One further explanation should here be made. We do not deny that there may be sometimes difficulty in deciding, whether this or that given effort be "congenial" or "anti impulsive"; but these will always be instances belonging to what may be called the border-land. In such a case, the

attractions on either side do not greatly differ in power; and it requires careful self-inspection, to determine on which side the balance preponderates. To take the common illustration-what can be more mutually contrasted than the respective shapes of a straight line and a circle? And yet the small arc of a very large circle is often quite indistinguishable from a straight line. But, though it sometimes happens that the anti-impulsive effort is so slight as not to be easily recognized for what it is, it happens quite as often that such effort is so intense, as to force its true character on the notice of the most casual observer. We cannot too often repeat, that if there be such a thing in the world as anti-impulsive effort, determinism is overthrown. We are not all concerned therefore to maintain that in all cases, but only that in some cases, the putting forth of such effort is an indisputable fact.

IV. We will next repeat the particular illustration cited from us by our kind critic in the " Spectator," with the view of more distinctly confronting the difficulty which he expresses. A rises at a given time on some given morning with simplest promptitude and alacrity, under the influence of a firmlyacquired habit; though he experiences at the moment more pain than pleasure in so doing. How is this to be psychologically explained? According to Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain, the explanation is such as the following; and we are entirely disposed to think it correct. It is true enough then, that the rising gives him at the moment more pain than pleasure; but at the same time he is keenly conscious, that his lying longer in bed would, on the whole, entail on him greater suffering than his getting up. His real desire then, is to rise from bed. He needs no "self-restraint," in order that he may get up; but he would need "self-restraint," in order that he should voluntarily lie in bed.

Now consider on the other hand the case of B. His desire -his preponderating and spontaneous impulse-is to lie inbed; but he resolves, from some motive or other, to get up. In order to fulfil that resolve, he exerts himself and puts forth anti-impulsive effort; he exercises manly self-restraint and forces himself to rise, though it be but laboriously and against the grain. A starts from bed by a spontaneous and indeliberate impulse; but B resolves and fails, resolves and fails again, until he at last succeeds by a crowning effort in launch

ing himself on the sea of active life. Surely no mental states are more unmistakably contrasted, than these two.

The

According to the "Spectator" however, the determinists would reply, "that what seems free volition" in B's case "is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half-hidden springs; the laziness and love of sleep being felt in every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency, by which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment sunk beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found in some deep-rooted conviction or custom or habit of the past, which at the present moment moulds his character without seeming to fascinate his will." We must say for ourselves, that we cannot see the slightest plausibility in such a reply. We will go all possible lengths in heartily admitting, that the will is often very powerfully affected by influences, which are for the moment (or permanently if you will) sunk beneath the surface of consciousness. same thought of pleasure and pain shall occur with equal vividness to Y and Z; and yet it shall impel Y towards action with immeasurably greater power than that with which it impels Z, because of various circumstances in his temStill look at the matter perament and past history. which way you will-all that these convictions, and habits, and customs, and temperament can even imaginably do, is to effect, that the desire, the spontaneous and preponderating impulse-be this rather than that. But that act of self-restraint or anti-impulsive effort, on which we are throughout insisting, presupposes the spontaneous impulse as already existing; nor does it come into action at all, until after the desire exists, until habits, temperament, circumstances have done their work. Here, precisely as before, to

An objection may be raised against what is said in the text, which it wil be more satisfactory expressly to notice. Suppose I desire some given course of action, M; and suppose I nevertheless resist that desire, from the motive of virtuousness or of my permanent self-interest. This motive of virtue or self-interest-so the objector may argue-on entering my mind, becomes in itself an attraction; and may probably enough (on the very principles of determinism) preponderate over the opposite attractions. We answer, that such cases undoubtedly are by no means uncommon; but that they are not the cases on which we rest our argument. If the new attraction preponderates over its rivals,-then my desire is no longer for course M, though I may have an optation_towards that course. In such a case therefore-although the action which I elicit is opposite to that, which just previously I had desired ;-nevertheless, at the moment of action, my desire and my action are in perfect mutual accordance. But the cases on which we insist are those, in which it is manifest that I resolve and act in direct opposition to what (at the very moment of acting) I desire. The undeniable existence of such cases is the fact, on which we rest as fatal to determinism.

act in accordance with my desire is one thing, and to resist my desire is just the opposite thing. Nor is there the most distant approach towards lessening the saliency and impressiveness of this contrast,-whether the desire has been generated by obvious and recognized influences, or by influences partially or entirely latent. See indeed what we observed in our note at pp. 334, 5.

