The first is a general essay on colonies, and contains a deduction of the advantages which must accrue to France, from a careful attention to the colonial system; and points out the principles that ought to guide her in the formation of new settlements. The second, on the relations between England and Ame rica, is an attempt to explain several facts which the author remarked during his travels over the greater part of North America; and truly, if the former of these papers makes us wish that every statesman, and especially the present rulers of France, were actuated by such li beral views as the author inculcates, it is impossible to read the latter, without lamenting that no traveller has ever appeared so capable as M. Talleyrand, of instructing his country by the scientific observation of foreign nations; and that he himself has not devoted his life to a pursuit pointed out alike by his genius and his acquirements. We express our admiration of this man's writings without any fear of misconstruction. It would be as foolish (were it as possible) to shut one's eyes to the lustre of talents, as to despise an enemy who is strong by their aid. Great as the resources of France are, if they were not wielded by such men as Talleyrand, she would soon cease to be the object of that watchful anxiety, which, in the actual posture of affairs, is the wisest part of wisdom.

Two great objects, according to him, are to be gained by the planting of new colonies, in the present state of France. A vast body of people has been either thrown idle by the revolution, or so corrupted by habits of intrigue and excesses of violence, as to be now incapable of regular industry. To open an egress for these troublesome spirits, and at the same time to derive profit from the qualities which render them useless and dangerous at home, is the double advantage of planting new settlements. The example of Ame rica, by a striking analogy, points out the former benefit; the latter is

sufficiently clear of itself. In the United States, Talleyrand was surprised to observe, that a long and vi olent civil war had left scarcely any trace of its existence in the character or intercourse of the various factions which divided the people. No hatred or animosity was perceivable among individuals; no turbulence or agitation of character had been permanently engrafted on the sober, solid habits of the colonists. None of these symptoms, in short, were observable, which, for ages after a violent and general conflict, always endanger the internal security of nations whose structure has assumed a regular form and consistency. The peculiar situation of the American people furnishes an easy explanation of this fact, though the change no doubt excited all those revolutionary dispositions which in other countries have prolonged the reign of anarchy, and formed abundance of characters fitted for profiting by such an alteration of popular habits; yet the vast extent of the country afforded a constant vent for the most restless activity in projects useful to the community, and tempt ing to the individual; drew off to a distance from the theatre of dissensions, those whose violence had not been calmed by victory, and secured an agreeable retreat to the numerous remains of the royalist party.

Now, as France, with much more of that turbulent spirit, has not at home the same opportunities of quenching it, he infers that it should be drawn off by colonial establishments, the only expedient which can enable a well peopled and cultivated country to unite the advantages peculiar to new settlements with those possessed by full-grown communities. He rapidly sketches the reasons that have induced the various emigrations recorded in history, and finds that they all owed their origin to far less pure motives than those which at present concur in recommending the scheme to France. The violence in which many of those plans originated, and

the total failure of every one that did not soon assume a milder and juster aspect, he holds up as a lesson well worthy of attention All colonial measures should begin with the fair offer of a settlement from government; and he states it as a striking proof, how essential freedom of choice is to the success of such plans, that those ancient republics which were constrained to send out colonies, by the narrowness of their territory, proposed the emigration as an allurement, and did not enforce, by positive law, even what was necessary for the existence of the state. Let us imitate the policy to which the most prosperous of those establishments owed their origin, and avoid the errors which modern nations have committed in following the example of the ancients. From sage measures of this sort, he expects every advantage will result to France. She has only to propose a colony, and the offer will be joyful. ly received. In describing the probability of this favourable reception, he enumerates rapidly all the motives which concur to recommend such an emigration to so many classes of the French.

But if the finding employment for the idle and restless is a great advantage to the mother country, he conceives the acquisition of rich and flourishing colonies to be no less important. The natural tendency of colonial settlements to throw off their dependence is great and manifest. The loss of America to England he deduces from causes neither accidental nor peculiar, and he views the attempts to restore order in the French West Indies as neither likely to succeed, nor, if at tended with temporary success, as sufficient to ward off long the blow which circumstances beyond the reach of edicts and armies have prepared in the western wing of the French empire. While, therefore, he recommends a due attention to the restoration of St. Domingo and Guadaloupe, he enforces the neces.sity of being prepared for the more

VOL. VI. NO. XXXVII.

