fifty of them at least Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot. For these you are to provide transports. And now, what farther preparations? Ten light gallies. For as he hath a naval power, we must be provided with light vessels, that our troops may have a secure convoy. But whence are these forces to be subsisted? This I shall explain when I have first given my reasons why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have advised that we should serve in person. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reason is this: it is not at present in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field; but we must harass him by depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first. We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions), nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have proposed, that citizens should join in the service, and help to man our fleet; because I am informed, that some time since, the state maintained a body of auxiliaries at Corinth, which Polystratus commanded, and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and some others; that you yourselves served with them; and that the united efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained a considerable victory over the Lacedemonians. But, ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates, while our enemies have arisen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail off to fight for Artabasus, or any other person; and their general follows them; nor should we wonder at it; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his soldiers. What then do I recommend? That you should take away all pretences both from generals and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domestic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inspectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at present our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, " Are "you at peace, Athenians?" the answer would immediately be, "by no means! we are at war with Philip. Have not we chosen the usual generals and officers "both of horse and foot?" And of what use are all these, except the single person whom you send to the field? The rest attend your priests in their processions. So that, as if you formed so many men of clay, you make your officers for shew, and

not for service. My countrymen! should not all these generals have been chosen from your own body; all these several officers from your own body; that our force might be really Athenian? And yet, for an expedition in favour of Lemnos, the general must be a citizen, while troops, engaged in defence of our own territories, are commanded by Menelaus. I say not this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever this command hath been intrusted, surely he should have derived it from your voices.

Perhaps you are fully sensible of these truths; but would rather hear me upon another point; that of the supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds. To this I now proceed. The sum therefore necessary for the maintenance of these forces, that the soldiers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above ninety talents. To the ten gallies, forty talents, that each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minæ. To the two thousand foot the same sum, that each soldier may receive ten drachmæ a month for corn. To the two hundred horse, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmæ each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a small convenience, that the soldiers are supplied with grain: for I am clearly satisfied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself will supply them with every thing else, so as to complete their appointment, and this without an injury to the Greeks or allies: and I myself am ready to sail with them, and to answer for the consequence with my life, should it prove otherwise. From what fund the sum which I propose may be supplied, shall now be explained. ******

[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raising the supplies, and proposes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator] These are the supplies, Athenians! in our power to raise. And, when you come to give your voices, determine upon some effectual provision, that you may oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by actions. And, in my opinion, your plan of operation, and every thing relating to your armament, will be much more happily adjusted, if the situation of the country, which is to be the scene of action, be taken into the account; and if you reflect, that the winds and seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of Philip's conquests; that he watches the blowing of the Etesians, and the severity of the

winter,

winter, and forms his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part then to consider this, and not to carry on the war by occasional detachments, (they will ever arrive too late) but by a regular army constantly kept up. And for winter quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent islands; in which there are ports and provisions, and all things neces sary for the soldiery in abundance. As to the season of the year in which we may land our forces with the greatest case, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coast to which we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours where we may put in for provisions-this will be easily discovered. In what manner, and at what time our forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the juncture of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part is contained in the decrce I have now proposed. And if you will be persuaded, Athenians! first to raise these supplies which I have recommended, then to proceed to your other preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and, lastly, to confine your forces, by a law, to that service which is appointed to them; reserving the care of distribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of the general; then, your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then, you will deprive him of the most considerable of his reve

nucs. For his arms are now supported, by seizing and making prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all?-No.-You shall also be secure from his attempts: not as when some time since he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains: not as when he surprized your vessels at Gerastus, and spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches: not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of Marathon, and carried off our sacred galley while you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach your forces at such junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reason (think ye) that the public festivals in honour of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of persons less distinguised: (festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole navy: and more numbers and greater pre

parations, than any one perhaps ever cost) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegasæ, that to Potidea. The reason is this: every thing relating to the former is ascertained by law; and every one of you knows long before, who is to conduct the several entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, first, we appoint our trierarchs; then we allow them the exchange; then the supplies are considered. These points once settled, we resolve to man our fleet with strangers and foreigners; then find it necessary to supply their place ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are failing to defend, the enemy is already master of; for the time of action we spend in preparing: and the junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irresolute measures.These forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof plainly discover their insufficiency. By these means hath he arrived at such a pitch of insolence, as to send a letter to the Euboeans, con ceived in such terms as these;

*The LETTER is read.

What hath now been read, is for the most part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if, by suppressing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the sole concern of a public speaker should be to please. If, on the contrary, these unseasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it is shameful, Athe nians, to deceive yourselves, and, by deferring the consideration of every thing disagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the same absolute au thority, with which a general leads on his forces: that the course of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their measures.

But you, Athenians, al of though possessed of the greatest power all kinds, ships, infantry, cavalry, and treasure; yet, to this day have never em ployed any of them seasonably, but are ever last in the field. Just as barbarians

engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip for, when one of them receives a blow, that blow engages him if struck in another part, to that part his hands are shifted but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist-for this, he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopyle, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provisions are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned with success. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For were he to sit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions, which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me it is astonishing, that none of you look back to the beginning of this war, and consider that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defensive war, to secure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some power rises to oppose him. But, if we wait in expectation of this, if we tend our armaments composed of empty gallies, and those hopes with which some speaker may have flattered you; can you then think your interest well secured? shall we not embark? shall we not sail, with at least a part of our domestic force, now, since we have not hitherto ?-But where shall we make our descent?-Let us but engage in the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians, will shew us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our orators, we cannot expect, no, not the least success, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the

whole be not present, the favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our side; but when we send out a general, and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike our allies with deadly apprehensions. For it is not, it is not possible for any one man to perform every thing you desire. He may promise, and harangue, and accuse this or that person: but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are persons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly engage ir. any determination, just from their suggestions; what must be the consequence? How then shall these abuses be removed?

