planted. If we have fauntered away our youth, we must expect to be ignorant men. If indolence and inattention have taken an early poffeffion of us, they will probably increase as we advance in life; and make us a burden to ourselves, and useless to fociety. If again, we fuffer ourselves to be mifled by vicious inclinations, they will daily get new strength, and end in diffolute lives. But if we cultivate our minds in our youth, attain habits of attention and industry, of virtue and fobriety, we fhall find ourselves well prepared to act our future parts in life; and what above all things ought to be our care, by gaining this command over ourselves, we shall be more able, as we get forward in the world, to refift every new temptation, as it arises. Gilpin.

§ 163. Behaviour to fuperiors. We are next injoined "to order ourfelves lowly and reverently to all our betters."

By our betters are meant they who are in a fuperior station of life to our own; and by ordering ourfelves lowly and reverently towards them," is meant paying them that refpect which is due to their ftation.

The word betters' indeed includes two kinds of perfons, to whom our refpect is due thofe who have a natural claim to it; and those who have an acquired one; that is, a claim arifing from fome particular fituation in life.

Among the first, are all our fuperior relations; not only parents, but all other relations, who are in a line above us. All thefe have a natural claim to our refpect. -There is a refpect alfo due from youth to age; which is always becoming, and tends to keep youth within the bounds of modefty.

To others, refpect is due from those particular stations which arife from fociety and government. Fear God, fays the text; and it adds, "honour the king."

It is due alfo from many other fituations in life. Employments, honours, and even wealth, will exact it; and all may juftly exact it, in a proper degree.

But it may here perhaps be inquired, why God fhould permit this latter diftinction among men? That fome fhould have more authority than others, we can eafily fee, is abfolutely neceffary in government; but among men, who are all born equal,

why should the goods of life be distributed in fo unequal a proportion?

To this inquiry, it may be answered, that, in the first place, we fee nothing in this, but what is common in all the works of God. A gradation is every where obfervable. Beauty, ftrength, fwiftnefs, and other qualities, are varied through the creation in numberless degrees. In the fame manner likewise are varied the gifts of fortune, as they are called. Why therefore fhould one man's being richer than another furprize us more than his being ftronger than another, or more prudent?

Though we can but very inadequately trace the wifdom of God in his works, yet very wife reasons appear for this variety in the gifts of fortune. It seems neceffary both in a civil, and in a moral light.

In a civil light, it is the neceffary accompaniment of various employments; on which depend all the advantages of fociety: Like the ftones of a regular building, fome muft range higher, and fome lower; fome muft fupport, and others be fupported; fome will form the ftrength of the building, and others its ornament; but all unite in producing one regular and proportioned whole. If then different employments are neceflary, of courfe different degrees of wealth, honour, and confequence, muft follow; a variety of diftinctions and obligations; in fhort, different ranks, and a fubordination, must take place.

Again, in a moral light, the difproportion of wealth, and other worldly adjuncts, gives a range to the more extensive exercife of virtue. Some virtues could but faintly exist upon the plan of an equality. If fome did not abound, there were little room for temperance: if fome did not fuffer need, there were as little for patience. Other virtues again could hardly exift at all. Who could practile generofity, where there was no object of it? Who humility, where all ambitious defires were excluded?

Since then Providence, in fcattering thefe various gifts, propofes ultimately the good of man, it is our duty to acquiefce in this order, and "to behave ourselves lowly and reverently" (not with fervility, but with a decent refpect)" to all our fuperi

ors.

Before I conclude this fubject, it may

be proper to obferve, in vindication of the ways of Providence, that we are not to fuppofe happiness and misery neceflarily connected with riches and poverty. Each condition hath its particular fources both of pleasure and pain, unknown to the other. Those in elevated stations have a thousand latent pangs, of which their inferiors have no idea; while their inferiors again have as many pleasures, which the others, cannot taste. I speak only of fuch modes of happiness or misery as arise immediately from different stations. Of mifery, indeed, from a variety of other causes, all men of every station are equal heirs; either when God lays his hand upon us in fickness, or misfortune; or when, by our own follies and vices, we become the minifters of our own distress.

Who then would build his happiness upon an elevated ftation? Or who would envy the poffeffion of fuch happiness in another? We know not with what various diftreffes that ftation, which is the object of our envy, may be attended.-Befides, as we are accountable for all we poffefs, it may be happy for us that we poffefs fo little. The means of happiness, as far as station can procure them, are commonly in our own power, if we are not wanting 10 ourselves.

Let each of us then do his duty in that ftation which Providence has affigned him; ever remembering, that the next world will foon destroy all earthly distinctions. One diftinction only will remain among the fons of men at that time-the distinction between good and bad; and this diftinction it is worth all our pains and all our ambition to acquire. Gilpin. § 164.

