DISCOURSE XVIII.

SPIRITUAL RENOVATION.

THEREFORE IF ANY MAN BE IN CHRIST, HE IS A NEW CREATURE: OLD THINGS ARE PASSED AWAY; BEHOLD, ALL THINGS ARE BECOME NEW. 2 Cor. v. 17.

THE change from Judaism to Christianity, or from Paganism to a belief in Christ, or from a condition of indifference or irreligion to practical and earnest piety, is spoken of in the New Testament in strong language. It is called, as in the passage I have just quoted, a new creation. "If any man be in Christ," which means, if any man be a Christian, "he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." In another place, nearly the same language is used: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." In another place, "That put off, concerning the former conversation, the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Does such language as this assert

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a moral or a constitutional change, a change of nature or a change of character? It has been asserted, that the change here spoken of is constitutional, not moral, -a change corresponding to that which took place in human nature at the Fall. And of course it asserts, by implication, that human nature is constitutionally depraved, and must be created anew, in order to have even the capacities for religion. A new creation, it may be affirmed, is the strongest language that could possibly be used.

There is another manner of speech in the New Testament which may be said to have the same bearing, that by which the change from Judaism to Christianity, and to religion from irreligion, is called regeneration, or being born again. It is conspicuous in Christ's conversation with Nicodemus. "Verily I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born of water and spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of flesh is flesh, and that which is born of spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the spirit." From these expressions, the same conclusion is drawn, as to the condition of human nature, of its constitutional depravity. Another idea is added to it, that of moral inability, - that the change from irreligion to religion is brought about by an agency that is above man, and altogether independent of his will; as much so as the motions of the atmosphere, which are not only beyond the control of man, but wholly beyond his knowledge. In confirmation of this view, another pas

sage is quoted: "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." In another passage, the agent in regeneration is said to be the word of God. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." Paul says to the Corinthians," For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers, for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the Gospel."

Now it may be asked, Does not such language as this assert, or at least imply, that the change from irreligion. to religion is a constitutional change, a change of human nature itself, and not only a change of its habits and exercises? And does it not assert, that this change is brought about by superhuman agency, and one to which man is naturally incompetent? I answer, in the first place, that there are strong moral objections to this. It seems wholly inconsistent with the moral attributes of God. If God be omnipotent, at the same time that he is wise and just, it was certainly in his power to have created man capable of religion. Religion, as far as we can see, is the highest end of human existence; and if man be created an immortal being, it is the only thing capable of making him happy here and hereafter. It is not antecedently probable that an almighty, wise, and good Being would have made man immortal, and withheld from him this crowning attribute, the power to love, obey, and please his Maker. Existence, with the capacity to evil, and without the capacity to good, is not a blessing. It dooms man inevitably to misery in this life, and if he be immortal, to everlasting misery in the world to come. Such a proceeding would be an infinite injustice.

God exercises a moral government over man in this

life. He does this in several different ways. He directly rewards some actions, and punishes others. He rewards industry, temperance, sobriety, with plenty, health, and peace. He punishes indolence, intemperance, and passion with want, disease, and disquiet. Now this is unjust, if there be an essential defect in human nature. Man is treated as if he were suspended in an even balance between good and evil. If a weight is secretly thrown into the scale, which turns it always towards evil, then he is not placed in a condition of fair moral probation. Is it said, that Adam was made so at first, and his fall changed human nature? I answer, that he could have had no such power of changing human nature, except by especial Divine appointment, and so through Divine agency.

God rewards and punishes men in this life, through their own consciences. "I have done right, when I He who can make this reflec"I have done wrong, when He who is conscious of this

might have done wrong." tion is made happy by it. I might have done right." is made unhappy. But both of these reflections are deceptions, unless man be really free to good and evil. This consciousness exists in the human mind by Divine arrangement, and if it is not true, then God himself deceives us, rewards one for that which he did not produce, and punishes the other for that for which he is not to blame.

Men are rewarded and punished in this life through the agency of each other. One man sees another do an act which he judges to be wrong. He spontaneously condemns both the act and the agent. One he calls sin, and the other guilty. He does this upon the strength of the supposed identity of human nature. He judges that

his neighbour has the same nature and capacities with himself. He believes that he has a moral sense, and is free to choose between good and evil. He punishes the guilty under the impression that the guilty deserve it. It is by Divine appointment that he has these sentiments concerning his neighbour, and these sentiments are some of the means which God has appointed to punish the sinner. If man be not free to good and evil, then these sentiments are unjust, the conduct to which they lead is unjust, and God is the author of the injustice.

The retribution which men exercise towards each other in this life is based upon the supposition, that they are free to good as well as evil. If freedom is necessary to the justice of rewards and punishments in the everyday morality between man and man, so must freedom to what is religiously good or evil be necessary to the justice of future rewards and punishments. Man cannot be justly punished for his want of religion, if he has no capacities for religion, and it is necessary for him to be created anew in order to possess religious capacities. All those who are not created anew, having no religious capacities, have no religious responsibilities.

And yet we are told in the Scriptures, that God will exercise the same retribution in the world to come that he does here. "They that have done good shall come forth to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation."

The interpretation, then, which would make the recreation and regeneration spoken of in the New Testament to be a change of constitution, has against its proba bility the evidence of consciousness, the integrity of the moral government of God in this life, and the unchangeable demands of eternal justice. These considerations