CHAPTER XXX

THIRD GENERAL OBJECTION TO MAJORITY RULE—THAT IT INVOLVES THE FURORE AND EXPENSE OF FREQUENT ELECTIONS

POPULAR elections are very unpopular with some people. Expensive, ineffectual, disturbing to business, productive of excitement and exaggeration, attended with outbursts of vulgarity and ill-will, frequent elections are regarded as an inconvenience, even as a public curse. The cost and the clamor of elections are one of the arguments most frequently urged against Majority Rule, and most widely credited. Bad as conditions now are with one year out of every four spent in preparation for a Presidential election and another in recovering from its effects, with state elections every second year and in some commonwealths annually, with city and judicial elections thrown in for good measure, and our basket of woes actually heaped up and running over with bond elections, and charter elections, and franchise elections, and what-not elections, it is urged that the adoption of the Initiative, the Referendum, and the Recall would be an inexcusable running after folly. Many people do not enjoy the sound or the sight of democracy at work. Its noise grates upon their nerves. Its interferences are disconcerting. The mountain labors mightily only to bring

forth a mouse. Then why all this turmoil and expense? With a Recall election invoked every few weeks by the political malcontents, with an Initiative election every little while to satisfy the demands of the political dreamers and with a Referendum election after every session of the legislature and almost after every meeting of the city council to give the minority another whack at the way things are going, what hope can we ever again have of enjoying even a modicum of peace and prosperity?

In considering this objection to Majority Rule, attention should first be called to the fact that under it precautions may be and usually are taken to discourage the multiplication of elections. The Recall, to be sure, always involves a special election, but this may be more than offset by the lengthening of terms of office, and the consequent diminution in the frequency of regular elections. Moreover, the number of petitioners required to invoke the Recall is usually so large as to discourage its use except at times when the people are glad to incur the expense and trouble of an extra election for the sake of correcting a grave political mistake. A man who employs a servant or appoints an agent is often greatly irritated by the necessity of stopping in the midst of important or interesting work to discharge him and find another to take his place. The employer grumbles at the time lost and the bother of the thing, but he would much rather undergo these annoyances than be compelled to put up with bad service or fraudulent representation for a long period. To discourage the multiplication of elections for Initiative purposes, the law usually provides that a much larger number of

signatures shall be required to call a special election than to submit a proposition at the next succeeding regular election. Such a provision has a powerful effect, for the expense and trouble of securing additional signatures will prevent the proponents of any Initiative measure from trying to get a special election unless they deem their proposition to be of an emergency character, which is seldom the case. The Referendum is more likely to be an emergency measure, and then the emergency is past when the petitions are filed and the legislative act aimed at suspended. Therefore, there is no call for a special election unless the executive, in his discretion, issues one. So we see that Majority Rule aims to be conservative in the matter of elections, though not absolutely preventing an increase in their number. Sometimes a further provision is made, limiting the number of measures that may be submitted to the people at one time. This limitation, if devised in good faith, is intended to simplify the issues and prevent disorder and confusion, but few advocates of Majority Rule are willing to accept it. They prefer to take their chances on the people's good sense preventing or overcoming the disadvantages of a laborious and complicated election.

It is to be noted, further, that Majority Rule is calculated to modify the characteristics of popular elections. The relative importance of persons is diminished and that of measures is increased. Now, while a campaign on a franchise question or a question of issuing bonds or of consolidating areas of government may give rise to bitterness and exaggerated statement, it cannot be doubted that in the majority of instances a discussion

of measures is likely to be more dignified and enlightening than a discussion of candidates. With the adulation of personal friends or hopeful followers as well as the unjust personal attacks of individual or political enemies eliminated, and with the people relieved of the sickening spectacle of eager candidates throwing themselves at the heads of the electorate by effusive bragging and the tapping of beer-kegs, we might certainly hope for a toning-up of the processes of democracy so that they would become less offensive to people with delicate sensibilities. While there will still be candidates for office and popular elections to select representatives, the whole theory of Majority Rule looks to a large reduction in the clamor of campaigns. This result, it is expected, will be brought about by a reduction in the number of elective officers, by the lengthening of their terms, by the diminution of the opportunities for official corruption and the consequent discouragement of office-seeking by unscrupulous men who are willing to make an election canvass a ribald riot if thereby they may win votes, by the greater relative weight given to platforms and measures as compared with persons, by the inducements offered to men of character and dignity to enter public life and to participate in public discussions, and by a hundred other influences tending to redeem democracy free, from the characteristic absurdities of democracy with its feet tangled in the ropes.

And, finally, if Majority Rule makes popular elections what they ought to be, namely, the means by which an enlightened people registers its will after full and fair discussion of questions intimately affecting the

welfare of every citizen, then the objection to them on the score of expense and bother falls to the ground, be they few or be they many. In the nature of things, there is nothing more worth while to everybody than real politics. There is nothing of more entrancing and persistent interest. It is only when elections are futile that their cost is wasted. In cities, especially, where the conditions of life tempt men and women, particularly the young, to dissipation and folly, frequent elections, if conducted in the true spirit of democracy, are a cultural influence of the highest value. They are a means of practical civic education. No money effectively spent in the training of the citizenship and the organization of the processes of democracy is ever wasted. To withhold the expenditure is the fatal extravagance.