Against wronging our neighbour by injurious words.

We are next inftructed "to hurt nobody by word or deed-to be true and juft in all our dealings-to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts-to keep our hands from picking and ftealing-our tongues from evil fpeaking, lying, and flandering."

The duties comprehended in thefe words are a little tranfpofed. What fhould clafs under one head is brought under another. "To hurt nobody by word or deed," is the general propofition. The under parts fhould follow: First, "to keep the tongue from evil fpeaking, lying, and flandering;" which is," to hurt nobody by word." Secondly, to be true and juít

in all our dealings ;" and "to keep our hands from picking and ftealing;" which is, "to hurt nobody by deed." As to the injunction, "to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts," it belongs properly to neither of these heads; but is a diftinct one by itself. The duties being thus feparated, I shall proceed to explain them.

And, firft, of injuring our neighbour by our "words." This may be done, we find, in three ways; by "evil-speaking, by lying, and by flandering."

By evil-fpeaking," is meant speaking ill of our neighbour; but upon a fuppofition, that this ill is the truth. In fome circumftances it is certainly right to speak ill of our neighbour; as when we are called upon in a court of juftice to give our evidence; or, when we can fet any one right in his opinion of a perfon, in whom he is about to put an improper confidence. Nor can there be any harm in speaking of a bad action, which has been determined in a court of juftice, or is otherwife become notorious.

But on the other hand, it is highly difallowable to speak wantonly of the characters of others from common fame; becaufe, in a thousand inftances, we find that ftories, which have no better foundation, are mifreprefented. They are perhaps only half-told-they have been heard through the medium of malice or envyfome favourable circumftance hath been omitted-fome foreign circumftance hath been added-fome trifling circumstance hath been exaggerated-the motive, the provocation, or perhaps the reparation, hath been concealed-in fhort, the reprefentation of the fact is, fome way or other, totally different from the fact itself.

But even, when we have the best evidence of a bad action, with all its circumftances before us, we furely indulge a very ill-natured pleasure in fpreading the fhame of an offending brother. We can do no good; and we may do harm: we may weaken his good refolutions by expofing him we may harden him against the world. Perhaps it may be his firft bad action. Perhaps nobody is privy to it but ourfelves. Let us give him at leaft one trial. Let us not caft the firft ftone. Which of our lives could ftand fo ftrict a fcrutiny? He only who is without fin himself can have any excufe for treating his brother with feverity..

Let us next confider "lying;" which

is an intention to deceive by falfehood in our words. To warn us against lying, we fhould do well to confider the folly, the meanness, and the wickedness of it.

The folly of lying confifts in its defeating its own purpose. A habit of lying is generally in the end detected; and, after detection, the lyar, inftead of deceiving, will not even be believed when he happens to speak the truth. Nay, every fingle lye is attended with such a variety of circumftances, which lead to a detection, that it is often discovered. The ufe generally made of a lye, is to cover a fault; but as the end is feldom anfwered, we only aggravate what we wish to conceal. In point even of prudence, an honest confeffion would ferve us better.

The meannefs of lying arifes from the cowardice which it implies. We dare not boldly and nobly fpeak the truth; but have recourfe to low fubterfuges, which always argue a fordid and dilingenuous mind. Hence it is, that in the fashionable world, the word lyar is always confidered as a term of peculiar reproach.

The wickedness of lying confifts in its perverting one of the greatest bleffings of God, the ufe of fpeech, in making that a mifchief to mankind, which was intended for a benefit. Truth is the great bond of fociety. Falfehood, of course, tends to its diffolution. If one man may lye, why not another? And if there is no mutual truft among men, there is an end of all intercourfe and dealing.

An equivocation is nearly related to a lyc. It is an intention to deceive under words of a double meaning, or words which, literally speaking, are true; and is equally criminal with the most downright breach of truth. When St. Peter afked Sapphira (in the 5th chapter of the Acts) "whether her husband had fold the land for fo much?" She anfwered, he had: and literally the fpoke the truth; for he had fold it for that fum, included in a larger. But having an intention to deceive, we find the apoftle confidered the equivocation as a lye.

In fhort, it is the intention to deceive, which is criminal: the mode of deception, like the vehicle in which poifon is conveyed, is of no confequence. A nod, or fign, may convey a lye as effectually as the moit deceitful language.

