Another circumstance likewise concurred in reducing the standard of professorial competence. The power of election, never perhaps intrusted to the safest hands, was in general even confided to those interested in frustrating its end. The appointment was often directly, and almost always indirectly, determined by college influence. In exclusive pos→ session of the tutorial office, and non-residence as yet only permitted to independent graduates, the fellows, in conjunction with the heads, came to constitute the great proportion of the resident members of Convocation and Congregation; and therefore, except in cases of general interest, the elections belonging to the public bodies were sure to be decided by them.* Nor was it possible to raise the tutorial system from its state of relative subordination, without an absolute subversion of the professorial. The tutor could not extend his discipline over the bachelor in arts, for every bachelor was by law entitled to commence tutor himself. But the colleges could not succeed in vindicating their monopoly even of the inferior branches of education, unless they were able also to incapacitate the University from affording instruction in the superior. For if the public lectures were allowed to continue in the higher faculties, and in the higher department of the lowest, it would be found impossible to justify their suppression in that particular department, which alone the college fellows could pretend to teach. At the same time, if attendance on the professorial courses remained necessary for degrees above bachelor in arts, a multitude of graduates, all competent to the tutorial office, would in consequence continue domiciled in the University, and the fellows' usurpation of that function it would be found impossible to maintain. With the colleges and fellows it was therefore all or nothing. If they were not to continue, as they had been, mere accessories to the University, it behoved to quash the whole public lectures, and to dispense with residence after the elementary degree. This the Heads of Houses easily effected. As the irresponsible guardians of the University statutes, they violated their trust, by allowing the professors to neglect their statutory duty, and empty standing to be taken in lieu of the course of academical study which it legally implied. The professorial system was thus, from the principal and necessary, degraded into the subordinate and superfluous; the tutorial elevated, with all its additional imperfections, from the subsidiary into the one exclusive instrument of education. In establishing the ascendency of the collegial bodies, it mattered not that the extensive cycle of academical instruction was con * Since writing the above, we notice a curious confirmation in Terra Filius. This work ap. peared in 1721, at the very crisis when the collegial interest was accomplishing its victory. The statements it contains were never, we believe, contradicted; and though the following representation may be in some points exaggerated, the reader can easily recognise its substantial truth. Speaking of the professors: "I have known a profligate debauchee chosen professor of moral philosophy; and a fellow, who never looked upon the stars soberly in his life, professor of astronomy: we have had history professors, who never read any thing to qualify them for it, but Tom Thumb, Jack the Giant killer, Don Bellianis of Greece, and such like records: we have had likewise numberless professors of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic, who scarce understood their mother tongue; and not long ago, a famous gamester and stock-jobber was elected Margaret Professor of Divinity; so great, it seems, is the analogy between dusting cushions and shaking of elbows or between squandering away of estates and saving of souls." And in a letter, from an undergraduate of Wadham,-"Now, it is monstrous, that notwithstanding these public lectures are so much neglected, we are all of us, when we take our degrees, charged with and punished for non-appearance at the reading of many of them; a formal dispensation is read by our respective deans. at the time our grace is proposed, for our non-appearance at these lectures [N. B.], and it is with difficulty that some grave ones of the congregation are induced to grant it. Strange order! that each lecturer should have his fifty, his hundred, or two hundred pounds a year for doing nothing; and that we (the young fry) should be obliged to pay money for not hearing such lectures as were never read nor ever composed." (No. X) tracted to the narrow capacity of a fellow-tutor;-that the University was annihilated, or reduced to half a faculty-of one professorship-which every "graduated dunce" might confidently undertake. The great interests of the nation, the church, and the professions, were sacrificed to the paltry ends of a few contemptible corporations; and the privileges by law accorded to the University of Oxford, as the authorized organ of national education, were by its perfidious governors furtively transferred to the unauthorized absurdities of their college discipline. That the representatives of the collegial bodies, as constituting the Hebdomadal Meeting, were the authors of this radical subversion of the establish-ment of which they were the protectors,-that the greatest importance was attached by them to its accomplishment,—and, at the same time, that they were fully conscious of sacrificing the interests of the University and public to a private job; -all this is manifested by the fact, that the Heads of Houses, rather than expose the college usurpations to a discussion by the academical and civil legislatures, not only submitted to the disgrace of leaving their smuggled system of education without a legal sanction, but actually tolerated the reproach of thus converting the great seminary of the English Church into a school of perjury, without, as far as we know, an effort either at vindication or amendment. This grievous charge, though frequently advanced both by the friends and enemies of the establishment, we mention with regret; we do not see how it can be rebutted, but shall be truly gratified if it can. Let us inquire. At matriculation, every member of the University of Oxford solemnly swears to an observance of the academical statutes, of which he receives a copy of the Excerpta, that he may be unable to urge the plea of ignorance for their violation: and at every successive step of graduation, the candidate not only repeats this comprehensive oath, but after hearing read, by the senior Proctor, a statutory recapitulation of the statutes which