By offering yourselves, Athenians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return; so as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No; they chuse the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the sentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then, as to your own conduct- -some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes, and the dissolution of some free states. Others assure us he hath sent an embassy to the king; others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe, indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do: (for it is the weakest among us who spread these rumours)-Let us disregard them: let us be persuaded of this, that he is our enemy, that he hath spoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been subject to his insolence, that

whatever

whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, that all the resource left is in ourselves, that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here-let us be persuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination, then shall we be freed from those idle tales. For we arc not to be so solicitous to know what particular events will happen ;, we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to atfairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, on my part, have never, upon any occasion chosen to court your favour, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would serve you. And, on this occasion, I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. It would have pleased me indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, so I might be assured that he who layeth it before you, would share the advantages: for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use. And, of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen, which will best advance the general weal! Leland.

$ 2. The first Olynthiac Oration: pronounced four years after the first Philippic, in the Archonship of Callimachus, the fourth year of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad, and the twelfth of Philip's reign.

INTRODUCTION.

The former Oration doth not appear

to have had any considerable effect; Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who probably recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably heard. In the meantime, this prince pursued his ambitious designs. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such remote parts, as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece. And, at the same time, he revenged himself upon the Athenians, by making himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his success emboldened him to declare those inten

tions which he had long entertained secretly against the Olynthians. Olynthius (a city of Thrace possessed by Greeks originally from Chalcis,-a town of Euboea and colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had arisen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians shew great regard to the friendship of Philip when he first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the possession of it. For they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy; and endea voured to conclude an alliance with Athens, against him, which he, by seeret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet scarcely secure upon his throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he courted, or rather purchased, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidea; which their joint forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gra titude towards such a benefactor. The rapid progress of his arms, and his glaring acts of perfidy, alarmed them exceedingly. He had already made some inroads on their territories, and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore dispatched ambassadors to Athens to propose an alliance, and request assistance against a power which they were equally concerned to oppose. Philip affected the highest resentment at this step; alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace; inveighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the conspirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions pursued his hostilities with double vigour, made himself master of some of their cities, and threatened the capital with a siege. In the meantime the Olynthians presscd the Athenians for immediate suc

cours,

cours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an assembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to, or to reject their demand. As the importance of the occasion increased the number of speakers, the elder orators had debated the affairs before Demosthenes arose. In the following oration therefore he speaks as to a people already informed,urges the necessity of joining with the Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommending to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put an end to all domestic dissensions.

IN many instances (Athenians!) have the gods, in my opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this state: nor is it least observable in this present juncture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip, on the very confines of his king dom, of no inconsiderable power, and, what is of most importance, so determined upon the war, that they consider any accommodation with him, first, as insidious, next, as the downfal of their country: this seems no less than the gracious interposition of Heaven itself. It must, there fore, be our care (Athenians!) that we ourselves may not frustrate this goodness. For it must reflect disgrace, nay, the foulest infamy upon us, if we appear to have thrown away not those states and territories only which we once commanded, but those alliances and favourable incidents, which fortune hath provided for us.

To begin on this occasion with a display of Philip's power, or to press you to exert your vigour, by motives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite improper. And why? Because whatever may be of fered upon such a subject, sets him in an honourable view, but seems to me, as a reproach, to our conduct. For the high er his exploits have arisen above his former estimation, the more must the world admire him while your disgrace hath been the greater, the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your state. These things therefore I shall pass over. He indeed, who examines justly, must find the source of all his greatness here,

not in himself. But the services he hath here received, from those whose public administration hath been devoted to his interest; those services which you must punish, I do not think it reasonable to display. There are other points of more moment for you all to hear; and which must excite the greatest abhorrence of him, in every reasonable mind.—These I shall lay before you.

And now, should I call him perjured and perfidious, and not point out the instances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice, and with justice. Nor will it engage too much of your attention to hear him fully and clearly convicted, from a full and clear detail of all his actions. And this I think useful upon two accounts: first, that he may appear, as he really is, treacherous and false; and then, that they who are struck with terror, as if Philip was something more than human, may see that he hath exhausted all those artifices to which he owes his present elevation: and that his affairs are now ready to decline. For I myself (Athenians!) should think Philip really to be dreaded and admired, if I saw him raised by honourable means. But I find, upon reflection, that at the time when certain persons drove out the Olynthians from this assembly, when desirous of conferring with you, he began with abusing our simplicity by his promise of surrendering Amphipolis, and executing the secret article of his treaty, then so much spoken of: that, after this, he courted the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidea, where we were rightful sovereigns, despoiling us his former allies, and giving them possession; that, but just now, he gained the Thessa lians, by promising to give up Magnesia; and, for their case, to take the whole conduct of the Phocian war upon himself. In a word, there are no people who ever made the least use of him, but have suffered by his subtlety: his present greatness being wholly owing to his deceiving those who were unacquainted with him, and making them the instruments of his success. As these states therefore raised him, while each imagined he was promoting some interest of theirs; these states must also reduce him to his former meanness, as it now appears that his own private interest was the end of all his actions.

Thus then, Athenians! is Philip circumstanced. If not, let the man stand

forth,