popular history, which before his time was every where dark and confused. Yet he has extended the affinity to some other instances infinitely less important, tracing back the exhaustless abundance of language to three chief families the Indian, Arabic, and Tartar; and, finally, after having himself so finely exhibited the total difference of the Arabic and Indian languages, seeking, from a love of unity, to derive all from one common source: I have, therefore, been unable to adhere closely in every particular to this excellent and learned man, since his arguments, being directed to support an opposite theory, would unquestionably militate against my own opinions.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I. ON THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Ir is an opinion very generally entertained, that the original condition of man was one of almost unreasoning stupidity, from which, impelled by necessity or other external incitements, he gradually attained, by successive efforts, to certain degrees of intelligence. Independently of the consideration that this idea is completely at variance with all known systems of philosophy, it must be acknowledged, that so far from being supported by the testimony of ancient historical records, it is, on the contrary, contradicted, and proved to have been adopted on arbitrary and insufficient grounds. Without mentioning the Mosaic records, which I shall reserve for examination in the third book of this treatise, the numerous ancient monuments existing in Asia, and the general progress of events, afford sufficient and incontrovertible evidence that, in the earliest steps of his mortal career, man was not left without God in the world. In India especially, many surprising discoveries have been made, which remarkably illustrate the progress of human intelligence in those ancient times; and the little we already know of Oriental literature has elucidated so many difficult points, that we may confidently anticipate that still more satisfactory results will attend the further prosecution of our researches.

H H

Having in the first book considered the Indian language in the relation it bears to the most important languages of Asia and Europe, Indian Mythology, the parent of so many other systems, appears to offer an appropriate subject for consideration in the second. We must, however, be on our guard against an error, into which the British Society in Calcutta has too often been betrayed, and not lay too much stress upon isolated and often deceptive appearance, while attempting to prove that an internal uniformity of structure exists both in the language and mythology, and that the similarity of the ground tissue in each, notwithstanding slight subordinate alterations, sufficiently indicates congeniality of origin. It is true that there is no dearth of such surprising coincidences as cannot be merely casual; but, before being received as such, they require to be more strictly investigated than even the language, the peculiarities of mythology being more variable and uncertain, and their delicate and evanescent spirit more difficult to seize and retain. Mythology presents the most complicated structure ever devised by human intellect; inexhaustibly rich, but at the same time most variable in its signification; and that being a point of the highest moment, requires to be scrupulously examined; the slightest variation of meaning is of importance, and should be considered in its simple individuality, apart from any consideration of time or place. Greek and Roman mythology, for instance, we are accustomed to treat as one and the same, unless forbidden by distinct historical records; and yet, any one whose researches have been carried back to the earliest origin of those people, will be sufficiently alive to the difference existing between them to feel that Venus and Aphrodite, Mars (Mavors) and Ares, &c. cannot justly be regarded as one and the same divinity. How widely do the Hellenic cities differ among themselves! how great is the difference between Corinth and Athens, or between Doriern in Sparta and Sicily; the symbolic representation of certain peculiar features in the history, and even the name of the divinity, may be common to many distant nations, and long preserved among them; but it is the signification, the idea conveyed by these symbols, which is the really essential point, and this everywhere assumes a different aspect. A great number of facts must be adduced, and many different sources

explored. before it will be possible to adopt, with any degree of success, the only method which can in this instance be available; that is, to enter into a full analysis of the system, displaying all its peculiar features in their just proportions, whether of internal development or external admixture, noticing even each trace of gradual change or variation: the scarcity of our materials makes it impossible at present to accomplish this in the Indian Philosophy.

I must henceforth abandon the system pursued in my first book, and instead of a comparative analysis of the mythology, which it is as yet too early to attempt, fix a few certain principles, which may serve as a groundwork for future researches; a brief inquiry, in short, into the character of Oriental genius, its distinctive peculiarities, and the most important stages of its progress. Much information in regard to details is still required; but we already possess enough to gain a tolerably just idea of its general structure : the mind should, however, if possible, be transported into the sphere of antiquity, and primitive ideas, and the facts themselves, simply stated, will soon lead to perfect clearness and precision.