prescribe the various public courses to be attended, and the various public exercises to be performed, as the conditions necessary for the degree, specially makes oath, "that having heard what was thus read, and having, within three days, diligently read or heard read, [the other statutes having reference to the degree he is about to take], moreover, the seventh section of the sixth title, that he has performed all that they require, those particulars excepted for which he has received a dispensation." (Stat. T. ii. § 3. T. ix. S. vi. 1-3.) The words in brackets are omitted in the re-enactment of 1818. (Add. T. ix. §3.) Now, in these circumstances, does it not follow that every member of the University commits perjury, who either does not observe the statutory enactments, or does not receive a dispensation for their non-observance? Under the former alternative, false swearing is manifestly inevitable. Of the University laws, it is much easier to enumerate those which are not violated than those which are; and the "Excepta Statutorum," which the entrant receives at matriculation, far from enabling him to prove faithful to his oath, serves only to show him the extent of the perjury, which, if he does not fly the University, he must unavoidably incur. Suffice it to say, that almost the only statutes now observed are those which regulate matters wholly accidental to the essential ends of the institution-the civil polity of the corporation, or circumstances of mere form and ceremonial. The whole statutes, on the contrary, that constitute the being and the well-being of the University, as an establishment of education in general, and, in par ticular, of education in the three learned professions,-these fundamental statutes are, one and all, absolutely reduced to a dead letter. And why? Because they establish the University on the system of professorial instruction. The fact is too notorious to be contradicted, that while every statute which comports with the private interest of the college corporations is religiously enforced, every statute intended to insure the public utility of the University, but incompatible with their monopoly, is unscrupulously vio lated. The latter alternative remains; but does dispensation afford a postern of escape? The statutes bestow this power exclusively on the Houses of Congregation, and Convocation, and the limits of "Dispensable" and "Indispensable Matter" are anxiously and minutely determined. Of itself, the very fact that there was aught indispensable in the system at all might satisfy us, without farther inquiry, that at least the one essential part of its organization, through which the University, by law, accomplishes the purposes of its institution, could not be dispensed with; for this would be nothing else than a dispensation of the University itself. But let us inquire farther:The original statute (Corp. St. T. ix. S. iv. § 2) determining the Dispensable Matter competent to the House of Congregation, was re-enacted, with some unimportant omissions, in 1801 and 1808. (Add. pp. 136, 188.) By these statutes, there is allowed to that House the power of dispensation in twenty-three specified cases, of which the fourth—“Pro minus diligenti publicorum Lectorum auditione"-need alone be mentioned, as showing, by the only case in point, how limited is the power committed to Congregation of dispensing with the essential business of the University. The students were unconditionally bound, by oath and statute, to a regular attendance on the different classes; and a dispensation for the cause of "a just impediment," is here allowed to qualify, on equitable grounds, the rigour of the law. It will not be contended, that a power of dispensation allowed for the not altogether diligent attendance on the public readers, was meant by the legislature to concede a power of dispensing with all attendance on the professorial courses; nay, of absolutely dispensing with these courses themselves. There has been no subsequent enactment, modifying the Laudian statutes touching the dispensing power of Convocation. This house, though possessing the right of rescinding old and of ratifying new laws, felt it necessary to restrict its prerogative of lightly suspending their application in particular cases, in order to determinate "the too great license of dispensation, which had heretofore wrought grievous detriment to the University." (Corp. St. T. x. S. ii. S 5.) Accordingly, under the head of Dispensable Matter, there is to be found nothing to warrant the supposition, that power is left with Convocation, of dispensing with the regular lectures of all or any of its professors, or with attendance on these lectures by all or any of its scholars. On the contrary, it is only permitted, at the utmost, to give dispensation to an ordinary (or public) reader, who had been forced by necessity to deliver his lecture, through a substitute, without the regular authorisation. (T. x. S. ii. S.) Again, under the head of Indispensable Matter, those cases are enumerated in which the indulgence had formerly been abused. All defect of standing (standing at that time meant length of attendance on the professorial lectures), all non-performance of exercise, either before or after graduation, are declared henceforward indispensable. But if the less important requisites for a degree, and in which a relaxation had previously been sometimes tolerated, are now rendered imperative; multo majus must the conditions of paramount importance, such as delivery of, and attendance on, the public courses, be held as such,-conditions, a dispensation for which having never heretofore been asked, or granted, or conceived possible, a prospective prohibition of such abuse could never, by the legislature, be imagined necessary. At the same time it is declared, that hereafter no alteration is to be attempted of the rules, by which founders, with consent of the University, had determined the duties of the chairs by them endowed; and these rules, as thus modified and confirmed, constitute a great proportion of the statutes by which the system of public lectures is regulated. (T. x. S. ii. § 5.) Under both heads, a general power is indeed left to the chancellor, of allowing the Hebdomadal Meeting to propose a dispensation; but this only "from some necessary and very urgent cause," and "in cases which are not repugnant to academical discipline." We do not happen to know, and cannot at the moment obtain the information, whether there now is, or is not, a form of dispensation passed in convocation for the non-delivery of their lectures by the public readers, and for the non-attendance