explained most successfully the nature and the extent of the human faculties, are the most ready to make this acknowledgment. This is particularly the case with Dr. Reid. Those who are conversant with the writings of this most excellent philosopher, know that in relation to innumerable facts, which came under his notice, he presumes to give no other reason than the will of the Creator. His conduct in this respect deserves to be imitated-It is suited to the weakness of our minds; and it accords with the reverence due to our Maker, and with the declarations of Scripture. We are frequently admonished of our incapacity to comprehend the ways of the Almighty: "Canst thou, by searching, find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? Clouds and darkness are round about him. For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" "His views are immense and eternal," says Dr. Scott, "and his reasons for every part of his vast designs are taken from himself, and his purpose of glorifying his own perfections: to us, therefore, they must be impenetrable and inexplicable, but they are all consistent with the riches or infinite abundance of his justice, truth, and love. His judgments and determinations, and his wisdom in them, cannot be fully investigated or comprehended by any created being, much less by us sinful worms. His dealings with his creatures cannot be traced out; for they are a vast deep, where his footsteps cannot be known." Ought

we then to be surprised, that the human mind should be thought incapable of assigning reasons for the determinations of God, in relation to the immensity of his works and dispensations? Will it follow, that the reason which this theory assigns must be the true one, were it even admitted that the human understanding can assign no other? Does it not better become our weakness and ignorance to confess, that his vast and eternal designs, and the reasons of his determinations, are to us incomprehensible?

But from a denial of the scheme of Optimism, it will by no means follow, that there can be no wisdom in the purposes and ways of God. This has sometimes been asserted, but without any good reason. It is true, indeed, that the maxims by which we judge of the wisdom of man, cannot, without very important variation, be applied to the wisdom of God. A man acts wisely by accommodating his determinations and conduct to facts and connexions which have an existence independent of his will, and over which he has no control. The wisdom of God is exercised in a manner very different from this, and infinitely superior to it; in originating, in a way altogether incomprehensible by us, the whole plan of creation, and in ordaining its several parts, relations, and results, with consummate intelligence and skill. The proof of the wisdom of God in creation, must be very precarious, if it be made to consist in the accommodation of his appointments to any nature and fitness of things, distinct from what he has ordained; or in the advantages which the present system of the universe may be supposed to possess

over an infinite number of other imaginary possible systems. Some may perhaps suppose that this scheme affords an enlarged and grand view of the works of creaBut this is a very great mistake. The information which it

tion.

professes to communicate, really amounts to nothing useful. It assumes that the present system, whatever it is, is better than any other possible system. But what it is in fact, must be learned some other way. A man might revolve this theory in his mind, during his life, and know nothing more of the works of God when he ended, than when he began. To my view, it dishonours the Creator, without adding any thing to our knowledge or conception of his works. The telescope has done incomparably more to enlarge our views of the extent and grandeur of the created universe, than has been done by all the hypothetical systems which the human imagination has devised since the beginning of the world. Were we to employ this theory as an organ of investigation, our conduct and our success would resemble that of some ancient philosophers, who concluded that the planetary motions are performed in circular orbits; because, according to their apprehension, a circle is the most perfect figure.

The theory of Optimism involves a scheme of universal necessity, which it will be very difficult to reconcile with the language of scripture, and with the common apprehensions of Christians;-a necessity which embraces the determinations and acts of God, as well as those of his creatures. It is cheerfully admitted, that the eternal and immutable purposes of Jehovah secure the state, the character, and the actions of all his creatures with infallible certainty; and that no event or change, different from what he has ordained can take place, throughout his universal and everlasting kingdom. The infinite perfections of his nature, the universality of his providence, the necessary dependence of all created beings, together with numerous unequivocal testimonies of Divine Revelation, ought to place this important truth beyond the reach of

controversy or doubt. If therefore the word necessity be used as synonymous with antecedent certainty, it cannot be denied that, in this sense, the determinations and actions of all created beings are necessary. But it does not appear that we have authority for asserting that the divine determinations are necessary. The scriptures speak a very different language. "But our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he pleased. Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight." In this account of the purposes of God, and the methods of his providence, it is our wisdom and our duty to acquiesce. That his determinations were rendered necessary by any extrinsical influence, no one will venture to assert. Nor does the notion that they were rendered necessary by the essential attributes of his nature, admit of an easy reconciliation with the obvious import of the preceding, and similar passages of Scripture. Indeed, this notion cannot be stated, as I have previously observed, without annihilating the distinction, otherwise universally recognised, between the different nature of justice and faithfulness, and that of pure beneficence. In certain supposed circumstances, it is admitted, the exercise of the former results essentially from the infinite perfection of the Divine nature. This cannot be said of the exercise of beneficence, as distinguished from them. It is perfectly free, being directed by sovereign will, and not by necessity. Even the existence of those facts and circumstances, which render the exercise of the former attributes necessary, depends solely upon the will of God. The essential attributes of his nature require the punishment of transgression, and the performance of his engagements; but they do not require, so far as we can see, that he should create beings

capable of transgressing, or that he should enter into covenant with his

creatures.