7. There is one doctrine implied in what we have just been saying, which it will nevertheless be more satisfactory expressly to set forth. It has reference to what we called in our article (p. 342) "non-emotional attractions." It would be quite unfair to allege that, according to determinists, my action is always determined by that "motive" (as they call it) which is accompanied by the most vivid picture of pleasure for the moment. On the contrary they hold, even as a prominent part of their doctrine, that a thought of pleasure or pain may exercise immense influence towards action, while causing nevertheless little or no emotion. We took every pains (we trust) to treat this part of their theory with full justice see pp. 330, 1; note at p. 332; pp. 342, 3. Take the preceding instance of A rising from bed. The pain of rising may be far more vividly presented to his imagination, than the pain of lying in bed. Nevertheless what precisely results from his confirmed habit of early rising is, (1) that the pain of lying in bed would in fact be found (when the time came) to be greater than the present pain of getting up; and (2) that this eventual predominance of pain is at this moment duly and influentially appreciated by his practical reason.* Determinists undoubtedly are quite explicit in urging this consideration; and (as we have often said) we are entirely disposed so far to agree with them.

In like manner, suppose I have acquired in great strength what Mr. Mill calls a habit of virtue ; i.e. a habit of benevolence. It will happen again and again, that I spontaneously practise what in some sense may be called self-sacrifice that is, I deny myself some great pleasure or endure some great pain, for the sake of benefitting my fellow-men. Moreover I do this, though the pleasure which I forego, or the pain which I endure, is painted on my imagination with immeasurably greater vividness, than is the pleasure which I shall enjoy from acting beneficently, or the pain which I should suffer from acting in a different way.† We need not here give the

It will be sufficiently clear here from the context, what we mean by this term "practical reason;" and, it is not worth while to treat at any great length a matter, on which we are entirely at one with determinists.

See the passage which we quoted from Mr. Mill in p. 331, note.

explanation of this phenomenon ; because to do so would only be to repeat, almost word for word, the explanation which we just now gave.

We entirely agree with determinists on the existence of such phenomena as these; but we say that they do not tend ever so remotely to discredit the argument on which we have insisted. In the former of our two instances, my real desire was to

get up; and my inclination towards lying in bed was a mere optation. In the latter case my real desire was to practise self-sacrifice; and I had no more than an optation towards the contrary self-indulgence. It still remains absolutely true then that, according to determinists, men by the very constitution. of their nature are inevitably determined to do what they really desire. See Mr. Mill's express language quoted by us in pp. 330, 331. Though we find no pleasure in such or such an action, he says, (( we still continue to desire it and consequently to do it." "I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion."

In one word. The whole deterministic controversy turns on this one question: "do I, or do I not, at various times exercise self-restraint? do I, or do I not, at various times act in resistance (not to a mere optation, but) to my real desire?". What can "motives," or "circumstances, or "temperament," or "habit," or "custom" imaginably do for me, except to effect that my desire shall be this rather than that? How can they imaginably influence my action in those cases, where my action is contrary to my desire? If then there are such cases-if it be true that I often act in opposition to what at the moment is my real desire--then it demonstratively follows, that my will at such times acts for itself; independently of "pleasure" or "pain" or " circumstances " or "temperament" or anything else.

And on this critical point we appeal confidently to the experience of any man, who will honestly examine his past and present consciousness. The question, to which our article was directed throughout, was the question we have first named. "Do men ever resist a real desire? Is there such a thing as self-restraint?" He would be an unusually bold man who, fairly confronting this question, should answer it in the negative but to answer it in the affirmative, is to reject determinism in every possible shape.

It is urgently important however, in reference to the course of argument which we hope to pursue in future articles, to

* In the sense in which determinists use that word.

make thoroughly manifest, that determinism is absolutely nowhere, as the saying is; that it is not only demonstratively, but even visibly and palpably false. We had rather therefore run the risk of saying many words too much, than of saying one word too little. And in accordance with this feeling, we will conclude by drawing out in form the argument, on which we have insisted, whether in our April article or in this Appendix.

The determinist reasoning, when analysed, will be found to consist of two propositions.

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Prop. 1st. Every man's desire at any given moment is infallibly determined by circumstances (1) internal and (2) external; i.e., (1) by the intrinsic constitution and tendency of his mind, and (2) by the external influences which at the

moment act on it."

Prop. 2nd. "Every man's will at any given moment is infallibly determined, as to its action, by the desire which prevails in his mind at that moment.”

From these two propositions taken together, the deterministic conclusion obviously follows; viz. that every man's will is infallibly determined by circumstances internal and external, as to its action at any given moment.

Moreover-not only this is in fact the reasoning of a determinist-but there is no other reasoning on which he can possibly rely. It is most obvious, that circumstances cannot determine a man's will to some action, except by disposing it thereto; or in other words that they cannot determine his action, except by determining his desire. His desire indeed in many cases may be negative and not positive; or, in other words, he may desire some course of action not as being in itself attractive, but as being less unattractive than any practicable alternative. Then again, when we speak of "desire," we by no means refer exclusively to what is sometimes called "conscious" desire. There are very many active impulses, which lead so immediately to action, that they cannot be reflected on, as distinct from the action to which they spontaneously and irresistibly lead. We include all these impulses under the general name "desire." And all this being understood, it is most evident that the determinist reasoning must consist of the two propositions above recited. If a man's action is infallibly determined by circumstances, this can only be because (1) his desire is infallibly determined by them, and because (2) his action is infallibly determined by his desire. With the former of the two propositions, we are entirely disposed to concur. Not only so, but we are disposed to concur with it in the particular shape in which Mr. Mill and Dr.