in Thessaly and it necessitated the payment of a considerable indemnity. On the other hand it virtually assured the final emancipation of the Great Greek island.' In 1898 Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy landed troops in the coast towns; in 1899 they declared Crete to be an autonomous State under the Suzerainty of the Sultan, and appointed Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner under their own protection. In 1905 the Cretan Assembly proclaimed the union of the island with the Kingdom of Greece, but at that point the Powers intervened; Prince George resigned the High Commissionership; the King of Greece, by permission of the Powers, nominated M. Zaimis to succeed him, and for the next three years the island was policed by an international military force. In 1908 the islanders, excited by the proclamation of Bulgarian Independence, by the 'Young Turks' revolution at Constantinople, and above all, by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria, again demanded annexation to Greece. A provisional Government was set up with M. Venizelos as Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs. The Powers, while refusing formally to recognise the provisional Government, entered into 'administrative relations' with it. If at this crisis Greece had acted with courage and promptitude the Cretan problem would probably have been solved there and then, but in fear of the Turk on the one hand, and on the other of the Powers, the Greeks allowed the favourable opportunity to slip.

In Greece itself, however, there was grave discontent, which eventuated in July 1909 in a coup d'état by a newly formed 'Military League.' From the chaos which ensued the kingdom was saved by the courageous wisdom of the King and the political genius of the sometime leader of the Cretan insurrection-M. Venizelos. Invited to Athens to advise the League, Venizelos was ultimately called into counsel by the King. persuaded the League to dissolve itself, and he procured the summoning of a national Convention which met in September 1910. In October, Venizelos became Prime Minister and carried out the revision described above, together with a long series of far-reaching domestic reforms.

He

More important, however, than internal reconstruction was the diplomatic achievement of Venizelos. The formation of the Balkan League of 1912 was primarily the work of this remarkable diplomatist.* The Turko-Italian war in Tripoli gave him his chance. He seized it with the high courage and the consummate adroitness which differentiate the great statesman from the time-serving politicians whom parliamentary government-not in Greece only-is apt to breed. Then, as M. Gueshoff writes,

'A miracle took place. . . . Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000. . . Once the Turks were driven back to Constantinople and Asia Minor, the Eastern Question would cease to be a source of troubles and dangers. On May 30, 1913, this solution of the problem was consecrated by the Treaty of London. The Balkan war thus ended as it had begun-by a miracle. More territories were being reclaimed from Turkish hands than in the case of the most victorious war ever waged by a Great Power against the Sultan.'

But not even Venizelos could smooth out the tangle of Hellenic, Serbian and Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. His failure to do so issued in what M. Gueshoff has truly described as an 'impious fratricidal struggle '-the second Balkan war of 1913. How far that failure was due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the allies, and how far to the intrigues of Berlin and Vienna is a point which cannot yet be determined. It is sufficient for our immediate purpose to note the results.

The military success of the Greeks in the two Balkan wars greatly surprised both friends and foes; most of all perhaps did it surprise the Greeks themselves. As a net result of war and diplomacy Greece almost doubled her territory and population.†

* For the Bulgarian view clearly and temperately stated, with ample documentary evidence, cf. The Balkan League,' by I. E. Gueshoff, late Prime Minister of Bulgaria. John Murray, 1915.

=

+ The population of Greece before 1912 2,666,000; after 1913 = 4,363,000. In area Greece occupied before the wars 25,014 square miles, and 41,993 after. There are said, however, to be some 3,000,000 Greeks still unredeemed' under Turkish rule. Bulgaria gained only 125,490 inhabitants and 9663 square miles. Serbia gained 1,636,291 inhabitants and 15,241 square miles.

Towards the north-east Greece obtained southern Macedonia, including the great city of Salonika, and the seaboard as far east as, and including, Kavala; on the northwest she obtained Epirus, but not that portion of southern Albania which is known to the Hellenes as northern Epirus, and which they occupied at the beginning of the European war. Turkey finally abandoned her suzerainty over Crete, which was at last formally annexed by Greece, and Greece secured (by the award of the Powers) all the Aegean Islands of which the Porte could dispose, except those which command the entrance to the Dardanelles-Imbros and Tenedos. The Sporades, including Rhodes, have been held since the Tripoli war by Italy, and Greece has recently refused an ill-timed offer of Cyprus from Great Britain.