Under the head of lying may be mentioned a breach of promife. While a refolution remains in our own breafts, it is fub

ject to our own review: but when we make another person a party with us, an engagement is made; and every engagement, though only of the lighteft kind, fhould be punctually obferved. If we have added to this engagement a folemn promife, the obligation is fo much the stronger: and he who does not think himself bound by fuch an obligation, has no pretenfions to the character of an honeft man. A breach of promife is ftill worse than a lye. A lye is fimply a breach of truth; but a breach of promife is a breach both of truth and trust. Forgetfulness is a weak excufe: it only fhews how little we are affected by fo folenn an engagement. Should we forget to call for a fum of money, of which we were in want, at an appointed time? Or do we think a folemn promise of less value than a fum of money?

Here we

Having confidered evil fpeaking and lying, let us next confider flandering. By flandering, we mean, injuring our neighbour's character by falfehood. ftill rife higher in the fcale of injurious words. Slandering our neighbour is the greatest injury, which words can do him; and is, therefore, worfe than either evilfpeaking or lying. The mifchief of this fin depends on the value of our characters. All men, unless they be pait fee' ing, defire naturally to be thought well of by their fellow-creatures: a good character is one of the principal means of being serviceable either to ourselves or others; and among numbers, the very bread they eat depends upon it. What aggravated injury, therefore, do we bring upon every man, whofe name we flander? And, what is ftill worfe, the injury is irreparable. If you defraud a man; reftore what you took, and the injury is repaired. But, if you flander him, it is not in your power to fhut up all the ears, and all the mouths, to which your tale may have accefs. The evil fpreads, like the winged feeds of fome noxious plants, which featter mischief on a breath of air, and difperfe it on every fide, and beyond prevention.

Before we conclude this fubject, it may just be mentioned, that a flander may be fpread, as a lye may be told, in various ways. We may do it by an infinuation, as well as in a direct manner; we may spread it in a fecret; or propagate it under the colour of friendship.

I may add allo, that it is a fpecies of flander, and often a very malignant one, to leffen the merits or exaggerate the 03

failings

§ 165. Against wronging our neighbour by injurious actions.

Having thus confidered injurious words, let us next confider injurious actions. On this head we are injoined "to keep our hands from picking and ftealing, and to be true and juft in all our dealings."

As to theft, it is a crime of fo odious and vile a nature, that one would imagine no perfon, who hath had the leaft tincture of a virtuous education, even though driven to neceflity, could be led into it.I fhall not, therefore, enter into a diffuafive from this crime; but go on with the explanation of the other part of the injunction, and fee what it is to be true and juft in all our dealings.

Juftice is even ftill more, if poffible, the fupport of fociety, than truth: inafmuch as a man may be more injuricus by his actions, than by his words. It is for this reason, that the whole force of human law is bent to reftra'n injuftice; and the happinefs of every fociety will increase in proportion to this reftraint.

We very much err, however, if we fuppofe, that every thing within the bounds of law is juftice. The law was intended only for bad men; and it is impoffible to make the meshes of it fo ftrait, but that many very great enormities will efcape. The well-meaning man, therefore, knowing that the law was not made for him, confults a better guide his own confcience, informed by religion. And, indeed, the great difference between the good and the bad man confifts in this the good man will do nothing, but what his confcience will allow; the bad man will do any thing which the law cannot reach.

:

in the mean time, has only one rule, which is, that all arts, however common in businefs, which are intended to deceive, are utterly unlawful. It may be added, upon this head, that if any one, confcious of having been a tranfgreffor, is defirous of repairing his fault, reftitution is by all means neceffary: till that be done, he continues in a course of injustice.

Again, in matters of contract, a man has many opportunities of being dishoneft within the bounds of law. He may be ftrict in obferving the letter of an agreement, when the equitable meaning requires a laxer interpretation: or, he can take the laxer interpretation, when it ferves his purpofe; and at the loop-hole of fome ambiguous expreffion exclude the literal meaning, though it be undoubtedly the

It is a fpecies of the fame kind of injuftice to withhold a debt, when we have ability to pay; or to run into debt, when we have not that ability. The former can proceed only from a bad difpofition; the latter, from fuffering our defires to exceed our ftation. Some are excufed, on this head, as men of generous principles, which they cannot confine. But what is their generofity? They affift one man by injuring another. And what good arifes to fociety from hence? Such perfons cannot act on principle; and we need not hesitate to rank them with thofe, who run into debt to gratify their own felfish inclinations. One man defires the elegancies of life; another defires what he thinks an equal good, the reputation of generofity.

Oppreffion is another fpecies of injus tice; by which, in a thousand ways, under. the cover of law, we may take the advantage of the fuperiority of our power, either to crush an inferior, or humble him to our defigns.

A loan, we

Ingratitude is another. know, claims a legal return. And is the obligation lefs, if, inftead of a loan, you receive a kindnefs? The law, indeed, fays nothing on this point of immorality; but an honeft confcience will be very loud in the condemnation of it.

We