purpose of amusing the English nation, could it have been contrived more ingeniously?"-Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte. See page 164.

2.-Time-serving in religion :

"BY-ENDS.-My brethren, we are, as you see, going all on pilgrimage; and for our better diversion from things that are bad, give me leave to propound unto you this question.

"Suppose a man, a minister or a tradesman, &c., should have an advantage lie before him to get the good blessings of this life, yet so as that he can by no means come by them, except, in appearance at least, he becomes extraordinary zealous in some points of religion that he meddled not with before; may he not use this means to attain his end, and yet be a right honest man?

'MONEY-LOVE.-I see the bottom of your question; and, with these gentlemen's good leave, I will endeavour to shape you an answer. And, first, to speak to your question as it concerneth a minister himself: suppose a minister, a worthy man, possessed but of a very small benefice, and has in his eye a greater, more fat and plump by far; he has also now an opportunity of getting it, yet so as by being more studious, by preaching more frequently and zealously, and, because the temper of the people requires it, by altering of some of his principles; for my part, I see no reason why a man may not do this, provided he has a call, ay, and more, a great deal besides, and yet be an honest man. For why?

"1. His desire of a greater benefice is lawful, (this cannot be contradicted,) since it is set before him by Providence; so then he may get it if he can, making no question for conscience sake.

"2. Besides, his desire after that benefice makes him more studious, a more zealous preacher, &c., and so makes him a better man, yea, makes him better improve his parts, which is according to the mind of God.

"3. Now, as for his complying with the temper of his people, by deserting, to serve them, some of his principles, this argueth, 1. That he is of a self-denying temper. 2. Of a sweet and winning deportment. And, 3. So more fit for the ministerial function.

"4. I conclude, then, that a minister that changes a small for a great, should not, for so doing, be judged as covetous; but rather, since he is improved in his parts and industry hereby, be counted as one that pursues his call, and the opportunity put into his hand to do good.

"And now to the second part of the question, which concerns the tradesman you mentioned. Suppose such an one to have but a poor employ in the world, but by becoming religious, he may mend his market, perhaps get a rich wife, or more and far better

customers to his shop; for my part, I see no reason but this may be lawfully done. For why?

"1. To become religious is a virtue, by what means soever a man becomes so.

"2. Nor is it unlawful to get a rich wife, or more custom to my shop.

"3. Besides, the man that gets these by becoming religious, gets that which is good of them that are good, by becoming good himself so then here is a good wife, and good customers, and good gain, and all these by becoming religious, which is good; therefore, to become religious to get all these is a good and profitable design."-Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress.

3.-Mental reservation :—

Verity and falsity being proprieties of an enunciative speech, as Aristotle teacheth us, that is, of that speech either conceived only in the mind or uttered by words or writing, by which we affirm or deny anything which we call a proposition-that we may the better discern this verity and falsity, we must needs consider the variety of propositions. And we may say with the logicians, that there be four kinds of propositions. The first is a mental proposition, only conceived in the mind, and not uttered by any exterior signification: as when I think with myself these words, 'God is not unjust.' The second is a vocal proposition, as when I utter those words with my mouth. The third is a written proposition, as if I should set the same down in writing. The last of all is a mixed proposition, when we mingle some of these propositions or parts of them together, as in our purpose, when being demanded whether John at Style be in such a place, I, knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless, 'I know not,'-reserving or understanding within myself these other words, (to the end for to tell you.) Here is a mixed proposition containing all this, I know not to the end for to tell you.' And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mind.”

"Our Saviour said to his disciples that he himself knew not the day of judgment, but his Father only, which by consent of the holy Fathers is to be understood that he knew it not for to utter it, although they were never so desirous to know it; whereas his Father knowing it, had uttered it unto him as man: for otherwise we know that St. Peter truly said, 'O Lord, thou knowest all things.' And St. Paul affirmeth that in Christ were hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God. So that it is a Catholic verity that he knew the day and hour of his dreadful judgment, notwithstanding this equivocal sentence, wherein he seemeth to deny that he had any such knowledge."

Besides these kinds of propositions which we have hitherto defended not to be lies, although by them always some truth is,

concealed, there be some other ways, whereby, without a lie, a truth may be covered, which I will briefly set down.

"1. First, we may use some equivocal word which hath many significations, and we understand it in one sense, which is true, although the hearer conceive the other, which is false. So did Abraham and Isaac say, that their wives were their sisters, which was not true as the hearers understood it, or in the proper meaning, whereby a sister signifieth one born of the same father or mother, or of both, but in a general signification, whereby a brother or sister signifieth one near of kindred, as Abraham called Lot his brother, who was but his brother's son; and our Lord is said to have had brothers and sisters, whereas properly he had neither. The like unto this were if one should be asked whether such a stranger lodgeth in my house, and I should answer, ‘He lieth not in my house,' meaning that he doth not tell a lie there, although he lodge there.