Greece is palpably halting between two opinions; hesitating, not unintelligibly, to commit herself definitely either to one or the other of two alternative courses, both of which are fraught with peril to an adolescent State. Through much tribulation has the Hellenic Kingdom struggled into existence; slowly and painfully have the Hellenes realised their national identity and achieved national unity. Had they listened to the voice of the one political genius whom in modern times their race has produced they would undoubtedly have taken some risks; but in politics nothing great can be achieved without risk. If Cavour and Victor Emmanuel had not risked everything in 1855, if Garibaldi had hesitated in 1860, Italian unity would not be an accomplished fact to-day. During the last hundred years Greece has incurred an incalculable debt to the Powers of the Triple Entente. In 1915 she has sadly neglected the opportunity of repayment. The bond she had given to her Serbian ally she has shamefully dishonoured. Faithlessness and ingratitude may earn a traitor's recompense; but well-rewarded treachery has, before now, proved to be the prelude to suicide.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

A NATION OF WORKERS

'HIS IS Majesty's Government are fully alive to the great im

portance of the economic, social, commercial and financial problems that will arise after the war, and I am strongly of opinion that not even our preoccupation with the immediate and paramount task of ensuring victory ought to prevent us from taking measures to ensure that these problems shall be carefully explored by skilled experts in advance.'

So said the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on December 13th, and his words, expressing as they do the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, are the most complete justification for the plea that the gravest and fullest consideration should be given now, even whilst we are wrestling with the unique problems of the present, to the equally unique problems of the future. If, without going into full detail, those problems can be outlined with sufficient clearness to provoke intelligent discussion and anticipation the purpose of this article will have been accomplished.

moon.

First and foremost we must always remember that we are looking forward not to possibilities but to certainties. We can be excused if we were not prepared, as our enemies were prepared, for war. Tous war had long seemed a mere contingency -a possibility rather than a probability. But we shall be inexcusable if we are not prepared for peace and the questions which arise out of it; for, whether it come in six weeks or six months or six years, peace is as inevitable as sunrise or full Let us, therefore, now, while we have time, call to our assistance all the available experience, the intellect and the ability of the nation, in order to have a clear and definite plan for meeting the difficulties of the future. Peaceful nation as we were, we yet in peace time, as has recently been disclosed, maintained a Committee of Imperial Defence, which, in spite of limitations, worked out as thoroughly as possible the problems to be faced in war and embodied them in a War Book.' Is it too much to ask that a Committee of at least equal influence and standing should even now be preparing a 'Peace Book' on similar lines? We must never forget that the standing of

British business and of British goods throughout the world depends on the conclusion of a victorious peace. Anything less than that would tarnish inevitably and tarnish for generations the very goodwill of every house of business trading outside these islands. It will reflect fairly or unfairly upon the quality of every article exported from this country and indeed the Empire. Victory in the present war is essential to the success of our future commerce as well as to our future liberty.

Though the problems to be faced may be grouped under the head of Business it must not be supposed that this means the greedy and grasping acquisition of wealth discussion on such a subject would rightly be viewed with chilly indifference by statesmen and people alike. Business, as the term is here used, connotes something far greater and higher it covers the whole problem of the preservation and future of the race. It is the problem of fitting and training and educating the coming generations, on whom will depend the race and the ideals for which so much human life is being sacrificed at the present time.

The broad outstanding fact with which we shall be faced for many years to come is the necessity of paying for the war. Few people are now simple enough to believe that any appreciable portion of the huge cost will be recoverable in the form of an indemnity. It is to ourselves, and ourselves alone, that we must look to pay our bills. From the enormous drain of money which will result will come a very considerable lowering of incomes, and in consequence it will be necessary for a far larger proportion of the population to be active workers. This is in itself far from being a disadvantage; indeed, no finer thing could happen to a nation than that every one of its members should become a worker. Side by side with this increase in the number of workers, including of course women workers, must be an increase in the other requisites for the production of wealth-new factories built, new machinery installed, new supplies of raw material tapped.

But while we shall be compelled to build up in the after-war period the machinery for increased production, on the other side of the account we must anticipate decreased internal consumption. We might place roughly in three groups the products which are in abnormal demand at present. First and