likely event, the total destruction of the French colonial power in the new world. Let France look about her, and see if there are no other countries where new settlements may conveniently be undertaken, and let those colonial establishments be formed upon principles which shall prevent the disasters that have befallen the West Indies. To show what are the right kinds of colonies, the settlements most safe and secure in themselves, and most likely to ensure a continuance of commerci al intercourse, even after they may have become independent of the mother country, the memoir upon the United States was composed. He decides in favour of agricultural settlements, where the natives of the soil are able to cultivate it; and warns mankind against all such schemes as those to which the negro system owes its origin. The territory where these plantations may be settled is plainly described. After a few words about the islands along the coast of Africa, M. Talleyrand seems to fix upon Egypt as the proper spot. Choiseul, it is well known, foresaw the probable separation of all the American colonies, without exactly predicting the manner in which the islands were to be lost; but he was so impressed with the likelihood of this event, that he entered into measures for the acquisition of Egypt, as a settlement which might serve to France instead of all her West India territory. Talleyrand asserts, that sooner or later the emancipation of the negroes must overthrow the cultivation of the sugar colonies; and adds, "il est politique d'aller au-devant de ces grands changemens, et la première idée qui s'offre à l'esprit, celle qui amene plus de suppositions favorables, paraît être d'essayer cette culture aux lieux mêmes où nait le cultivateur."

The Egyptian expedition was undertaken a few months after this memoir had been read to an assembly to which the captain of the enterprise belonged; and the author of these opinions was engaged in 6

the government which planned the conquest; little doubt will then remain that the ultimate object of the capture of Egypt was the settlement of a colony which might serve as a refuge for the agriculture of the West Indies. It is difficult to say whether France had a view of proceeding against India from that quarter. Enough was surely gained by that memorable expedition, if it had but secured to France the finest colony in the world; raised her to the height of commercial prosperity, from an almost total annihilation of her trade; enabled her to sacrifice all her expensive and fickle dependencies in America, and gave her the certainty of ruining in a few crops all the colonial prosperity of her rival.

View

The object of the memoir upon the North American commerce is to point out the system best calculated to secure a beneficial intercourse between the mother country and the colonies, after all political dependence is at an end. ing a separation as the natural consummation of all such plans, he is anxious to explain how the relations of trade may be made to survive this event; and he examines, at great length, the circumstances which have maintained the connection between England and the Unit ed States, long after the cessation of their political ties. Why, since the American war, the trade between England and the United States has more than doubled, is explained in a manner perfectly satisfactory. The American colonies were entirely English. They were knit to the mother country, not by laws and governments, but by identity of origin and language, similiarity of character, habits, and political institutions. The English manufactures were necessary to countries utterly destitute of all but agricultural industry; the English merchant sold cheaper and on longer credit than any other in the world. Not only the best goods for the money were to be had from him, but goods of such excellent quality were

not to be had for money in any other quarter. Not only prompt payment was dispensed with by the English trader, when all other dealers insisted on it, but the former regularly allowed his American customers to retain the use of his capital until it had yielded the gross profits, and then was satisfied with a smaller portion of the gain for his net allowance than other lenders could afford to take. All these advantages, the consequences of established skill and long experience, with a great stock, and old habits of mu tual dealings, were sufficient to preserve the mercantile connections between the mother country and her late colonies, in full force, even if the powerful ties of language, manners, and blood, had not united their influence in the same direction. Compared with these bonds of attachment, what were the obligations which the colonies owed to France for assisting them in throwing off the yoke of Great Britain? The Americans, indeed, never believed that France was their real friend; they only gave her credit for being the enemy of England. But, although they had acknowledged the full extent of their debt, and felt the utmost gratitude of which their nature admitted, would such feelings have followed them into their counting-houses and warerooms? With every eye streaming out in love for their deliverers, would they have altered one inch the course of a single penny, destined, like all the pence of all the traders and all the consumers in the world, to follow, not the objects of their attachment, but the cheapest goods, and the easiest creditors? There is no wonder, then, that the trade between England and America should have continued in its wonted channel, in spite of their political separation, and of the political services of France. That channel is never open to any public influence, and feels only the force of one motive, individual interest.

He blames the old government of France, for having prepared, by its

impolitic conduct, the renewal of the commercial relations between England and the United States.France, according to him, should have endeavoured to multiply and extend the connexions which, during the war, she had established with the people of America. Instead of this, she began to fear the introduction of those principles at home which she had fomented abroad, and discouraged all further intercourse. Now, although this discouragement of intercourse was certainly a ridiculous as well as an impolitic measure, it would be difficult to show what active means could have been used to prevent the renewal of the trade with England, or even to increase, in any sensible degree, the French commerce with America.In the face of all the circumstances already stated, the force of which must have been omnipotent in favour of the English market, even if France had spent her whole revenue in senselessly pushing her American trade by encouragements, how can it be supposed that the new relations between America and England could be in the least degree affected by any measures which the French government might pursue? Unless the ancienne regime possessed the power of making the merchants richer, the manufacturers more skilful, and the people more English than the English themselves, a feat which lettres de cachet have never been known to perform, it cannot be blamed for not having drawn away the Americans from the markets of Great Britain.

