ish. They can fight on with a good chance of snatching victory from defeat somewhere along the tortuous mountain road that leads from the first step in the legislative process, which is taken by the legislature itself and is purely tentative, to the final step, which is taken by the United States Supreme Court and from which there is no practicable appeal. But where it is a case of promised boons withheld, where after long and careful planning the prize comes within reach only to be snatched away, where effort and expense are lost, where excited lust of golden benefits is thwarted, where misplaced confidence ends in humiliation, causes both material and spiritual unite to foster rage. It is no wonder that the Referendum is unpopular at such times with those who have been thwarted by it. How much better it would be, from their standpoint, if the legislators were required to stand up and be counted, and show how many of them dare to refuse to fulfill their part of the bargain by virtue of which they got their seats!

If the Referendum is used because of the legislature's unwillingness to decide between two factions of the people, the objection to it cannot be stated very forcibly, for under these circumstances there is no charge of disloyalty toward secret masters, but merely of desire to avoid the consequences of taking action contrary to the will of a large number, perhaps a majority of their constituents. It is hardly demanded, even by the most stubborn reactionary, that general measures affecting the people, in which they take an active interest and which merely involve questions of governmental policy in relation to the common activities of

life, should be arbitrarily settled against the will of the majority by the representative body. If a Referendum vote is the only way of determining how the majority feel about such measures, few people would have the spirit to oppose it on theoretical grounds. It may be regarded, however, as much safer for the stability of our institutions and as better comporting with the dignity of the representative principle for the legislature to take a chance at guessing the will of the people rather than humiliate itself by asking them for a definite, mathematical demonstration of it at the polls. Wise legislators are supposed to have ways of feeling the public pulse and of divining the people's will without the formalities of arithmetic. There are the letters and petitions that flow in from constituents. There are the editorials in the local newspapers. There are the week-end conferences with the leading lights in local politics. There are the casual conversations on the street and in the train. There are the appearances at public hearings before legislative committees. There are the persuasive whispers of the cloak-room and the illuminating confidences of the convivium. With all these sources of enlightenment, why should the legislative body have recourse to anything so vulgar as the Referendum? Still, the opposition is not bitter. It is mainly a question of good taste, and of what will ultimately come of these first flirtations of legislative youth with the siren of democracy.

A more serious condition is revealed where the Referendum discloses the incompetence of the legislature. Even the crude results that spring from existing legislative practices would often be more crude if the

legislature had to depend entirely on itself for guidance. It is now attended by skilled mentors who try to save it from some of the follies of inexperience and give its work a semblance of intellectual respectability. When the Referendum cuts down the rewards of legislative tutoring, so that experience and wisdom desert the lobby, the graduates of the corner grocery and the novitiates of the law who respond to roll-call in the legislative halls may find themselves somewhat bewildered by the intricate problems of legislation for a great state or a populous city. It is not strange that a representative assembly, freed from one of its masters, should feel the need of turning to the other. The Referendum under these conditions might have the effect of revealing the incompetence of the legislature, but it could not truthfully be charged with increasing this incompetence. It is not to be wondered at that incompetent persons should shrink from accepting responsibility when all their secret props are removed. If, under the Referendum, the legislators disclosed their incapacity for leadership, the people would have cause to regret the fact of this incapacity, not their knowledge of it. The natural tendency of the Referendum, when joined with the other instruments of democracy, is to dignify the representative function by freeing it from the paralyzing effect of secret control and by giving legislators a better opportunity for the development of individual leadership. As issues tend to be separated and settled on their merits, instead of being inextricably tangled in personal and party platforms and confused by partisan organizations, there is greater encouragement for the use of brains

by legislators and for their acceptance of responsibility.

The legislative timidity induced by the Referendum is, therefore, partly a wholesome respect for the will of the rightful master, partly a revelation of present incompetence, and partly an earnest of better conditions in the future, when singleness of purpose, free play of mind and responsible leadership of the people shall, we hope, characterize the activities of representative assemblies.

CHAPTER XV

SECOND OBJECTION TO THE REFERENDUM—THAT IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE ORDERLY PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

WHEN the Referendum, invoked on account of opposition to a particular item in the appropriation bill, or to the increase in a particular item, has the effect of holding up the entire budget of a state for six months. or a year, or even longer, the inconvenience of the institution cannot be denied. When the constitution, in order to make the Referendum effective, provides that no act of the legislature, without exception, shall go into effect until ninety days after the legislature adjourns, and not then if a five per cent petition is filed against it, thus effectually preventing the legislative body from adopting prompt measures for public relief or protection in times of sudden crisis, there is ample reason for denunciation of the institution in the form in which it lends itself to such obstructiveness. But these results are not the necessary concomitants of the Referendum. In order that regular appropriations may not be held in suspense and the established organs of government starved to a standstill, the Referendum section of the constitution should be so drafted as to require petitions calling for a vote on appropriations to be aimed at specific items or the increases in specific