DISCOURSE IV.

ARGUMENT FOR THE RECTITUDE OF HUMAN NATURE DERIVED FROM THE STRUCTURE OF UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE.

YEA, AND WHY EVEN OF YOURSELVES JUDGE YE NOT WHAT IS RIGHT?-Luke xii. 57.

I INTEND, from these words of the Saviour, to pursue an inquiry in which we have been some time engaged, as to the moral structure of human nature, the power of distinguishing right from wrong, the moral feeling with which right and wrong are viewed, and the power which men suppose themselves to possess of choosing between them and the responsibility upon which they are conscious of acting every day of their lives.

Much light, I believe, will be thrown upon this subject by a consideration of the structure of universal language. The universal language of mankind is the best exponent of what they find in their own constitution. Languages were formed by those who had no theories to support, either metaphysical or theological, by those who never heard of the doctrine of original sin, who were unpledged to any theory of the fall of Adam, and who never heard of Adam himself.

The structure of universal language on this subject

is the best evidence, because it is wholly incidental and undesigned. What testimony does it bear as to the fact, that man, since the Fall, is created averse to all good, and inclined to all evil? The universal structure of language is the best evidence upon the subject, for “it is out of the abundance of the heart that the mouth speaketh." Language is the expression or declaration of the impression that outward things make upon the senses of man, and upon the moral nature within, and of the results of reflection upon them. There is a correspondence among all languages, because human nature is everywhere the same, and the relations of man to man, and to external things by which he is surrounded, are the same. Every language has words for cold and heat, for square and round, for bitter and sweet, for father and mother, for sister and brother, because these things are universal. So every language has words for truth and falsehood, for justice and injustice, for virtue and vice, for mercy and cruelty, for gratitude and ingratitude, for fidelity and treachery, for selfishness and benevolence.

The existence of the words cold and heat, light and darkness, square and round, bitter and sweet, are demonstrations that all mankind have senses, sight, feeling, taste. So the existence and universality of the terms which indicate the moral qualities of actions, right and wrong, just and unjust, good and bad, are a demonstration equally strong of the existence and universality of a moral sense, which discerns certain moral qualities in actions. One action is pronounced good, and another bad.

How does this great fact agree with the theory, that human nature was wrecked by the Fall, and is now in ruins? The structure of universal language demon

strates that the moral faculty survived the ruin, whatever it might be, and is still active and discriminating, performs its appropriate office of informing man what is good and what is evil, what is right and what is wrong, what is meritorious and what is blameworthy.

We are told, that by the Fall man lost his congeniality to that which is good, and his repugnance to that which is evil, and became by nature better pleased with that which is evil, and averse to that which is good. This whole theory is directly contradicted by the very structure of language. It can be true on no other supposition, than that all mankind had conspired to form languages directly contradictory to their moral constitution, to call that evil which is agreeable to their moral sense, and that good which is repugnant to it. Such a universal conspiracy is just as incredible as a universal conspiracy to call that bitter which the human palate pronounces sweet, and that sweet which the human palate pronounces bitter.

Had such a change in human nature taken place, that that which is good afterwards seemed to be evil, and that which is evil seemed to be good, then the law of human nature itself is changed, for we can go no deeper than what seems to us. What seems to us must be taken to be reality, and in the absence of revelation, human nature is its own law; our constitution is the only way in which God makes known his will to us. We cannot believe otherwise than that our senses make a true report to us of outward things, nor can we believe otherwise than that our moral sense makes a true report to us of things which relate to right and wrong. We can be obliged only to go according to appearances, because God made our senses, and made it impossible for us to

distrust them, and he made our moral sense, and made it impossible for us to distrust that. Human nature, as it now is, is our law, and not human nature as it was before the Fall, if there ever was such a thing. What seems to us to be good we must take to be good, and what seems to us to be evil we must take to be evil. As far as we are concerned, it makes no difference whether human nature was changed by God or Adam or not, if it has been changed, and the laws which were previously applicable to it are not applicable now, for human nature is its own law. Sin is the violation of a law, the law given to the being who transgresses it. In the absence of revelation, human nature itself is the only law which man has. It is that which points out some things as right and others as wrong. If human nature was changed by the Fall, then the human nature which now is is man's law, and not the human nature which existed before the Fall. If evil has become good, and good evil, there is no help for it. Man must obey the law of that nature which God has given him, and not that nature which a remote ancestor lost.

Revelation is no remedy for the evil of the Fall, even if there was such a thing and it consisted in the depravation of human nature, if revelation makes known a higher law than that which corresponds to nature in its present state. A law, to be just, must be commensurate with that nature to which it is proposed, and of which it is required. Revelation cannot alter nature. What man wants, if his nature is fallen, is not a higher law, that only increases his difficulty, but a restoration of his nature to that condition in which it was before the Fall. Then a higher law would be just and proportionate to his nature. .

If sin arise from a defect in nature, then revelation is no cure for it, for revelation cannot change nature. But if sin be an abuse of nature, then revelation may be a remedy for it. In one case it depends on the will of · man, and in the other case it does not depend upon it. No man by force of will can change his nature, but a man may by the force of will cease to abuse his nature. And this is precisely what revelation induces him to do.

If there were such an impediment in human nature as the doctrine of original sin asserts, then revelation would be in vain, for there would be no power of rising to the level which revelation proposes. It would be as vain as to command man to ascend to the clouds without wings, or to avoid death, being created mortal.

I trust that I have made it clear that the structure of universal language proves the universality of a moral sense, and moral perception of the difference between what is right and what is wrong, that these perceptions were not destroyed by the Fall, that they constitute the natural law of human nature, and if they were impaired, they would still, in their imperfect state, constitute the law of human nature, because they would be commensurate with its powers.

If any further proof were wanted of this, it would be found in the relation of language to revelation. Revelation did not create language. It used the language previously in existence. At the first call of Abraham, we read that God said to him, "I am Almighty God. Walk before me, and be thou perfect." Consider what this language implies. What could Abraham understand by the word "perfect"? How could he know what perfection was ? There was no written law at that time, and perhaps writing was unknown. The only per