on their lectures by the students. Nor is the fact of the smallest consequence to the question. For either the statutes are violated without a dispensation, or a dispensation is obtained in violation of the statutes. But as there is nothing in the terms of these statutes, however casuistically interpreted, to afford a colour for the monstrous supposition, that it was the intention of the legislature to leave to either house the power of arbitrary suspending the whole mechanism of education established by law, that is, of dispensing with the University itself, whereas their whole tenor is only significant as proving the reverse; let us now look at the "Epinomis, or explanation of the oath taken by all, to observe the statutes of the University, as to what extent it is to be held binding,” in which the intention of the legislature, in relation to the matter at issue, is unequivocally declared. This important article, intended to guard against all sophistical misconstruction of the nature and extent of the obligation incurred by this oath, though it has completely failed in preventing its violation, renders all palliation at least impossible. It is here declared, that all are forsworn who wrest terms of the statutes to a sense different from that intended by the legislature, or take the oath under any mental reservation. Consequently, those are perjured, 1. who aver they have performed, or do believe what they have not performed, or do not believe what they have not performed, or do not believe: 2. they who, violating a statute, do not submit to the penalty attached to that violation: 3. they who proceed in their degrees without a dispensation for the nonperformance of dispensable conditions, but much more they who thus proceed without actually performing those pre-requisites which are indispensable. "As to other delicts," (we translate literally,) "if there be no contempt, no gross and obstinate negligence of the statutes and their penalties, and if the delinquents have submitted to the penalties sanctioned by the statutes, they are not to be held guilty of violating the religious obligation of their oath. Finally, as the reverence due to their character exempts the MAGISTRATES of the University from the common penalties of other transgressors, so on them there is incumbent a stronger conscientious obligation; inasmuch as they are bound not only to the faithful discharge of their own duties, but likewise diligently to take care that all others in like manner perform theirs. Not, however, that it is intended that every failure in their duties should at once involve them in the crime of perjury. But since the keeping and guardianship of the statutes is intrusted to their fidelity, if (may it never happen!) through their negligence or sloth, they suffer any statutes whatever to fall into desuetude, and silently, as it were, to be abrogated, in that event we DECREE THEM GUILTY OF BROKEN FAITH AND OF PERJURY." What would these legislators have said, could they have foreseen that these "Reverend Magistrates of the University" should "silently abrogate" every fundamental statute in the code of which they were the appointed guardians? It must, as we observed, have been powerful motives which could induce the heads of houses originally to incur, or subsequently to tolerate, such opprobrium for themselves and the University; nor can any conceivable motive be assigned for either, except that these representatives of the collegial interest were fully aware that the intrusive system was not one for which a sanction could be hoped from the academical and civil legislatures, while, at the same time, it was too advantageous for themselves not to be quietly perpetuated, even at such a price. We do not see how the heads could throw off the charge of "broken faith and perjury," incurred by their "silent abrogation" of the University statutes, even allowing them the plea which some moralists have advanced in extenuation of the perjury committed by the non-observance of certain College statutes. For, in the first place, this plea supposes that the observance of the violated statute is manifestly inconsistent with the end of the institution, towards which it only constituted a mean. Here, however, it cannot be alleged that the statutory or professorial system is manifestly inconsistent with the ends of a University; seeing that all Universities, except the English, employ that instrument exclusively, and as the best; and that Oxford, under her new tutorial dispensation, has never manifestly been the exemplar of academical institutions. In the second place, even admitting the professorial system to be notoriously inconvenient, still the plea supposes that inconvenience has arisen from a change of circumstances unknown to the lawgiver, and subsequent to the enactment." But in the present case, the only change (from the maturer age of the student) has been to enhance the importance of the professorial method, and to diminish the expediency of the tutorial. But, in the third place, such a plea is, in the present instance, incompetent altogether. This is not the case of a private foundation, where the lawgiver is defunct. Here the institution is public-the lawgiver perpetual; and he might at every moment have been interrogated concerning the repeal or observance of his statutes. That lawgiver is the House of Convocation. The heads in the Hebdomadal Meetings are constituted the special guardians of the academical statutes and their observance; and, as we formerly explained, except through them, no measure can be proposed in Convocation for instituting new laws, or for rendering old laws available. They have a ministerial, but no legislative function. Now the statutory system of public teaching fell into desuetude either in opposition to their wishes and endeavours, or with their concurrence. The former alternative is impossible. Supposing even the means of enforcing the observance of the statutes to have been found incompetent, it was their duty, both to the university and to themselves, to have applied to the legislative body for power sufficient to enable them to discharge their trust, or to be relieved of its responsibility. By law, they are declared morally and religiously responsible for the due observance of the statutes. No body of men would, without inducement, sit down under the brand of "violated faith and per PALEY, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, b. ii. c. 21.—His arguments would justify a repeal of such statutes by public authority,-never their violation by private and interested parties, after swearing to their observance. VOL. III 30 |