed of this movement, was compelled to fall back upon Bois-le-Duc, and, encamping near Heefwick, left Breda to the ftrength of its garrifon, the Dutch army remaining at Ramdyke. Valenciennes and Condé falling about this time again into the hands of the French, and thereby affording an evident proof that places, however ftrong, cannot hold out long without covering armies, Pichegru determined to run all hazards, and not betiege Breda, bus pass it, and, pursuing the English army, oblige it to cross the Meufe. He therefore, on the 4th of September, took a polition near Meerle; and while he detached a confiderable body of cavalry to within fight of Breda, he purfued his march to Boxtel, where he' met with five or fix thoufand men of the enemy. This poft was naturally entrenched by the Dommel, and by a deep ditch: for the French to make an attack, it was neceffary to pass, firft the ditch, and then the river; the bridges were all broke down. By fwimming, and by the affittance of planks, the General overcame thele obftacles, and took a part of the oppofing force prifoners. From this circumftance, and the Duke of York's referve being worsted in an affair on the 15th of September, Bergen-op-zoom, Breda, and Bois-le-Duc, were left to their fate. If Pichegru had waited to befiege Breda and the other strong places mentioned, it would have required fo many men, that the English army would not have been compelled to retire as it did before fuperior numbers; nor would Pichegru have advanced far enough towards the United Provinces in time to avail himself of the favourable and feasonable froft for completing the conquest of all Holland. The unexampled fatigue Pichegru had undergone rendered it necellary that he should have fome repose. Accordingly, after announcing the capture of Bois-le-Duc, the reprefentatives Bellegarde and Lacombe fignified to the Convention the neceflity of a temporary retreat being allowed to a general who had endured the continued fatigues of two campaigns, in all which time, it was observed, he had never been beaten. Pichegru took up his abode at Bruffels, and to Moreau was confided the command of his army. The Army of the North was at this time before Nimeguen; and though, from having contracted an inveterate cutaneous diforder, which obliged him to have recourfe to baths and other remedies, he could not be a witnefs of what was going on, he did not fail regularly to correspond with Moreau and Jourdan, and to affift them in his advice. Only to trace, as with a pencil, the fuccefsful courfe of the French armies at this period, bewilders the imagination, and would occafion the reader to confider whether what is treated of is real, or only romance. He ought, therefore, to be apprifed of the politi cal condition of Holland at the time of the French invation, which, in conjunction with the circumitance of one of the feverest frofts experienced for many winters, was calculated to render Holland an eafy conqueft to a general lefs fortunate and leis expericnced than the one fent against it. In any other feafon of the year than that in which Pichegru retumed the command of the army, it would have been impoffible to conquer Holland, on account of its waters. An army can fcarcely make a step without meeting with a lake, a dyke, or a river, the pontoons which the French had would have been infufficient to the purpose. The roads are all made on dykes or maribes. The pallage of an army over them would have broken them down, and confequently have rendered a retreat, if not impoluble, highly dangerous. In a moment of extreme danger and diftres, it may be prefumed that, if the Stadtholder and the Batavian people had been united, they would have confented to open the fluices of North Holland, by which ail Wett Friedland, the province of Holland, and a part of that of Utrecht, would be laid under water. They could alfo have cut ditches from the rivers, innundate the eaftern provinces, and thereby throw infurmountable obftacles to an invading army, In the spring or fummer thefe means might have been adopted, whatever inconveniencies or hardships the Dutch themselves could have experienced from them: the ancestors of the Prince of Orange had actually used them against Lewis XIV. A froft of uncommon feverity, however, put thefe contiderations out of all queftion. It not only converted the waters into a folid mafs, affording a free and eafy paffage for men, horses, and heavy artillery, but it would appear to have benuimbed the faculties of every one of the natives, and left activity and vigour only to the French. This effect, however, cannot be fo much afcribed to the power of the weather on the bodies of the inhabitants as to the political influence of the government on their minds. The houfe of Naffau had been gradually lofing its credit and authority for a number of years, and it had a great many enemies among the wealthy |