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right from wrong, he proceeds to inculcate the general adoption of the best usage introduced on these subjects in times then recent, and to persuade all nations to pursue it by reasons of justice, by considerations of interest, by the sanction of religion, as well as by its concidence with the writings of the wisest men in all ages, and with the most famous examples of venerable antiquity.

Had it been a work professedly of science, it might be well charged with too slight a foundation of principle; with a confusion of the separate provinces of right and humanity, of reason and usage; and with a profusion of authorities, where a few would have left the true purpose for which they were cited more visible. But it may be doubted, whether nicer distinction and more sparing citation, would not, in his own time, have weakened the practical efficacy and persuasive power of the work. It first presented to kings and statesman the concurrent testimony of all whom they had been accustomed to reverence-historians, poets, orators, philosophers, divines, schoolmen, lawyers, ancient and modern, Christian and pagan, of all creeds and nations and ages, to the wisdom and reasonableness of abstaining from unjust and even unprofitable wars; of conducting hostility with no unneces sary harshness; of observing faith, and exercising mercy; and of eagerly returning to peace. Perhaps the impression then made by the display of the universal homage rendered to these simple principles (of which a naked proof might seem superfluous), has contributed to that reverence for them which has since distinguished the European nations above the rest of mankind. That the book of Grotius became the companion of Gustavus Adolphus during the war undertaken by that virtuous hero for civil and religious liberty, is a very striking proof of its extraordinary fitness for its purpose. A purely philosophical work of the highest excellence might have distracted his mind from his great end. Perhaps no work can be named of equally extensive practical effects, till the appearance of the "Spirit of Laws."

The name of Grotius gave a lustre to this part of knowledge for more than a century. His successors rather derived credit from his name, than improved the science which he left them. About forty years after the appearance of the treatise on the "Law of War," Puffendorff followed, on nearly the same subject, though evidently treading in the footsteps of Hobbes. And without adopting the judgment of Leibnitz, that Puffendorff" was very little a lawyer, and not at all a philosopher," it may be truly said, that as his work made pretensions to a scientific character, and had very little either of that literature or eloquence, or familiarity with the details of controversy between states, which could give it any species of practical character, he has much less excuse than Grotius for laying insecure foundations; and is more reprehensible for the confusion of discordant matters. From him, however, in consequence of his more scholastic form, rather than from Grotius, flowed those innumerable abridgments of natural law, which occupied the European universities till very modern times. Vattel, a diffuse, unscientific, and superficial, but clear and liberal writer, still maintains his place as the most convenient abridgment of a part of knowledge which calls for the skill of a new builder.

It is chiefly on account of the moderate abilities of the greater part of the followers of Grotius, that their number and influence are observable circumstances in the condition of Europe. That great writers should impel and direct public opinion, is in the ordinary course of things. Since Grotius,

however, none of this class of writers could have such pretensions. Yet, from the peace of Munster to the French Revolution, writers on this subject incessantly succeeded each other. It became a principal part of the education of all politicians; the treatises concerning it were appealed to by all sovereigns and states in their controversies; it was thought an advantage by the most powerful and ambitious prince to have them on his side; and whatever was positive and practical in those systems, whatever regulated the conduct and rights of individuals under the general usage of European war, was adopted by the tribunals of one country from the writers and courts of foreign and even hostile communities. No other age of the world had witnessed such an appearance (if it should be thought no more) of respect from the mighty to the private reason of the humble and obscure teachers of justice. The opinion of men without power or office, or even superior genius, was appealed to by conquering monarchs, discussed by statesmen, and never publicly disregarded, but by those who had renounced all pretensions to the exterior of morality. Moral appearances are always important realities. The very act of apparent submission to such humble authorities by the rulers of the world, implies improvement, and produces much more. Divested of all extraordinary claims on public deference, and having little advantage but that likelihood of right opinion which arises from the absence of interest and passion, the respect shown to them could proceed only from a growing reverence for that justice which they taught. Every such appeal was a lesson taught by the sovereign to his subjects, of the homage due from both alike to the supreme authority of Reason. These were among the means which rendered the public opinion of Europe an arbiter of some authority in the disputes of states, and in the controversies of princes with their subjects. Combined with the secure independence enjoyed in the same period by the smallest states, under the protection of the balanced strength and mutual jealousy of the greater, with the right of asylum practically granted to all political and religious refugees, with the right of free discussion exerted against their oppressors by those refugees, in the free and Protestant countries of England and Holland, it formed so effective a control on tyranny at home and conquest abroad, that it was scarcely any longer a metaphor to call Europe a commonwealth, in which the energy arising from national distinction was reconciled with the order and safety of general laws. Even the confusion of different subjects under the same general title,* gave to the moral exhortations of private jurists somewhat of the weight belonging to the opinion of a lawyer on real cases of positive law. The degree of respect shown to their authority, served in some degree as a measure not only of the morality of statesmen, but of the general happiness of the times. It decreased as violence and insecurity prevailed. In our times, it began to be openly renounced in the most wretched period of rage and fear. Furious enthusiasm, or uncontrolled despotism, for a time seemed to have banished it from Christendom. If it has been resisted in quiet and free countries, it has only been with regard to those ambiguous acts to which the apprehension of great