The separate portions of this description must not be regarded as a system of philosophy, but rather as illustrating distinct epochs of the Oriental mind; for these several theories are not all precisely similar, and many were systematically developed at a much later period than others, and their origin is to be sought in a principle that lies deeper than mere philosophy. I have treated these new systems or modes of thought separately, because all are actually distinct, divided both by their characteristic features, and by historical evidences. We shall remark in each separate division the gradual transition from one to another, or the particular points in which the later appear to grow out of earlier theories, or are most strikingly contrasted with them. I shall, in each epoch, confine my attention to such peculiar points of Indian mythology or philosophy as belong to it, merely alluding to that of other Asiatic nations, when by so doing the whole can be rendered more perfect and intelligible.

CHAP. II. — ON THE DOCTRINES OF THE METEMPSYCHOSIS, AND ON EMANATION.

AMONG all the numerous systems of philosophy which recognise Asia as their parent-land, none are so positively of Indian origin as the doctrines of the Metempsychosis and of Emanation; nor can any, with the exception of the Mosaic dispensation, lay claim to such great antiquity. The most essential doctrines of these systems are contained in the first book of the laws of Menù, which no critic of sound judgment will assert to be of slight antiquity: : they are, at the least, more ancient than any existing records of European literature. The laws of Menù have been, for thousands of years, the basis and groundwork of the Indian constitution and legislature (of Indian life, in fact), and their influence is no less sensibly exerted in regard to philosophy and learning, in which they are clearly seen to be the ruling spirit. Information even more precise than that afforded by the laws of Menù may be drawn from the first part of the Vedas, containing that system of philosophy termed the Mimansà, which was founded by Jaimini, the author of the Sámaveda, and is, perhaps, the earliest Indian system now in existence.

It will be easily seen that the doctrine of Emanation, taken in its earliest original meaning, is closely and immediately connected with that of Transmigration; but the inquirer must first dismiss from his mind every idea of emanation borrowed from the Indian, and afterwards promulgated by Chaldee and Greek philosophers, who, instead of propounding any system of original purity and simplicity, rather amalgamated into one body all the various innovations and admixtures which had either sprung from or been engrafted upon the original doctrine, and applied to the whole the indefinite title of Oriental philosophy. We must be especially on our guard also against the too frequent error of confounding the doctrine of Emanation with Pantheism. The bold and fanciful character of that Oriental system is easily mistaken for a pantheistic tendency by those who are familiar only with the dialectic structure of modern European philosophy; and, viewed in that light, it of course appears connected in many points with later times. Still there is so

much actually at variance between them, that it would be impossible to deny or cancel the individuality of the ancient Indian doctrine. The re-incorporation of individuals into the unity of the Godhead is only possible, not of absolute necessity, and those who are incorrigibly evil will continue separate and divided throughout eternity; or, if we may employ a theological mode of expression, which, although apparently modern, completely embodies the ancient idea, "the eternal strife of hell" is by no means irreconcileable with the doctrine of Emanation, but, on the contrary, forms an essential element of that system. The difference between Emanation and Pantheism, in regard to the powers of good and evil, is very marked and important. Pantheism teaches that every thing is intrinsically good and pure; all originally one with divinity, and that every appearance of wrong or guilt exists but in idea, or depends on the conventional idea entertained of it. Hence its dangerous influence on the moral life and character; for by whatever subtlety of language the meaning may be disguised, and however men may cling to a belief in the all-regulating power of conscience, yet, if this destructive principle be admitted as a ruling fact, the conduct of individuals will be considered as of slight importance, and the eternal distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, set aside, and finally rejected. Far different, however, is the doctrine of Emanation: in that system the condition of all created existences is rather counted unhappy, and the world itself ruined and guilty in its very essence; all is in a state of mournful degradation, sinking deeper and deeper into the abyss which divides it from the perfect bliss and purity of its divine Creator.

It would be useless to enter into a dialectic argument concerning the philosophical incorrectness of this system, for it rests not on any logical basis; nor can it be supported by demonstration, but, like other merely poetical systems of cosmogony, rather wears the character of an arbitrary invention. Still a systematic connexion may be traced throughout, and to that it is probably indebted for its stability during so many thousand years, but still more to primæval tradition and the divine origin ascribed to it. The labour of investigating and comprehending this doctrine will indeed be amply repaid, even if we regard it merely as the earliest