In mentioning the long credits allowed by English traders to their American correspondents, he remarks, that they no doubt are oblig. ed to make up for permitting their capital to lie out, by charging so much more profit on the transaction. Yet if the English capitalist reimbursed himself by an advance of profit for the long credit which he gave his customer, this surely cannot be called an accommodation.The long credit is exactly a diminution of profit; it is one of the ways

in which a great competition of capitals, in a well stocked country, tends to bring down the gains of each trader. France or Spain could give as great credit as Holland or England, were they to charge higher in proportion as the term of payment was delayed, were they to charge interest for the loan. It is because, without this additional charge, England can afford to sell at long credits, and to buy at ready money, that she pushes her trade where France cannot reach. So far, then, from the English merchants repaying themselves the long credit for which they give their American customers, this credit unrecompensed is the cause of their capital finding employment in the American states, and the consequence of that capital being very extensive. Talleyrand seems to think it voluntary on the part of the creditor; an accommodation which he allows his debtor for a certain consideration. On the contrary, it is a matter of necessity, and is forced upon him by the competition of other capitalists, while it is rendered practicable by the great extent of his own stock.

The author falls into an error of a much more general and fundamental nature, in stating the progress of the American commerce with England. Instead of simply asserting that the mercantile intercourse between the two countries, interrupted by the war, was revived after the peace, and continued as close after the independence of the United States, as it had been during the colonial government, he maintains that this intercourse was enlarged by the separation, and that Great Britain was therefore a gainer by that event.He only takes care to warn France not to reckon upon a similar gain when she gives up her colonial dominions; observing, with great justice, that the cases of the continental and insular settlements are by no means parallel.

The fact, however, by no means warrants such an inference. The consumption of English goods in America had increased when Tal

leyrand wrote, to three millions sterling, from less than one half the sum, its amount after the peace of Versailles. But where is the proof that the same augmentation would not have taken place though the colonial system had been preserved? It surely is not in consequence of the change, that the population of the states goes on doubling every twenty-five years; for, before the rupture, the increase of numbers proceeded at a rate somewhat more rapid, from the mere circumstance of the total amount being considerably less. Nor can the substitution of a primary for a subordinate form of government have promoted the clearing of the forests, when, before the revolution, ground was constantly prepared for the tens of thousands which each year added to the mass of the inhabitants. And if the freedom of navigation be suspected of having augmented the American wealth, it must be shown, in the first place, that all our author's own reasonings on the closeness of the voluntary connexion between England and America are false; and that what he justly terms the voluntary monopoly, has no existence. In truth, this monopoly, which has survived the navigation laws, is the clearest possible proof, that the only effect of those laws was to enforce what must have taken place naturally. If a trifling commerce be now carried on by American traders with foreign nations; and if, in consequence of its profits, the Americans are enabled to buy a little more from England than they otherwise could have done, the difference is probably more than counterbalanced by two circumstances, both effects of the revolution-the exclusion of the Americans from a free trade with one of their best markets, the British West Indies, and their receiving the articles of foreign growth at first hand, instead of getting them, as formerly, through the medium of the mother country. The former of these circumstances has injured both the growth of the United States, and of the colonies which remain dependent; the latter

has been favourable to the United States, but has been attended, of course, with a slight direct detriment to Great Britain; and this must be set off against the indirect advantages which she reaps from the benefit which the same circumstance confers on the North Americans.

The effect of both these circumstances upon Great Britain, taken together, must obviously turn the balance of the profit and loss arising from the free trade of the Americans somewhat against her. She indeed retains the power of admitting them to a full share of the West India commerce; but the question is, whether, in fact, the increase of demand for British goods has been owing in any degree to the independence of North America; and, indeed, the possible advantages which England may derive from a change of her navigation laws, in favour of the United States, can no more enter into a list of the good effects produced by the revolution, than the advantages she might have derived from a change of the same laws in favour of the North American colonies can enter into a list of the good effects which would have accrued from a continuance of their dependence.— Talleyrand's opinion, therefore, of the superior closeness of mercantile connexion between Britain and America, in consequence of their political separation, is entirely groundless. That the natural circumstances of relationship, which arose out of the original connexion, maintained unbroken the intercourse between the two countries, and permitted their commerce to go on increasing as rapidly as it would have done, had the ancient ties of colonial subordination subsisted, is the utmost extent of the conclusions which the facts and arguments warrant, even as stated by Talleyrand himself. No attempt is made to demonstrate, that the change has augmented those relations of commerce; and though it were proved that such had been the effects of the revolution, still it would remain to show that Great