*To show how the confusion ought to be rectified, would be to draw an outline of at least two very important treatises; of which one, relating to the Proper Law between Nations, is at the present moment a very great desideratum. But, without now entering on so unseasonable a task, we may observe, that Mr. Stewart seems to us to lay somewhat too much stress on this confusion. -What shall be said of the very distinct sciences comprehended under the common name of Moral Philosophy in our Scottish universities? But if this should be thought too local an observation, what definition of Natural Philosophy will, on the one hand, distinguish it from Chemistry. and, on the other, comprehend all the branches taught under the name of Natural Philosophy throughout Europe?

danger might have tempted even such communities. With a slight alteration in the saying of a philosopher, we may truly say, that no man ever became an enemy to the law of nations till that law had first been his enemy. With these opinions, we cannot but wonder, and even somewhat regret, that Mr. Stewart should have so far departed from the usual mildness and wariness of his equitable judgments, as, in speaking of these writers, to say, that, "Notwithstanding all their industry and learning, it would be very difficult to name any class of writers whose labours have been of less utility to the world." (Disc. 131.) It would be more just, in our opinion, to have said, that notwithstanding the mediocrity of their general talents, and their frequent offences against the order of science, it would be difficult to name any class of writers whose labours have been of more utility to the world. To promote the civilisation of mankind, by contributing to diffuse a reverence for the principles of justice, is certainly far more useful to the world, and (if that inferior object were worthy of notice) indirectly even more useful to science itself, than to make any addition, however splendid, to the stock of knowledge. A class of writers, remote from power, without sympathy for ambition, and happily disabled by inexperience from making allowance for the real exigencies of state necessity, addressing themselv esto the great body of readers, similarly circumstanced and disposed with themselves, and expecting all their credit and popularity from the approbation of that important and daily increasing body, became necessarily the advocates of liberal principles, and the preachers of strict justice between all nations. In this manner, they became, as Mr. Stewart states, the forerunners of the beneficent science of political economy-spreading the same spirit which it breathes, and reaching, with a sort of practical coarseness, some of its results: though their reasonings did not, we conceive, lead by any logical process to the establishment even of its first principles. The connection is rather historical than philosophical. But at all times they carried on that avowed war against the policy (we think harshly) called Machiavelian, which was solemnly declared by Grotius in almost the concluding sentiment of his work -"That doctrine can have no permanent utility which renders man the enemy of his fellow-men."

It is with considerable regret that we find ourselves precluded, by time and space, from throwing the most cursory glance over the writings of Hobbes, who fills so great a station in metaphysical history: a profound and original thinker, distinguished by a fearless consistency in following every principle through its logical consequences-whose diction is perhaps the most perfect example of the union of clearness and brevity on abstruse subjects, and in proposing new opinions; but whose discourse of human nature is probably the work of man, which, without the circle of mathematical knowledge, has the smallest number of ambiguous or unnecessary words. In the philosophy of understanding, he has doubtless anticipated the greater part of those speculations which are presented as disco

“Non potest diù prodesse doctrinâ quæ hominem hominibus insociabilem facit." Grotius, de Jure Bel, et Pac. lib. iii. cap. xxv. et ult.-" Monita ad fidem et ad pacem."

+ Hobbes is to be added to the number of those philosophers who have exerted imagination in their censure of imagination. In one passage he condemns metaphors in very strongly metaphorical language. But for metaphors, they are utterly to be excluded: for, seeing they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning, were absolute folly."-Leviath. p. 1. c. 8. The truth is, that a writer will seldom be quoted whose mind is so mutilated as to want an imagination which will force the way, like Hobbes, in metaphorical objections to metaphors; or like Malebranche, in ungrateful hostility against fancy; or like Rousseau, in eloquent declamation against the arts, without sparing eloquence itself.

VOL. III.