"2. Secondly, when unto one question may be given many answers, we may yield one and conceal the other. So Samuel, being commanded by God to go to Bethlehem to anoint David king, said unto God, 'How shall I go? for Saul will hear of it, and kill me.' And our Lord said, Thou shalt take a calf out of the herd, and shalt say, I come to do sacrifice to our Lord.' And Samuel did as our Lord said unto him, and came into Bethlehem. But the ancients of the city, wondering thereat, met him and said, 'Is thy coming peaceable?' who answered, 'It is peaceable; I am come to do sacrifice unto our Lord.' Here Samuel uttered the secondary cause of his coming, and warily dissembled the principal, which notwithstanding they principally intended to know, and by this answer were put out of suspicion thereof. So may it happen that one coming to a place to hear mass may answer them who ask the cause of his coming, that he came to dinner or to visit some person who is there, or with some other true alleged cause satisfy the demanders.

"3. Thirdly, the whole sentence which we pronounce, or some word thereof, or the manner of pointing or dividing the sentence, may be ambiguous, and we may speak it in one sense true for our own advantage. So it is recorded of St. Francis, that being asked of one who was sought for to death, whether he came not that way, he answered (putting his hand into his sleeve, or, as some say, into his ear), he came not this way?

دوو

"4. To these three ways of concealing a truth by words if we add the other of which we spoke before, that is, when we utter certain words, which of themselves may engender a false conceit in the mind of the hearers, and yet with somewhat which we understand and reserve in our minds, maketh a true proposition, then shall we have four ways how to conceal a truth without making of a lie."-A Treatise on Equivocation.

PART IV.

THE FORMS OF REASONING.

WE have now, gentle reader, passed through three parts of our work. In the First Part we considered the Introduction to Reasoning. In the Second Part we considered some of the Principles of Reasoning. In the Third Part we considered another class of the Principles of Reasoning. In this, the Fourth Part, we are going to consider the Forms of Reasoning. But you may ask what is the difference between the principles of reasoning and the forms of reasoning? The difference is this,-the principle refers to the nature of the reason, the form refers to the manner of expressing it; the principle refers to ideas, the form refers to the language and the method. We will explain this by an example. Suppose in the morning, your wife advises you to put on your great-coat, to prevent your taking cold. Here the principle of the argument is the relation of cause and effect. And the validity or strength of this argument must depend upon the soundness of this principle in its application to the present case; that is, upon the probability that you will take cold if you do not wear your great-coat. But this argument may be proposed in a variety of forms. She may say, "My dear, put on your great-coat, this morning; if you don't, you'll be sure to take cold." Or she may speak interrogatively: "Why don't you put on your great-coat this morning? Do you wish to take cold again as you did before? What's the use of having a great-coat, if you don't wear it such a day as this." Or she may speak syllogistically, and say, "Whenever you are in 'danger of taking cold, you should put on a great-coat; I am sure you are in danger of taking cold this morning; therefore, this morning you should put on your greatcoat."

You will perceive, then, that by the forms of reasoning,

we mean the different ways in which reasons may be placed before us. The strength of an argument must depend upon the soundness of its principles: but the readiness with which that strength is perceived, will depend very often upon the manner in which the argument may be presented to the mind. Hence, different arguments are drawn up in different forms, according to the subjects discussed, and the character of the audience to whom they are addressed. These different forms chiefly refer to the method, and the style. To be able to reason with the greatest effect, we should study not only the rules of logic, but also the rules of grammar, and endeavour to acquire a facility of expressing the same ideas in different words. Dr. Watts, in his Improvement of the Mind, has given us some rules for the acquisition of this useful talent :—

"1. Accustom yourselves to read those authors who think and write with great clearness and evidence, such as convey their ideas into your understanding, as fast as your eye or tongue can run over their sentences: this will imprint upon the mind a habit of imitation; we shall learn the style with which we are very. conversant, and practise it with ease and success.

"2. Get a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of the subject which you treat of; survey it on all sides, and make yourself perfect master of it; then you will have all the sentiments that relate to it in your view, and under your command, and your tongue will very easily clothe those ideas with words which your mind has first made so familiar and easy to itself.

Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons,
Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.

HOR. de Arte Poet.

Good teaching from good knowledge springs;
Words will make haste to follow things.

3. Be well skilled in the language which you speak; acquaint yourself with all the idioms and special phrases of it, which are necessary to convey the needful ideas on the subject of which you treat, in the most various and most easy manner to the understanding of the hearer: the variation of a phrase in several forms is of admirable use to instruct; it is like turning all sides of the subject to view; and if the learner happens not to take in the ideas in one form of speech, probably another may be successful for that end.

Upon this account I have always thought it a useful manner of instruction, which is used in some Latin schools, which they