The doctrine of necessity, which this theory involves, does not accord with the impression which is naturally made upon the mind by an examination of the works of God, and the ways of his providence. The astonishing union which we observe between uniformity and variety, forbids us to attribute them either to chance or to necessity. "Art and contrivance," says Mr. Baxter, "are designedly multiplied, that we might not take it for chance; and, in some cases, the method itself is different, that we might see it is not the effect of such necessity." This argument is forcibly stated by Ray in his celebrated work, The Wisdom of God in the Creation. "Neither yet can these works be the effects of necessity or fate, for then there would be the same constancy observed in the smaller as well as in the larger parts and vessels; whereas there we see nature doth, as it were, sport itself, the minute ramifications of all the vessels, veins, arteries, and nerves, infinitely varying in individuals of the same species, so that they are not in any two alike." With the naturalist, I apprehend, the argument suggested in the preceding quotations, will have more weight against the doctrine of necessity, than any thing which can be said by the most ingenious theorist, will have in its favour. When we contemplate the immense number of different species which are found among the works of God, the unlimited diversity which prevails among individuals of the same species, the multiplication of different means for the production of one common effect, the luxuriant, spontaneous, and sportive varieties, which every where meet our view, this doctrine must appear extremely forced and unnatural.

The consequences, to which the scheme of Optimism has generally

led those who have embraced it, are of such a nature as to justify us in regarding it with suspicion. It is admitted with pleasure that some have adopted it, under the apprehension that it might be employed, ' in a satisfactory and useful manner, to vindicate the ways of God, especially in relation to the existence of sin and misery. Whilst the goodness of their intentions, and the real services which, in many instances, they have rendered to the cause of truth and useful knowledge, are cheerfully admitted; I hope it will not be considered a violation of the respect to which they are justly entitled, to call in question, in this particular, the clearness and accuracy of their views. The inferences which Leibnitz deduced from this gratuitous principle, appear, to say the least, exceedingly strange and paradoxical. He rejected the idea of a vacuum, and maintained that no part of space was unoccupied; that if there were but one body in the universe it must be immoveable; that it is impossible even for Divine power to create two particles of matter, or two things of any kind, perfectly alike. Hence he was led to assert the identity of indiscernibles, and the existence of monads; ascribing to each particle of matter a monad, or active principle, by which it is distinguished from every other. Whether these conclusions were justly drawn from his primary hypothesis or not, it is surprising that their extravagance did not lead him to doubt of its certainty.

This scheme can be of no advantage for the illustration or defence of the truths of religion. If we admit, according to Scripture, and the natural and unsophisticated judgments of our understandings, that sin is the act, and consequently the fault of the creature, this theory is not necessary for the vindication of the ways of God in permitting the existence of sin. If we represent God as the author of sin, the

theory of Optimism will be a very poor apology for our blasphemy. As to the miseries, which, so far as our knowledge extends, are uniformly connected with sin, surely no gratuitous and doubtful hypothesis need be assumed for their vindication. They are the just punishment which God, the righteous judge, has annexed to transgression; and who sees not that if they deserve the name of punishment, their righteousness must be obvious and indisputable, separate from any consideration of the beneficial results to which they may be rendered subservient. Penal inflictions must be right in themselves, independently of consequences; if they be not, no supposed consequences can justify them. If, therefore, we adhere to scriptural and rational principles concerning sin and its attendant misery, it is clearer than the sun, that the purposes and dispensations of God in relation to their existence need no vindication, and least of all that which this theory can give. It is useless, and worse than useless. It raises suspicions of difficulties where none really exist; and from the dubious and unsatisfactory so lution which it is capable of giving of pretended difficulties which it assumes, it becomes the occasion of exciting reproach and blasphemy against the righteous ways of the Lord; whereas a simple and precise statement of the truth could, not fail to carry along with itself its own evidence, and its own vindication.