18

veries by his successors. In that which regards the sentient and active part of human nature, he has set out from principles, or rather assumptions, so utterly false as to contract and debase his ethics, and to render his politics a mere system of slavery. Should we be so happy as to meet Mr. Stewart when, in the sequel of this discourse, he renders that justice to Locke which there has been of late a disposition to deny to that incomparable person, we may have again an opportunity to consider the writings of Hobbes-undoubtedly the mine from which Mr. Locke extracted part of his treasure and if ever a contrast between the intellect and character of two great philosophers can be instructive, it seems to be in that which is so striking between the mode and spirit in which Hobbes and Locke have cultivated the same science, and sometimes expounded the same truths. We are told by Mr. Stewart, that "the theory so fashionable at present, which resolves the whole of morality into the principle of Utility, is more nearly akin to Hobbism than some of its partisans are aware of." (Disc. 138.) It is curious to observe," says he, in another place, "how nearly Hobbes and Locke set out from the same assumptions, though they differ so widely in their practical conclusions." (Disc. 62.) There is one sense in which the first of the observations must be allowed to be more absolutely just than it is represented to be. It is that in which Leibnitz regards many ethical systems which hold very different language, as being no more than modifications of a principle differing only in name from that of utility. "The next question," says he, "is, whether the preservation of human society be the principle of the law of nature. This the excellent writer denies, in opposition to Grotius, who founds the obligations of that law in its tendency to maintain society; to Hobbes, who derives it from mutual fear; and to Cumberland, who derives it from mutual benevolence-both which last systems are equally resolvable into its tendency to preserve society." The theory of talent, and the various forms of intellectual character, an equally important and imperfectly cultivated subject, leads Mr. Stewart to observe, that the distinction of Locke between wit and judgment, is substantially the same with that of Malebranche between the sound sense which discerns real differences and the superficial thinker who imagines or supposes resemblances; and finally, with that of Bacon, who says, that "the great and radical division of minds, in relation to philosophy and the sciences, is into the Acute, who can discover the smallest shade of differenceand the Sublime and Discursive, who recognise the slender resemblances of things the most unlike."

But it seems to us, that no two of these distinctions relate precisely to the same subject. Those of Bacon and Malebranche agree in being applied to the reasoning powers, and to their employment in the pursuit of truth. The distinction is expressly so limited by Bacon; and the words of Malebranche, where he speaks of" supposing resemblances" as the vice of "shallow intellects," clearly imply the same limitation. Malebranche contrasts the healthy state of reason with its chief disease. The division of Lord Bacon is into the two grand classes of merely intellectual power-the acute and the comprehensive understanding; of which last he is himself the most sublime example that human nature has yet exhibited-by the wide range of his reason, independent of all consideration of his splendid imagination, which was only the minister and interpreter of what Leibnitz calls

The law of nature, here, evidently is co-extensive with morality. The passage is in the Letter to Molanus, cited above, and written in 1700.

his "divine genius." * The distinction of Locke appears to us to be entirely of another kind. It is not like that of Bacon-the description of two sorts of intellect, both confined to objects of science;-nor like that of Malebranche, a mere contrast between cursory and patient observers. It is a discrimination between the two powers of wit and judgment. It is so far from being limited to philosophising, like the two others, that one of the members is totally without the province of philosophy. Wit can never have any influence on reasoning, but to disturb it. The titles of the chapter and section of Locke, of which the last is "The Difference between Wit and Judgment," manifestly point to a distinction between mental powers essentially different, and employed for different purposes. In all but the terms, it corresponds to the distinction of Hobbes (Hum. Nat. c. 10.) between fancy and judgment. But, says Hobbes, "both fancy and judgment are comprehended under the name of wit." This word has, indeed, in the course of two centuries, passed through more significations than most others in our language. Without going farther back than the reign of James I., wit is used by Sir J. Davies as the most general name for the intellectual faculties, of which reason, judgment, wisdom, etc. are subdivisions. (Immort. of Soul, sect. XXV.) In the time of Cowley and Hobbes, it came to denote a superior degree of understanding, and more particularly a quick and brilliant reason. In the famous description of facetiousness by Barrow, the greatest proof of mastery over language ever given by an English writer, wit seems to have retained the acceptation of intellectual superiority. In Dryden's character of Lord Shaftesbury, it has the same signification; and is very nearly synonimous with the modern words talent or ability. But in the course of forty years, from the publication of Hobbes to that of Locke, it had come to denote that particular talent which consists in lively and ingenious combinations of thought. In Mr. Addison's papers on wit, we find an approach to the modern sense of the term. To Mr. Locke's account, which he adopts with warm commendation, he expressly adds (what was perhaps implied in Mr. Locke's language), that it must be such "an assemblage of ideas as will give delight and surprise." From a shade in the meaning of this last word, has gradually arisen that more limited sense of ludicrous surprise, which seems now an essential part of the import of wit, except where some of its more ancient significations are revived by epithets, or preserved in phrases which have descended from former times.

Having mentioned Mr. Addison, in this Discourse very beautifully called the English Fénélon, we cannot refrain from expressing our satisfaction at the justice rendered by Mr. Stewart to the admirable Essays on the Pleasures of Imagination. Perhaps they may deserve a still more ample consideration, when he comes to consider the philosophy of the eighteenth century, in which they seem to have opened a new path of speculation. If we are to measure the previous progress by the notes on Boileau's Longinus, the most eminent writer who had treated a similar subject about the same time, we must allow that Mr. Addison has made a step in philosophy. We are not indeed aware, that any writer before him had classed together the pleasures of contemplating beauty in nature and the arts, or had distinguished that class of sentiments from the pleasures of sense, as well as those attendant on the exertion of the understanding; or had set the example of classifying them by subdivision, under such heads as Novelty, Beauty, and

• "Divini Ingenii Vir, Franciscus Bacon de Verulamio."

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