The theory of Optimism must not be confounded with the common doctrine of Christians, which maintains that all the works of God are excellent and perfect; that the permission of evil furnishes no objection, which is not ultimately resolvable into the narrowness of our views, against the infinite glory of his nature, the perfection of his plans, and the rectitude of his dis

sations; and that, in the end,

even sin itself will be wisely overruled for good, and be made the occasion upon which the glorious attributes of God will be illustriously manifested. This statement may be made with perfect safety, and it ought to be made, in opposition to the presumptuous cavils of those, who, from the crimes and disorders which we witness, might take occasion to deny the existence, or revile the dispensations of their Maker. On the contrary, the theory of Optimism, as it is usually stated, seems scarcely reconcileable with the fundamental distinctions of right and wrong, holiness and sin. In this conclusion, many of the most acute, both of its friends and enemies, concur. "The scheme of Optimism, on the contrary," says Mr. Stewart, "as proposed by Leibnitz, is completely subversive of these cardinal truths. It was, indeed, viewed by the great and excellent author in a very different light; but in the judgment of the most impartial and profound inquirers, it leads, by a short and demonstrative process, to the annihilation of all moral distinctions." Many of its advocates in Europe have, accordingly, embraced a system of necessity, and of materialism, with the avowed design of excluding all the distinctions of morality. In their philosophy, no action deserves either praise or blame, reward or punishment. He who does good is fortunate, not virtuous; he who does evil, is unfortunate, not criminal. Remorse and repentance are founded on a mistake; nor is there any more reason for being angry with the wicked, than with the whirlwind that fills one's eyes with dust. These are some of the consequences deduced from the glorious doctrines of Optimism, and philosophical necessity; all besides, according to them, is prejudice and false philosophy. The friends of this system, in our country, will not, it may be expected, admit the fairness and accuracy of these con

clusions from it. But are their own conclusions less exceptionable? The following sentences from Dr. Hopkins will enable the reader to =form some judgment of the nature of the fruits, which it has produced on this side of the Atlantic. "Who does not now see that God may determine, order and cause moral evil to take place, and in this sense, create it, consistent with his infinite holiness and goodness, if this be necessary for the greatest good of the whole, both moral and natural; yea, that God could not be infinitely wise and good, if, on this supposition, he did not order and cause it to take place?" "Supposing he sees it most for his glory, and the general good," says the same writer, "that you should be damned, it is certainly his will that you should be damned. On this supposition, then, you ought to be willing to be damned." To my apprehension, these inferences are not less ad verse to reason, piety, and scripture, than a downright denial of all moral distinctions-It is not surprising, that a system, from which they can with any appearance of justness be deduced, should excite distrust and opposition.

There is no small difficulty in reconciling the different accounts given of sin by the friends of this theory. According to their fundamental principle, all the wickedness and crimes which exist are necessary in the best possible system, and that with respect to the whole, they are not evil, but good; and yet they affirm, that the essential nature of sin consists in its evil tendency upon the whole; in its opposition to the highest welfare of the universal system. In what way these different statements will admit of a plausible reconcilement, I confess myself unable to conjecture. The real ground of difficulty seems to consist in the incompatibility of the primary hypothesis, with a belief in the essential distinctions of right and wrong. VOL. V.-Ch. Adv.

The account which they give of holiness is equally wide of the truth. Instead of representing obedience to the law of the Lord, the regulation of all our desires, intentions, and pursuits according to his will, as the true characteristick of holiness in every rational creature; they refer us to the principle of expediency, or general benevolence, as the foundation and measure of all moral excellence. Virtue consists in a supreme, impartial, and disinterested regard to the highest welfare of being in general; and from this we are conducted, by a short and direct path, to the shocking and impious notion, that we ought to be willing to be given up to sin and damnation forever, if the interests of the universe require it! It is not easy to speak of this. account of holiness in terms of un

due severity. The supreme and exclusive authority of Jehovah is displaced to make room for a groundless and extravagant fiction. The highest interests of the universe are substituted in the place of the glory of God, as the great and ultimate object of desire and pursuit. It requires us to acquiesce, not in the will of God, but in a kind of necessity, an invincible fatality in the nature of things, independent of his will, and which he has no power either to modify or prevent.

The views, to which this theory leads of the nature of justice and punishment, are manifestly repugnant to the natural convictions of our minds. Justice, we are told, when employed in punishing sin, is an exercise or modification of benevolence to the universe, an expedient intended to promote its highest welfare. These notions of justice and punishment are widely at variance with the common sentiments of mankind. Our belief in the justice of punishment is not derived from considerations of expediency, nor can it be resolved into them. To say that sin deserves punishment, is to communicate lit

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